AUTONOMISTIC AESTHETICS OF INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC, 1800-10: CONTEXT, PRECEDENCE AND RECEPTION

by

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**Thesis Abstract**

This thesis focuses on aspects of instrumental music aesthetics in the first decade of the nineteenth century. In order to appreciate the "autonomy aesthetic" as it was manifest at this time, earlier musical aesthetic developments are examined. Using the technique of selected source readings from classical antiquity to early Romanticism, the evolution of the aesthetic theory of instrumental music is traced. Initially, views destructive to the development of an autonomous theory of music, particularly the doctrine of *mimesis*, are expounded. Gradually the discussion proceeds to include more mixed views and views which run counter to *mimesis*. A particular feature of the methodology of this thesis is that the sources used encompass not only music-specific tracts but also general art theory and philosophy, with the aim of demonstrating points from the history of ideas which have some relevance to instrumental music aesthetics. The thesis culminates with mention of E.T.A. Hoffmann's classic Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (1810), a central early Romantic testimony to the pervasiveness of the idea of the independent nature of pure instrumental music.
Prefatory note

This note is intended to serve as a reader's guide to some of the conventions I have adopted in this thesis.

Throughout, I mention "aesthetic" variously in both the singular and plural. This means that one may find "these aesthetics" as well as "this aesthetic". The justification I offer is that some contexts seem naturally to warrant the plural, but the matter is open to debate.

As to citational preferences the following points apply. Uncredited translations are mine. Quotations from the works of Plato, Aristotle, Horace and Longinus are in the main taken from the Penguin Classics series of translations, the remainder being taken from that of the Hackett Publishing Company. Each of these volumes is to be found in the References and Select Bibliography under the name of the translator. In the cases of Plato and Aristotle full standard references (for example, Aristotle, *Ethics*, 1103a14) are given without footnote reference to the translator except where a point is made by the translator concerning a particular passage, phrase or word.

My citation method in the case of Kant, 1790 specifies
whether it is the first (aesthetic judgement) or second (teleological judgement) part which is in question, followed by the page number in Meredith's translation.

Finally, a word on Romanticism. Only German Romanticism gets a substantial coverage in the present work, so I here draw the reader's attention to two (among many) good basic sources for English and French Romanticisms, Moore,1993 and Charlton,1984 respectively, which I have found useful.
"All knowledge is musical."

(Neuhaus, 1958; p.28)
CHAPTER 1 -

INTRODUCTION: MUSICAL AESTHETICS, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY
Introduction

The focus of the present work is aspects of musical aesthetics in the period c.1750-1810. More precisely, it is concerned with the concept of music as an "autonomous" art which emerged perhaps most explicitly from about 1790.\(^1\) One important function of the present work is to offer what may be regarded as a historical treatment of this concept according to a history of ideas. Such an approach contains the possibility that autonomistic musical aesthetics\(^2\) may in its historical manifestations be best understood by reference solely to how it was viewed by contemporaries (including their views of the past). However, it is also clear that in order to appreciate how the notion of autonomy may work in application to music a philosophical account would be useful. This approach entails an outline of more general questions critically raised by historical

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\(^1\) The powerful discussion of personal taste, and autonomy in art and nature in Kant, 1790 may give some justification for taking that year as an effective starting point for modern musical aesthetics. Many other starting points are, of course, conceivable (perhaps even concepts in the works of Plato and Aristotle may reasonably be held to constitute indispensable starting points for specifically modern aesthetics). Kivy, 1990 notes (p.x) that "the philosophy of pure music" begins with Kant. In Ch.4 of the present work the importance of Kant, 1790 is treated following a consideration of some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British aesthetics.

\(^2\) Current usage of this term (which is fundamental to the present work) occurs, for example, in Plavsa, 1981. This Preamble will attempt to elucidate its meaning in a comprehensive way.
concentrations on the aesthetics of independent instrumental music. The philosophical interest in music generalises from music's historical aesthetic vicissitudes to the desire to contribute towards a deeper understanding of the truth of its nature, at least at a theoretical level. In a philosophical account, which may or may not be applied to a specific historical period, there need not be a chronological restriction of sources. This means that modern sources may assist the discussion of historical events and that in the concern to allow philosophy to be heard in its own right a chronological order of events is not necessarily imposed.

Both the history of ideas and the philosophical approach are relevant to the discussion of autonomous music. At this point further reflection on the nature and aptness of each approach is postponed until the question of what is meant by autonomy as applied to art (and music in particular) has been addressed.³ Some aesthetic aspects seem central to the autonomy of art and

³ It is the philosophical approach which will be most evident in the present chapter. In further chapters, chronological ordering which one would endorse in the history of ideas is adopted, though the philosophical approach is not neglected (but, perhaps, rather, integrated in the discussion).
others less so. This sometimes may have to do with the degree to which one espouses extreme formalism (considering, for example, ideas developed in Herbart, 1831, Hanslick, 1854 and Zimmermann, 1865).⁴

Broadly speaking, the question of the autonomy of art centres on two core issues: representation and expression. Discussion of other associated matters may be built around these. Though perhaps not the only viable interpretation or model of autonomy, this serves the case of music. Special status was accorded to music by early Romantics and this stimulated renewed discussion about its exalted capabilities. It is appropriate to begin the (philosophical) discussion of autonomous music by first briefly considering the autonomy of art in general and following with an examination of music, especially insofar as it constitutes a special case.

Art and autonomy

It is sometimes, if not, in fact, often, difficult to decide what constitutes art. But that question is amply dealt with

⁴ These formalist texts are discussed later in this chapter.
elsewhere. Here it is presumed that many works ("art objects") produced within diverse aesthetic traditions in all history can, in whatever manner, be works of art. What is to the purpose of the present discussion is that holding that something is a work of art immediately raises general enquiries which touch on what one supposes it to do. In more detail, since a work of art is not a conscious entity, one obviously does not expect to communicate with it but rather (analogously) it to relate to oneself. This relation is usually thought of in terms of the effect the work has on the beholder. Without this relation there would be little reason to engage with art and therefore to speak of it as art (though there might be some excuse for speaking about it under another heading). The perceived effect of a work of art may assist one in reaching a conclusion as to the nature of the work and possibly of art in general. Each work of art, however, is separately identifiable. Works (or groups of identical works)

5 For example, Danto., 1981 is an essential modern account. The title (The Transfiguration of the Commonplace) embraces the notion that commonplace ("functional") objects may become or be termed works of art.

6 Objects can, of course, be used to communicate with.

7 This does not take account of the question of reproduced copies, or performances of music etc. The reproduction may be said to be the work itself insofar as it gives the beholder access to
are unique. Being unique, then, are they self-contained?

Autonomous? Of what importance is the concept of artistic autonomy and how may it be defined?

Perhaps artistic autonomy may be thought of as a measure of the extent to which art is perceived to set out to reveal itself to the beholder. This general thought (which will presently become clearer, particularly when the notions of intention and representation are discussed) seems to inform efforts to categorise various approaches to artistic (or aesthetic) autonomy. For example, taking Croce's concept of (aesthetic) sincerity as a starting point, Casey, 1973 introduces (pp.65-6) the "doctrine" that art in general is autonomous, noting importantly (p.66) that "it would be misleading to speak as though there were a single doctrine. Art has been held to be autonomous in many senses, and even if the doctrine is true when interpreted one way, there are other ways of interpreting it such that it is certainly false." It is the challenge which Casey here mentions that will later in this discussion be examined with the work.
reference to the case of music. In the general case, Casey explains (ib.) three senses of autonomy:

[1] Some people have thought for instance that there is a distinct category of aesthetic experience, distinct from every other sort of experience, yet somehow essential to our understanding of works of art. [2] Again it is sometimes said that to describe the aesthetic character of something is to engage in an activity quite different from any other sort of describing. Works of art have an aesthetic character quite distinct from their character as physical objects, or as patterns of sound and meaning. Aesthetic properties - properties such as features of expression - are a distinct kind of property. They are properties essential to an object regarded as a work of art, but are logically unrelated to any other properties it might have.

Casey chooses to associate the second and third senses rather than comment on any similarity between the first two senses. The third sense is perhaps the most formalistic:

[3] This doctrine holds that in trying to understand a work of art we cannot make use of facts external to the work itself - facts of biography, convention and (perhaps) intention. Such facts would be irrelevant to appreciation or criticism.

Casey requires (ib.) that the second sense be clearly demonstrated before the third sense (which he sees as important) is addressed.

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8 This challenge is addressed in the treatment of certain "autonomy theses" in Hermerén, 1983 (see below).
In an essay with the same title as Casey's ("The Autonomy of Art"), Hermerén, 1983 presents a number of "autonomy theses" which are "methodologically different in the sense that it is not possible to use the same methods in checking their tenability" (p.47). Hermerén begins by asking (p.35) what a useful notion of autonomy, applicable to a number of works of art (examples from literature are given), might be. He follows by posing (ib.) what is, for him, the equally important question as to whether all art forms are equally autonomous. This latter question could perhaps be well answered by taking into account a modification of it, whether all works of art are equally autonomous. But this is general, and it would seem that the conventional route to a discourse on the autonomy principle, by way of recognising the different capabilities or effects of different art forms themselves, is the most viable. Hermerén's theses have frequent recourse to this route. Certainly, he wishes (in common with many other writers) to address the significance of the degree to which

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9 It seems that in historical treatments hardly any other approach is admitted. Note, for example, Dahlhaus, 1978: "Romantic poetics feeds on the idea of absolute music as much as the idea of absolute music, conversely, is nourished by poetry" (p.67). This remark highlights a fundamental thesis of the present work, that Romanticism as thought cannot adequately be described without the inclusion of music and musical aesthetics.
a given art is autonomous relative to other arts: "Is there a
method by means of which such statements about the relative
autonomy of various art forms can be tested? What is such a
method like, if indeed it exists?" (ib.). Overall, he is
attempting to rationalise "the problem of the autonomy of art"
(p.36), though he later specifies (p.44) that "there is no such
thing as the problem of autonomy."

Hermerén's second thesis is (as others of his theses are)
similar to Casey's first two senses of autonomy:

Thesis 2. The origin of a work of art - or an artistic
movement - can never be completely understood and explained,
unless the explanation is given (a) at least partly, or (b)
exclusively, in terms of artistic or aesthetic
considerations (motives, events, actions, and so forth).

(p.37)

Hermerén seems to consider it important that "a large family of
interpretations" (ib.) be available in the case of any of his
theses. This is in order to accommodate many different art forms.
In respect of thesis 2, Hermerén recognises (ib.) that, at least
in the visual arts (which are what he seems to be mentioning),
it is not difficult "to find examples of works of art where the
choice of motives, symbols, techniques, and so forth, cannot be
explained and understood merely in terms of artistic or aesthetic considerations".\footnote{10}

He also notes (ib.) a positive survival of

thesis 2, that if it "is taken only to mean that artistic
innovations cannot be derived completely from, for example,
social or psychic changes, there is no need to quarrel with it;
art often transcends the conditions under which it has been
created."\footnote{11} It is, of course, important to retain this idea of

\footnote{10} Hermerén has by this point noted (ib.) that "artistic" and "aesthetic" stand (sorely) in need of clarification.

\footnote{11} The "social dimension" of art, in the sense that it cannot help being a product of society or of historical fortune, was recognised even by Hanslick,1854, who, however, offers (p.62) the following caution: "We should, nevertheless, always remember that parallelisms between specific works of art and the events of certain epochs belong to the history of art rather than to the science of aesthetics. Though methodological considerations may render it necessary to connect the history of art with the science of aesthetics, it is yet of the utmost importance that the proper domain of each of these sciences be rigorously guarded from encroachment by the other."

The social dimension has been seen to occur at the more local level of the relationship of the artist and his work. Supicic,1971 uses this to attack formalism, holding (p.194) that "it would be absurd to believe that any work of man, and especially an art, could be completely and absolutely non-expressive. Psychological research shows clearly that man expresses himself in his activity, that he discloses himself and even betrays himself in what he does. This refutes any view of art as a product of the human mind which does not express its creator and carry meaning." And again (referring to music) (p.202): "Although the work of music undoubtedly preserves its autonomy, it cannot be fully divorced from the human element without unacceptable deformation." On examination, however, these assertions are every bit as vague as the views they attack.

Dahlhaus,1977, in criticising the (common) practice of setting musical works and contemporary historical and cultural events side by side in a chronological table, asks (p.19) "might it be that events which are extrinsically contemporaneous are, intrinsically, anything but contemporaneous, a conclusion made grotesquely and abundantly clear precisely when we use chronological tables in an attempt to illustrate the \textit{Zeitgeist} that supposedly pervades all spheres of life at a given time? Does music mirror the reality surrounding a composer, or does it propose an alternative reality? Does it have common roots with political events and philosophical ideas; or is music written simply because music has always been written and not, or only incidentally, because a composer is seeking to respond with music to the world he lives in?" For Dahlhaus, therefore, a key musicological issue is "the relation between art and history" (ib.).
(here, potential) transcendence which art possesses, though the idea may also be retained in contexts different from thesis 2.

Skipping thesis 3, which puts the case that qualities of a work of art are themselves autonomous, one now arrives at what Hermerén terms (p.39) merely a "fairly common interpretation of 'autonomous'", the nonreferentiality of art:

Thesis 4. Works of art (a) do not refer to anything whatsoever - every work of art is a closed world without any connection with anything else; or (b) do not refer to any subjective or objective reality outside the realm of art - works of art refer only to other works of art.

(ib.)

From the ensuing argument (pp.39-40), it is clear that Hermerén wants thesis 4 to fall, though he does not deal with every possible objection. In the case of thesis 4b, for instance, it might be asked whether "subjective or objective reality" is always distinct from art (which is itself part of reality). There are, of course, many cases where it is not. Perhaps Hermerén allows for this at the end of his discussion of thesis 4: "If, however, a sharp distinction is made between art and life, it becomes difficult to understand why art should be so important
to us" (p.40). Thesis 4a, the stronger of the pair, is the extreme formalist tenet. But Hermerén is still concerned throughout to show that there is more to autonomy than formalism. Accordingly, thesis 6 is more conciliatory:

The work of art constitutes a microcosm, a closed world of its own, which in various ways is related to a macrocosm, a world outside the work of art. For example, the microcosm may depict, express, or be a model of the macrocosm.

(p.41)

In respect of this, Hermerén notes: "If, however, at the same time it is argued that this microcosm is genetically or causally dependent on the macrocosm, it is difficult to talk about the autonomy of art without being misleading, considering that one of the basic meanings of 'autonomous' is 'independent.' This kind of autonomy can at most be called 'relative'" (ib.).

Here one is driven to ask how basic the meaning "independent" is

12 Casey, 1973 notes (p.80) that "most people who take the arts seriously would want to say that art is a form of knowledge, but knowledge of something other than fact. Works of art do not provide us with new information, but nor do they merely 'excite' feeling." But since one attains a knowledge of reality, does one also and in a similar way attain knowledge of and/or through art? And can one do this without new information provided by works of art? It is perhaps possible to rephrase "knowledge of something other than fact" as, simply, "artistic knowledge". This also raises the issue of the significance of the word "musical", liberally used by many writers as an adjective.

13 It is useful to cross-compare the different theses even though Hermerén conceives of them as largely independent from one another.
for the concept of autonomy. The term "independent instrumental music" has already been used (p.7, this Chapter) to designate music *per se*, music performed using instruments only (or textless vocal or choral music). This is perfectly in keeping with, for one, Hoffmann's practice in describing such music.

It is appropriate to omit consideration of theses 7 and 8, which deal with institutional stresses ("political, moral, or religious authority" - p.42) on art. The sociological sense of "autonomy" they impart is certainly vital but it is only indirectly concerned with aesthetics (simplistic as that may appear). The present work is not in any sense a social history. Only aesthetic autonomy is under discussion. The relation between this and sociological considerations would appear to be a matter for study elsewhere. Moving to thesis 9, it is plain why Hermerén considers it to be consistent with "radical formalism in music":

Works of art have (a) only aesthetic or artistic effects on the beholder's thoughts, attitudes, and feelings, and on society at large, or (b) no important nonaesthetic or nonartistic effects of that kind.

(p.44)

But it is shown (pp.44-5) that this can in some way depend on thesis 8 (which states that there "ought to be" no institutional
Hermerén finally posits a detailed axiological argument. He wishes it to seem plausible that "the concepts of aesthetic and artistic value should be distinguished not only from each other, but also from whatever effects of a nonaesthetic and nonartistic kind a work of art may have" (p.45). But he is alive to the dichotomous result of this: "The autonomy thesis then becomes interesting and, to say the least, controversial. Its tenability depends upon the ability to single out conceptually artistic and aesthetic value (interest, attitude, effect, etc.)" (p.46). This leads back to the sociological dimension, mediated in thesis 12:

In cases of conflicts between values or norms, aesthetic and artistic considerations should always be decisive and outweigh moral, political, and religious ones when works of art are to be evaluated.

(p.46)

This is Hermerén's last word, as it were, on the matter of sociological conditioning (where applied) and reception of art. But he remains cautious concerning the unconditional adoption of theses 11 and 12 (p.46). For one thing, it is necessary to settle on a meaning of "aesthetic and artistic considerations". Hermerén
notes (p.46n16): "In an aesthetic evaluation, aesthetic considerations have to be decisive - otherwise it would not be an aesthetic evaluation." Purely aesthetic and artistic considerations, though they may integrate with, do not depend on interpretations of the work of art which stem from moral, political or religious concerns etc. Aesthetic and artistic considerations are independent in nature, in the first place drawing their own conclusions from the evidence of the work itself, which is the object of inquiry. However, the primacy of aesthetic evaluation remains in many cases contestable, hence the problem with theses 11 and 12.

The conclusion of Hermerén's essay attempts a wide-ranging statement of the scope of "autonomy": "Further comments could obviously be made on each of the twelve theses distinguished above, and still other theses could have been obtained by focusing on ideas or conceptions of autonomy, rather than on the autonomy of art. It is obviously one thing to try to find out whether art in one sense or another is autonomous, and something quite different to study the origin, meaning, development, and effects of various ideas about the autonomy of art" (p.47).
a very natural way, this takes in Hermerén's insistence, in the later theses, on addressing the social aspects of the work of art.

One message from Casey, 1973 and Hermerén, 1983 is clear enough: the autonomy of art is a multi-faceted issue. Casey's conclusion (which presupposes discussion of issues such as representation, intentionality and expression - to be addressed in the next sections of this chapter)\(^{14}\) certainly affirms this:

Art, which has always been associated with the exercise of the imagination, is one possible way of clarifying feeling, one possible way of "expressing" feelings so that they take on a clearer, more conscious, more "active" character. It is, however, only one way of doing so. In one sense then art is not autonomous since, like imagination, it is a natural stage in the development of mind. Yet it is autonomous in another sense in that, in common with all efforts of reflection and imagination, it gives to the original experience a character that it demands, but which it would not otherwise have had.

(p.87)

Looking at what has so far been considered of Casey's and Hermerén's arguments, it may, in the interim, be asserted that

\(^{14}\) A general account of representation and intentionality is offered in the present chapter (as well as a special consideration of these concepts in the case of music). Expression is examined in the context of music only (this examination is integrated with the considerations of representation and intentionality in music). For useful accounts of expression in general, see Tormey, 1971 (expression as a concept) and Stecker, 1984 (some considerations of expression in the arts).
the autonomy of art depends both on its freedom from and interaction with ideas on what it is perceived to do. It is at this point important with regard to the present work to re-emphasise that, in the spirit of Hermerén's thesis 12 (see above, p.11), the interest is restricted to the autonomy of art in its aesthetic, not sociological consequences. Now it is necessary to amplify the aesthetic dimension by reference to ideas (which were developed historically) of art's function.\textsuperscript{15} This assists towards a more rounded definition of the autonomy of art and, more particularly, of music. An obvious and most fundamental idea is that of representation.

\textbf{Theory of representation}

The main purpose of this section is to define the terms \textit{mimesis}, resemblance, imitation and representation as they are used in the present work.\textsuperscript{16} While these terms do not exhaust the variety of expressions and concepts which could and have been used in connection with representation as a notion, they are

\textsuperscript{15} Dahlhaus, 1967, for instance, equates (p.14) the "autonomy of musical works of art" with "functionlessness".

\textsuperscript{16} This section also considers, where appropriate, what is meant by abstract art.
central to modern discourse and thus need to be taken into
account. Firstly *mimesis* is considered, it being historically the
basic category which underpins the other three terms.

Kerferd, 1967 notes that "*mimesis* covers two meanings, that
of imitation and that of artistic representation." For the
purposes of the present work it is appropriate to begin with
Platonic *mimesis*, omitting earlier theory.\(^\text{17}\) Abrams, 1953 warns
(p.8) that although the mimetic theory of art as the imitation
of aspects of the universe can be said to be the most primeval
aesthetic, it is complex by the time it reaches Plato. In the
Platonic dialogues the philosopher works with three categories -
the Ideas, the world of sense which reflects them, and, in turn,
the reflection of the world of sense (whether literally, as in
a mirror, or through fine art) - while *mimesis* in later forms was
simpler, with two categories - the object of imitation and the
imitation itself. In *Republic*, Book X, art's remoteness from the
Ideas distances it not only from truth, but also from the
beautiful and the good. Everything is referred back to the Ideas.

\(^{17}\) Ch.2 studies mimetic doctrine from Plato to Twining.
Tatarkiewicz, 1973 traces (pp.226-7) the way classical mimesis as imitation evolved as a concept. Its meaning underwent extensive change: "In the fifth century B.C. the term 'imitation' moved from the terminology of cult into philosophy and started to mean reproducing the external world" (p.226). Democritus and Plato unreservedly took mimesis to mean imitation of nature but by this each of them understood something different. Of the two views it was the Platonic concept of copying the appearances of things which survived. Reflecting on the roles of painting and sculpture, Socrates introduced the notion of imitation's being the fundamental function of the arts. Plato and Aristotle consolidated this theory and it became established as the long-lasting foundation of aesthetics.

Tatarkiewicz notes (p.227) that the distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian mimesis was subsequently often overlooked. Plato's "variant" evolved from the application of imitation only to what might be termed representative (and not descriptive) poetry to its application (as Socrates would have it) to almost all painting, sculpture and poetry. There were, of course, the later, "extreme" ideas of Republic, Book X. Plato
here saw imitation (merely) "as a passive and faithful act of copying the outer world. [...] His theory was descriptive and not normative; on the contrary, it disapproved of the imitation of reality by art on the basis that imitation is not the proper road to truth" (p.226). While Aristotle "preserved the thesis that art imitates reality...imitation meant to him not faithful copying but a free and easy approach to reality; the artist who imitates can present reality in his own way" (ib.). In Poetics Aristotle advocated the use of art to exaggerate or diminish qualities of beauty or moral worth: imitation is thus freer than in Plato and in order to exercise that freedom its faithfulness to the original model should be limited to only its most essential features (ib.).

The doctrine of imitation originated in classical Greece. Its foundations were "that the human mind is passive and, therefore, able to perceive only what exists. ...even if it were able to invent something which does not exist, it would be ill-advised to use this ability because the existing world is perfect and nothing more perfect can be conceived" (p.227). In Renaissance thought the principle of imitation remained intact
but the emphasis on the imitation of nature was supplanted by a concentration on the imitation of antiquity. "To give a very general outline of the development from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century we may say that some theoreticians defended the principle of imitation at the expense of some concessions, while others abandoned it completely. It was abandoned by those who adhered to the radical (Platonic) concept of imitation and maintained by those who voiced the moderate (Aristotelian) concept" (p.229).

Of the terms *mimesis*, resemblance, imitation and representation, resemblance is the only one that has a nonintentional basis. At first sight, then, resemblance may be thought of as being simply an objectively given feature of things themselves and therefore unsusceptible of human action or bias as such. In this mode of thinking resemblance, as it were, cannot help itself. But Woodfield,1992 notes: "Specifically valued features of resemblance are ultimately dictated by the requirements placed upon visual imagery by the culture in which it is produced" (p.370). Resemblance is, as Wollheim,1968 states (p.34), "context-dependent". The perception of resemblance is an
important part of the understanding of representation. However, awareness of the convention of representation precedes the perception of resemblance. Thus Wollheim concludes that "the attribution of resemblance occurs inside, and therefore cannot be used to explain, the language of representation" (ib.).

Resemblance is not a kind of imitation. Imitation has intention. But still the imitative task is (in its basic conception and execution) easy: likeness is apparent. In other words, the imitative task is perhaps easy at least in the philosophical and perceptual senses, though often a highly skilled and difficult accomplishment (as conceivably in the case of detailed naturalistic realism). Imitation, then, could be said to have resemblance as its object. This means that some imitation at any rate is simply reproduction. Other forms of imitation, however, do not merely reproduce. They are more closely tied in with representation. Relating the concept of imitation to representation, therefore, one can philosophise further and think of imitation as "straightforward" representation, representation where the imitative purpose is prominent and clearly achieved. But there is more to representation as a general concept than the
imitative component. Scruton, 1983 comments: "Interest in representation may involve an interest in its lifelike quality; but it is not, for all that, an interest in literal truth. It is irrelevant that the depiction be inaccurate; what matters is that it be convincing. To require accuracy is to ask for a report rather than a representation" (p. 63). For an account of the nature and scope of representation it is useful to rely on Wollheim, 1991.

Using the example of painting, Wollheim, 1991 presents the idea that in order to understand representation one must start from the perspective of the artist: "Inside each artist is a spectator upon whom the artist, the artist as agent, is dependent" (p. 101). To be a spectator entails a specific perspective which the artist assumes in front of his painting. The significance of having this posture is that it facilitates the acceptance by the artist, qua agent, of "certain broad perceptual capacities that the spectator has and will bring to bear upon the completed painting" (p. 104). Wollheim proceeds to

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18 This, however, Scruton notes (ib.n2), is skimming the surface of a depth of philosophical difficulties which persist since Plato.
list the three principal capacities which are needed in the spectator, the first of which, "seeing-in", becomes the focus of Wollheim's discussion.¹⁹

Wollheim begins his definition of seeing-in by relating the importance of the "physics" of the perceptual experience:

Seeing-in is a distinct kind of perception, and it is triggered off by the presence within the field of vision of a differentiated surface. Not all differentiated surfaces will have this effect, but I doubt that anything significant can be said about exactly what a surface must be like for it to have this effect. When the surface is right, then an experience with a certain phenomenology will occur, and it is this phenomenology that is distinctive about seeing-in.

(p.105)

What happens in this situation Wollheim calls "twofoldness": "when seeing-in occurs, two things happen: I am visually aware of the surface I look at, and I discern something standing out in front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else" (ib.). This is the twofoldness of a single experience and not a division into two separate experiences, "though it is true that each aspect of the single experience is capable of being

¹⁹ The other principal capacities Wollheim calls (ib.) "expressive perception" and "the capacity to experience visual delight". Wollheim,1991 relinquishes the account of representation given in Wollheim,1968; "seeing-as" is replaced by "seeing-in".
described as analogous to a separate experience" (ib.). To recognise either of the two aspects to the exclusion of the other, i.e. to be aware only of the surface medium of the work of art or only of that which is discerned in front of or behind something else, is erroneous. "And we get not so much into error as into confusion if, without equating either aspect of the complex experience with the simple experience after which it can be described, we ask how experientially like or unlike each aspect is to the analogous experience" (ib.). This comparison is impossible in practice: "The particular complexity that one kind of experience has and the other lacks makes their phenomenology incommensurate" (ib.).²⁰ Wollheim allows that one aspect of the experience may be emphasised at the cost of the other and so twofoldness is lost. But this, in general, amounts to only a temporary loss: "Seeing-in will probably reassert itself: such is its pull" (pp.105-7).

Seeing-in is prior to representation: it is possible to see something in surfaces that are neither representations nor

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²⁰ Wollheim recognises here that there is nonetheless "an important causal traffic between seeing-in and seeing face-to-face".
believed to be representations. Furthermore, representation is itself explicable by reference to successful and universal seeing-in. If all (or the majority of) the members of a community see the same thing in a drawing, as the artist intended they should see, seeing this particular thing becomes correct, whereas seeing something else or not seeing anything at all is incorrect.21 "Representation arrives, then, where there is imposed upon the natural capacity of seeing-in something that so far it had been without: a standard of correctness and incorrectness. This standard is set - set for each painting - by the intentions of the artist in so far as they are fulfilled" (p.107). From this criterion of correctness Wollheim is able to show various levels of representation. Firstly, there are sights for which there is nothing that it is correct to see in them, indeed it is only correct to see nothing in them. The examples which Wollheim gives are damp-stains, frosted panes of glass, and clouds (p.109). Then there is the kind of picture that Wollheim calls "a half-way house to representation", in which it is

21 Wollheim notes: "seeing-in appears to be biologically grounded. It is an innate capacity, though, as with all innate capacities, it requires an environment sufficiently congenial and sufficiently stimulating, in which to mature" (p.114).
correct to see something instead of nothing at all, though this
something cannot be pinned down as an individual thing which it
is correct to see because its claim to be seen there is greater
than anything else's. Wollheim's example is the Rorschach test
card (ib.). Finally there is "full-blown representation". But
this does not escape being the occasion of perceptual fantasies.
The standard of correctness upon which the whole picture rests
may be set aside: "it is still possible, enjoyable and maybe
profitable, to take holidays from this standard and select out
of the various things we can see in a painting what we choose
to." To do this, however, is not necessarily to claim that the
representational meaning of the picture is altered; just that the
artist's intention is, for whatever reason, overruled (ib.).

Wollheim dismisses Renaissance thought which sets the cart
before the horse and reasserts the explanation that seeing-in
precedes representation:

That representation is grounded in seeing-in is
confirmed by the way seeing-in serves to explain the
broad features of representation. For the most general
questions about representation become amenable once we start
to recognise that representation at once respects and
reflects the nature and limits of seeing-in - so long as we
also recognise that seeing-in is itself stretched by the
experience of looking at representations.

(p.115)

The first general question Wollheim wishes to answer is, what is (and, what is not) a representation? Wollheim is concerned to emphasise that "representation does not have a very sharp boundary" but rather "exhibits a broad swathe of borderline cases" (p.118). Taking the examples of signs, for example road signs or trade logos, one must ask whether discernment of what they signify comes about through an awareness only of the marks on the surface, in which case the remaining information required would come via an understanding of some convention, or of, additionally, depth, in which case one sees in the surface whatever the picture signifies, without having to fall back on knowledge of a convention or system. Of these two options Wollheim says that neither can be asserted with much conviction, which is what makes these examples borderline cases (ib.). A map is not a representation because its meaning is not derived from seeing-in, which is innate, but from the skill of map-reading, which is learned (p.119). Wollheim places no little emphasis on the fact that this result accords "with our prior intuitions,
even if they do not clamour for it" (p.121).

Still on the question of what a representation is or is not, Wollheim uses seeing-in to dismiss the frequently put forward contrast between representational and abstract painting. He puts in its place the notion that all abstract art is somehow representational, at least in principle: "Abstract art, as we have it, tends to be an art that is at once representational and abstract" (p.122). In the case of abstract art, the raw material of seeing-in, what is seen in, does not consist of figurative forms (as when the figure of a woman is seen in a cloud) but rather nonfigurative or abstract forms (as when an irregular shape is seen in a furze bush). Basically, most abstract paintings conform to twofoldness; this is what makes them representational. In order to conceive of an abstract

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22 Osborne, 1976 distinguishes between "semantic abstraction" and "non-iconic abstraction". Semantic abstraction transmits information about a part of the visible world but this can range from a complete, clear indication of features to distortion of them. Semantic abstraction is a matter of degree. It is, in fact, a form of representation, "a factor of the relation between a work of art and that which the work represents" (Osborne, 1976a; p.243). Non-iconic abstraction has no such connection with the visible world. It represents nothing external and its abstraction is not a matter of degree. "There is no relation between the work and something represented because the work represents nothing in the universe apart from what it is" (p.244). Osborne also cautions (ib.) that the difference between the two types of abstraction is not always clear-cut. The question arises as to music, is it more non-iconically than semantically abstract? In the present work it is held that non-iconicity is the better explanation of music, and references to "abstract art" in subsequent Chapters, with analogies to music, are in respect of non-iconic abstraction.
painting that is nonrepresentational, one or both elements of twofoldness would be omitted from the perceptual experience (pp.122-3).

Wollheim's second general question is, what can be represented? (p.123). Wollheim postulates a cross-classification based firstly on whether the representation is of an object or of an event and secondly on whether it is of a particular object/event or of one that is merely of a particular kind. The second distinction "applies in virtue of the intentions, the fulfilled intentions, of the artist. It has to do with how the artist desired the picture to be taken, and how well he succeeded in making the picture adequate to his desire. The distinction in no way depends upon what we happen to know about who or what the picture is of" (p.129). The categories of a representation's being of a particular object/event and of its being of an object/event which is merely of a particular kind are mutually exclusive. Any representational painting, however, represents something of a particular kind and this means that if

23 Only a very general summary of this argument is given here. See pp.123-9.

24 Wollheim lays stress on this word in his account (p.129).
the painting represents a particular object/event, then it
represents it as belonging to that particular kind. The general
cross-classification "takes us to the core of how representation
relates to the world" (ib.). It confirms the dependence of
representation on seeing-in rather than on seeing face-to-face.
What one sees in a surface submits to the same cross-
classification as what is represented in a painting does, but
what one sees face-to-face does not (completely):

If I claim to see a young woman face-to-face I cannot, when
asked, Which young woman?, beg off and say that the question
doesn't apply and that to ask it only betrays a misunderstanding
of what I have said. Of course I can say that I don't know the
answer, but not that there isn't one. It is this fact
that argues most conclusively for the view
that what can be represented is just what can be seen in a
marked surface rather than what can be seen face-to-face.

(ib.)

Wollheim again subordinates representation to seeing-in.

The third general question is, what is it for a
representational painting to be naturalistic? Twofoldness must
play a part in this account: both the "configurational aspect"
(awareness of the marked surface itself) and the "recognitional
aspect" (awareness of something in the marked surface) need to
be accounted for as experiences (p.132). Wollheim suggests that
there is a kind of reciprocity between the two experiences which makes the spectator designate the painting as naturalistic. Naturalism has an improvisatory character and is not the same for all historical periods, since it is difficult or impossible to specify a "formula" for the reciprocity (p.133). Paintings may be equally naturalistic and at the same time stylistically very divergent. Wollheim cautions that the configurational aspect does not consist in attention to the brushwork only, noting other factors which, historically, received attention before brushwork did (p.134).

For a spectator to see a painting "correctly" he needs what Wollheim refers to as a "substantial cognitive stock" (see pp.138-9). The question is, what can validly comprise the cognitive stock? Wollheim answers: "The information must be such that by drawing upon it a spectator is enabled to experience some part of the content of the picture which otherwise he would have been likely to overlook" (p.140). The worth of the information does not depend on the source from which it came, nor on its content, but on the use to which it is put in order to see that in the painting which is there to be seen (i.e. is the result of the artist's intention). And Wollheim makes a further
differentiation: "Sometimes however the information that we need is not just information that will, in conjunction with what we already know, enable us to see what is to be seen in the picture, but is information that details or makes explicit what is to be seen in the picture. The knowledge that we require in such cases has to function not so much as cognitive stock but as perceptual cash" (pp.140-2). Whether it is cognitive stock or perceptual cash, "any information", Wollheim concludes, "of which the spectator has need must be information that affects what he sees when he looks at the picture: because it is only through what can be seen when the picture is looked at that the picture carries meaning. What is invariably irrelevant is some rule or convention that takes us from what is perceptible to some hidden meaning: in the way in which, say, a rule of language would" (pp.144-5).25 Here Wollheim rejects a linguistic analysis of representation. The emphasised portion would seem to be predicable particularly of music, nebulous as it is.

Representation, according to Wollheim,1991, is an outgrowth

25 Emphasis added.
of the innate capacity of seeing-in. It results from the external imposition of a standard of correctness which is to guarantee the acceptance of the work of art as a representation of whatever it is the artist intends to represent. Wollheim's account is adequate and acceptable for the purposes of the present work. Having defined representation in this way, it is now appropriate to consider the application of representation to the case of music.

Music and representation

Arguments on music and representation (initially, perhaps, on music as representation) are not necessarily solved by the premise "that there is pure, nonreferential music and a purely musical experience of it" (Kivy, 1990; p.194), since it must be asked, is any music representational? This is, of course, the correct way (or at least one which is very important and valid) of approaching the question of representationality in any of the arts. Because, for one thing, representation is such a powerful attribution once made to a work of art, involving intention,

26 This is like the view of Clive Bell, for example: "He [Bell] considered representation to be potentially harmful and 'always irrelevant'" (Martienssen, 1979; p.144).
one cannot apply or ascribe it indiscriminately to any of the arts or even to examples of art which bespeak representationality more easily than others. Much care is required.

In modern terms, musical representation (where it is said to exist) has to do with the representation or just simple imitation of material, external realities such as the sound of birds chirping or of running water or of an approaching train. Musical expression is concerned with the expression (or representation) of immaterial, inner things, in the feeling world of emotions, in constant or changing thoughts, and so forth. Musical expression also connotes the evocation of these things in the listener (arguably another side of the same coin).

Representation or depiction is (for the purposes of the present discussion) a common principle in the two situations (material and immaterial realms), though it is also true that something may depict without expressing.

Kivy's general discussion (as well as discussions by others) gives rise to an all-important question, does representational music represent? A variation of this question, suggested by reading Urmson, 1973 (p.132), is, is music which "contains
Definitive answers to this question or intermediate positions which attempt to reconcile its contradictory aspects cannot be given without some detail. It is, in fact, the intermediate positions which abound. Kivy's pet term "alone" is the keyword which mediates his thought on the matter: "music alone cannot be defined in terms of the intentions of composers alone, if only because, one way or the other, we do not seem willing to allow composers' intentions to override our strong musical impressions that a work is music alone or that it is not" (pp.22-3). And Kivy's definition of "music alone" is bound up with intention and its problems, though it is evident that he wishes to define it in terms of "pure, instrumental music tradition" (p.14). It is thus "nonverbal" music that is the primary focus of the present work. It must be remembered as well that the same questions

27 Urmson notes: "On the other hand, it is quite clear that some music is representational, or at least contains representational elements." Plavsa, 1981 proposes what may amount to a variation of this: for him the (representational) onus is on the composer: "His intention obliges him in the first place and only then his listeners" (p.69). By contrast, an extreme formalist argument could be that the onus is on representation to prove that it can subsist in music and not on music, even highly "suggestive" music, to prove that it generally eludes representationalistic definition.

28 It is the focus of the present work to discern in particular cases the aesthetic status, according to certain writers and epochs, of instrumental music (compared, say with vocal music), as well as its perceived representational capacities.
that are asked in the case of this, "pure" music may (and this is perhaps surprising) also reasonably be asked in the case of texted vocal music and other (seemingly) representational music (for example, nineteenth-century programme music). Representation is a potent issue and in the determination of its applicability all examples must be taken into account.

If one takes as a vital feature of representation the conveyability of its import in linguistic form, the following remarks by Dahlhaus, 1978 give, in historical terms, some idea of the problem when music is in question: "If instrumental music had been a 'pleasant noise' beneath language to the common-sense aestheticians of the eighteenth century, then the Romantic metaphysics of art declared it a language above language. The urge to include it in the central sphere of language could not be suppressed" (p.9). Is music a language? If music is representational, must it be one? Kivy, 1990 takes representation as having to be "in aesthetic contexts, a success concept"

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29 This, however, is not undertaken in the present work (see preceding note).

30 In other words, if representation is, say, the name given to the ultimate intelligibility in words of a particular work of art.
When representation succeeds, it is through language or something like language, in other words a structure by which one perceives and understands or is able to speculate on what the representation might be of. What exactly would a linguistic analogy mean? In the first place, can music actually and definitively (i.e. specifically) represent, say, a train (in sound)? Would the alleged musical representation be unmistakeably of a train and nothing else? After all, music physically constitutes just one aspect of reality, sound. It is through sound that music is said to represent. Music, therefore, can (allegedly) represent the sound of a (moving) train. This, in theory, is done through motional imitation of the sound and motion of the train. However, music cannot (it would seem) represent other characteristics of the train's reality such as the visual. It is difficult to see, for example, how any music

31 Kivy also notes (ib.) that a failed intention does not automatically mean that a representation has failed: "an intention ignored in the face of recalcitrant music may be viewed as simply an intention that has failed."

32 Visual art cannot, on the surface, convey sound, musical or otherwise, with the exception of notated symbols, for example musical notation or parallel lines drawn near characters or objects in cartoons to indicate shouts or loud sounds. But music and sound do not, it would appear, have even any similar possible exceptions for conveying specifically visual features. This is another reason for regarding music and sound as at least less specific representers.
could successfully convey the redness of the painted carriages of a train. And as to specific representation of a train, one may here offer to define visual aspect as the distinctive visual profile or compound of features that enables cognition of the object as a train and even more specifically as one particular train or model of train. This cognition certainly can also be achieved through the sound world, but even if that were true in all cases it would not necessarily warrant consideration of music as significantly or seriously representational, certainly not to the extent of visual representation, and such representation as music could conceivably muster would not always be without ambiguity.

The visual arts can, in theory and obviously in practice, represent visual aspect. They are more comprehensive and complete in the achievement of the success concept of representation. Visual knowledge or representation betokens a greater degree of interpretative and semantic certainty than music or sound, though

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33 Perhaps it is here worth mentioning Kivy's observation: "The survival value of vision is obvious enough" (Kivy, 1990; p. 3). Whether this survival value always surpasses that of hearing may be a moot point. Bearing in mind the present example, the sound of an oncoming train is probably likely to inspire as much caution as the sight of it. It would be interesting to compare the effect of, say, Honegger's Pacific 231 with that of a highly realistic painting or even film showing a train approaching at speed, in terms of the emotion inspired.
not always necessarily a greater degree of vividness. This seems to be readily acknowledged, at least in some Enlightenment thought and since, but is it, in fact, the case? Tentatively, perhaps, it would seem that the information offered by visual arts (or senses) about an object to be represented is more informative, i.e. is more easily and comprehensively verbalisable, than that offered by music (or the auditory senses, which reveal the sound of the object to be represented). This may of course be fraught with difficulties and fine distinctions. For one thing, the observer's having full possession of his sensory faculties is presupposed, so that the argument does not have to take account exclusively of, say, the blind from birth, who could in turn argue for the representationality of music and sound as a priority. But, musical autonomists argue, it is the relatively lesser degree of representationality or simply the plain nonrepresentationality of music that in the end enables it to be prioritised among the arts and many other qualities which it has to be discovered and highlighted. In this connection, it is worth noting briefly some of the points made by nineteenth-century formalists concerning music and representation.
To the question of whether representational music represents Herbart, 1831 answers no, or at least that it doesn't matter whether it does or not. He nevertheless acknowledges the difficulty (or, perhaps, rather, the unpopularity) of this argument: "No one is likely to accept unreservedly that all incidental, or at any rate inessential apperception shall be discounted in connection with the appreciation of beauty" (p.453).³⁴

Hanslick, 1854 supports Herbart's negative view of representation but without any similar hesitations:

Music, we are told, cannot, like poetry, entertain the mind with definite conceptions; nor yet the eye, like sculpture and paintings, with visible forms. Hence, it is argued, its object must be to work on the feelings. [...] On the one hand it is said that the aim and object of music is to excite emotions, i.e., pleasurable emotions; on the other hand, the emotions are said to be the subject matter which musical works are intended to illustrate. Both propositions are alike in this, that one is as false as the other. (p.9)

In fact, Hanslick is concerned to subjugate and stamp out any

³⁴ For an account of Herbart's pervasive influence see Beckerman, 1994, Ch.2. Herbart succeeded to Kant's chair of philosophy at Königsberg and, Beckerman notes (p.16), saw himself as the exact preserver of Kant's ideas.
notion of music's being able to represent anything definite and replace this with music's being simply a beautiful object of pure contemplation. Pleasurable reactions as a result of this contemplation are independent of, incidental to, and even unnecessary for, the beauty which is complete in itself: "I may, indeed, place a beautiful object before an observer with the avowed purpose of giving him pleasure, but this purpose in no way affects the beauty of the object" (pp.9-10).

For Zimmermann, the mimetic paradigm is rooted in a "psychological error": "It is psychologically false to confuse perception (i.e. sense-perception) with feeling - that is to say, a psychic condition belonging to the presentation - with a condition that presupposes the imagination; and it is only a psychological error of this kind that could lead to the attempt to express feelings by musical sounds in the same way as presentations are expressed in words" (p.48).

None of these three key writers takes representation seriously as an explanation for music's action upon the listener. Instead they have recourse to an approach which renounces external pressures (representation), appealing, as it were, to
common sense premises. A strong case can be made that this is indeed the best option, provided one is prepared to ask awkward questions such as already noted concerning representational music (if after detailed examination such is held to exist). There may not always be cut-and-dried answers available, perhaps only positions which lean more towards the idea of musical autonomism in their apparent appeal to common sense.

Before further discussion of musical formalism it may be useful to attempt to round off the initial consideration of music and representation with mention of some points made by Dahlhaus, 1967. Dahlhaus is concerned to establish the general, psychological nature of music: "Music is transitory. It goes by, instead of holding still for inspection" (p.11).35 "Common-sense" observations such as this are more important to Dahlhaus' account of musical aesthetics than a (strictly) chronological historical treatment in terms of which aesthetic paradigms are

35 Dahlhaus' observation relates of course to the immediate effect of music, that on the listener. It does not take account, for example, of the reader of a musical score, who can perhaps "see" the musical work as a "whole" and, therefore, as intransitory. Dahlhaus later observes (p.68): "Only the present counts; this is one of the laws of operatic music." This may be one of the ways in which Dahlhaus possibly means to make some differentiation between operatic music (and texted music in general) and pure, untexted instrumental music.
discussed one after the other. Dahlhaus elaborates on the temporal nature of music: "Like a work of plastic art, music is also an aesthetic object, a focus of aesthetic contemplation. However, its objectivity is displayed not so much immediately as indirectly: not in the moment when it is sounding, but only if a listener, at the end of a movement or section, reverts to what has passed and recalls it into his present experience as a closed whole" (ib.).

This brings forward a central concern: the liberal use of the word "musical", often fondly employed in critical discussion and perhaps without regard for its inherent centrality in pinpointing the very problem of that quality or set of qualities which pertains to music specifically. Dahlhaus relates the question back to the listener: "Musical meaning is 'intentional'; it exists only insofar as a listener grasps it" (p.12).

The third chapter of Dahlhaus, 1967 is entitled "Changing phases of the aesthetics of emotion". It is here that Dahlhaus first seems reconciled to some kind of developmental account of

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36 It is possibly something similar to Dahlhaus' thought here that leads Kivy, 1990 to refer to music (musical works) as "musical sound structures" (p.11).
musical aesthetics. His main point is: "The idea that music's goal was to represent and arouse affections is a commonplace, rooted as deeply in history as the opposing thesis that music is sounding mathematics" (p.17). Dahlhaus is, however, eminently satisfied with the notion that "the characters of musical feelings are primarily conceived as objective" (ib.). This he explains formally:

Involuntarily, listeners attribute an impression of something serious, sad, or dull to the tonal structure itself as one of its characteristics. In unprejudiced perception, a melodic motive does not express dullness and transport one into a dull mood, but rather it seems dull in itself. Only later, if at all, will anyone experience the objective emotional impression as a mere condition or interpret the impression as a sign. Both the transition into a mood felt by the listener as being his own and also the idea that the emotional character must express that of some person, some subject behind the music, are secondary. To be sure, there is no separation of the various aspects. Often they flow into each other imperceptibly. What is at stake can only be an emphasis, not an exclusive domination of one function or another. Yet the change in emphasis is important enough to distinguish one epoch from another in the development of the aesthetics of emotion.

(pp.17-18)

Dahlhaus' model of "the change in emphasis", which he invokes alone to account for what eventually are no less than epochal upheavals, needs at least careful justification if it is not to
be seen as a product of overzealous psychological analysis.

Dahlhaus summarises: "In order to recognise the affective meaning of a piece of music, one need not oneself be stirred" (p.19). This is because "both musical and psychic motions are subject to the same laws" (ib.). Here again is the liberal use of "musical".

Writing about programme music (or, rather, imagined programme music), Dahlhaus notes: "historical genesis of works is not the same as their aesthetic value" (p.60). The reader seems here (and often in Dahlhaus) to be left to decide what are the boundaries between aesthetics and history, a significant though perhaps imponderable question. This quotation may, however, suitably preface the final words of the chapter.

37 Dahlhaus has at this point observed that, historically, "it was the concept of motion that provided a connection between music and affection or ethos" (ib.). On this matter note, for example, the discussion in Walton,1988 about the potential (motional) depiction in music of the concept of struggle (pp.360-1). But music is not or not fully representational, "in the way that visual images seem to be" (p.364n53): "The music may capture this impression [of a particular actual struggle or merely the thought of (a certain sort of) struggle in general] without being specific about its source" (p.361).

38 Some idea of the problems surrounding the aesthetics of programme music, and thus the question, does representational music represent, is given by some of the very particular (and perhaps even unfortunate) phraseology in Walton,1988 (who is nevertheless concerned to show, insofar as he thinks it exists, the inherent abstraction of the musical art); for example: "Blatant programme music" (p.351 - emphasis added), "the obviously representational arts" (p.353).

39 Ch.10, "Programme music".
The role of the symphonic poem in the history of the emancipation of instrumental music is equivocal: progressive and regressive at once. The claim to rank as art in an emphatic sense, which Liszt put forward for Beethoven's instrumental works and for his own, was progressive. The methods whereby he tried to establish his claim were regressive: grasping for "masterpieces of literature", whose transfiguration into tones he thought would prove that music was an art not to be despised.

(p.63)

"Regressive" could here denote aesthetics which lean towards an externalist, mimetic model for the explanation of a musical work and its effect, one that involves, in Hoffmann's words, an "admixture of other arts". "Progressive" could denote aesthetics which tend towards an autonomist, antirepresentationalist view which relies on the immanent quality of the thing itself in order to account for the effect of music and the musical work. The present work concludes that this is the historical order at least, whether or not it is the axiological order.

Formalism and autonomistic musical aesthetics

40 The present work has in many contexts the paired use of "aesthetic" (or, sometimes, "pro-aesthetic") and "anti-aesthetic". Autonomistic musical aesthetics is, as the subject of the present work, taken to be the aesthetic, while mimetic, rationalistic thinking is taken to be the anti-aesthetic.
Commonplace brief definitions of formalism amount to the notion of the concentration on form in a work of art at the expense of content. In addition there is the definition, slightly different in emphasis, offered in the *OED* (2nd ed.): "Strict or excessive adherence to prescribed forms; an instance or variety of this". More to the point of the present work seems to be the following definition of "aesthetic formalism" in Wolterstorff, 1995:

the view that in our interactions with works of art, form should be given primacy. Rather than taking "formalism" as the name of one specific theory in the arts, it is better and more typical to take it to name that type of theory which emphasises the form of the artwork. Or, since emphasis on form is something that comes in degrees, it is best to think of theories of art as ranged on a continuum of more formalist and less formalist. [...]  

Those who use the concept of form mainly wish to contrast the artifact itself with its relations to entities outside itself - with its representing various things, its being expressive of various things, its being the product of various intentions of the artist, its evoking various states in beholders, its standing in various relations of influence and similarity to preceding, succeeding, and contemporary works, etc. [...]  

It comes as no surprise that theories of music have tended to be much more formalist than theories of literature and drama, with theories of the visual arts located in between.\footnote{Perhaps the definition of aesthetics in Zimmermann, 1865 harmonises with and extends what Wolterstorff tries to convey: "Aesthetics as a pure science of forms is a morphology of the beautiful. By showing that it is only forms that give, or fail to give, pleasure, aesthetics}
Autonomist theories, however, do not always explicitly designate form as the basis for their deliberations. Perhaps a general illustration of this is given by Dahlhaus' distinction between (early) Romantic aesthetics (by no means anti-autonomistic)\(^{42}\) and formalism (in its nineteenth-century development):

In contrast to the formalistic aesthetic that draws a line between absolute music and poeticising or programmatic intentions (instead of separating absolute, poetic music from programmatic or characteristic music), Romantic aesthetics understood absolute music to be the realisation of the "purely poetic".\(^{43}\)

(Dahlhaus, 1978; p.69)

Dahlhaus is also concerned to make a historiological distinction, between the aesthetics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

\(^{42}\) Cf. Ch.3. Supicic, 1971 also notes (pp.197-8) formalism's distinction from Romanticism in another (alleged) way: Romanticism stressed the unity of the arts while (Hanslickian) formalism defended music's autonomy and even total separation from the other arts. This would seem to be a categorial matter, in no way undermining Romanticism's special valuation of music.

\(^{43}\) Discussion of the genesis and connotations of "absolute music" is beyond the scope of the present work. Dahlhaus, 1978 traces its origin to Wagner, noting (p.142) that the "idea of absolute music (without the term) appears in E.T.A. Hoffmann, and, inversely, the term (without the idea) appears in Richard Wagner". He also says (p.33), significantly: "Absolute music, historically the later form, is metaphysically the original one."
He makes the following observation, neatly stating what seems to be one significant critical point in the aesthetics of Herbart, 1831, Hanslick, 1854 and Zimmermann, 1865: "The notion that a work of art represents a document about its creator was not so much called into question as summarily dismissed on the grounds of being inimical to art. Even as early as Eduard Hanslick's polemical attack on the 'worm-eaten aesthetic of sentiment' the point was not, as is often believed, that there is no psychological truth to this aesthetic but that it is irrelevant to art" (Dahlhaus, 1977; p.22). This, for Dahlhaus, ushers musical formalism into the twentieth century:

> It distinguished between works, which focus largely on themselves, and documents, which refer to something outside themselves, with the true object of musical perception being no longer the composer "behind" the work but the work itself, a self-contained functional complex variously made up of elements of technical "form" and expressive "content". Sympathetic identification with an individual personality gave way to structural analysis of a musical creation.44

(pp.22-3)

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44 Dahlhaus' footnote here reads: "'Structure', as defined by aesthetic structuralism, also encompasses expressive elements without at the same time offending the principles of what is unhappily termed 'formalism.' The point is that a work should be viewed 'in its own terms' rather than 'from without.'" This raises the important question of the place of "content" ("expression") within formalistic accounts and the relation between form and content.
The point is made even clearer:

With regard to today's concert public it might be exaggerated to claim that the twentieth century has seen a gradual replacement of the personal view of music by a structural one. [...] In place of the terms "essence" and "image," with their Platonic or Neoplatonic overtones, that used to underlie the metaphysic of the artist, the sober Aristotelian concepts of "form" and "material" have been put stage centre in current theories of art. In the nineteenth century the relation between material and form was a secondary factor and was taken for granted. Today it has been elevated to the primary object of aesthetic and historiological reflection.

(pp.76-7)

Dahlhaus' account of formalism therefore includes theoretical, historical and pragmatic bases. Formalism is "sober"; it concerns itself (perhaps - the implication is - even more than early Romantic effusions, "Herder's or Wackenroder's dithyrambs") with "what is 'specifically musical'" (Dahlhaus,1967; p.29).

The main purpose of the present section is to examine the concept of musical formalism, using Herbart,1831, Hanslick,1854 and Zimmermann,1865 as case examples, and in this light to make preliminary observations on autonomistic musical aesthetics.

First it is worth noticing some further relevant points in modern thought on formalism. Martienssen,1979 makes some observations which could invite application to the sphere of music. She
describes early twentieth-century formalists as attempting to demystify the understanding of art theory and the aesthetic experience. Their conclusions, she says, were "that the shape was the factor in terms of which the object or experience could be regarded as a work of art" (p.144). The justification for this follows: "Everything visually or intellectually isolable is so by reason of its formal constitution" (p.145). Martienssen then goes on to note (ib.) that "although the art experience is absorbed by means of sense organs, it would be incomplete if it were not recorded intellectually, and in the process of recording there might well be further, even sensory, response to the total implication, extending almost indefinitely the aesthetic awareness." Despite Martienssen's putting forward of this "indefinite extension of aesthetic awareness", she seems, along with most other commentators, reluctant to give formalism priority as an aesthetic theory, preferring to accommodate it to existing theories and works of art rather than acknowledge the possibility of its having a central role in their explanation. Martienssen's conclusion, for example, rests on the acceptance (which she seems to regard as decidedly optional) of the notion
that "a formal arrangement, even if totally abstract, may be emotionally moving".\textsuperscript{45} "there is no justification for a total rejection of a Formalist possibility, bearing always in mind that it is not an inclusive definition but only a minimal requirement" (p.146). There is, nevertheless, the following very thought-provoking and cryptic-sounding observation: "We are, as we have made ourselves, verbal animals, and we are finally left with the idea of the experience itself. It may be here, in this idea, that we should look for the form." This is perhaps an assertion of the importance of language in the formulation and assessment of formalism as a theory and as a feature of the work of art. Then again it may be best to consider the ramifications of this statement only in the light of examples and overall context.

Herbart,\textsuperscript{1831} places great emphasis on the internalisation of values of a work of art:

\begin{quote}
An incalculable amount must be read into every work of art, without exception; its effect depends much more on the inner reactions of the beholder than on outside stimuli. A learned work of art is a misconception; it might easily
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{45} Note in this connection Dahlhaus' remark: "There is a gulf between art's characteristic dependence on form and the affective power of music - a power felt more intensely in the eighteenth century than later, for that age was every bit as sentimental as it was rational" (Dahlhaus,\textsuperscript{1967}; p.33).
presuppose too much and impress rather than please.46

(p.453)

The thought seems to be that too much learning constitutes an excessive imposition from without and thus stifles the aesthetic experience, which must remain essentially immanent and, furthermore, incalculable. Herbart develops a theory of the arts from these principles. Form makes the plastic arts the most easily intelligible. More (incalculable) "mental effort" - and this effort is crucial - must be invested in the appreciation of painting and architecture. When the art of the ancient world is in question, this appreciation becomes apperceptual, i.e., in Herbart's meaning, conscious of itself and of history. The work of art is in this case "monumental".

Herbart is now ready to offer formalist reflections on music:

46 Martienssen, 1979 appears to use this point to accompany (and perhaps justify) the denial of the principle of "aesthetic emotion" (propounded, for example, by Bell): "It is true that a special kind of 'significance' of relations in the art work meant for some a stimulation to what they thought of as the 'aesthetic' emotion, but it has been revealed (perhaps to some people disappointing) not only that there is no justification for the concept of an emotion specifically aesthetic, but that the experience of the aesthetic - however it may be defined - is as often evoked in situations not created by artists as such but engendered by some selectivity or perception in the spectator himself" (p.145). However, Martienssen does not offer any evidence in support of this "revelation".
But the more incidental apperception is, the more easily it can be dispensed with; and the more important the role of the incidental in the assessment of a work of art, the less will that work be a coherent whole. Not even dynamics are considered in a musical style (such as a fugue); the performer could perfectly well manage without them, as also could his instrument (e.g. the organ). The notes need only be heard (or, indeed, merely read) for them to give pleasure [...] (ib.)

This is quite far-reaching. It would seem that not only are expressive features incidental to the appraisal of the work of art or music but they can actually detract from its structural integrity. This accords with claims, more modern in origin, that (some) art may in fact legitimately be conceived as nonexpressive in character. What matters to Herbart is the musical material itself, taken in its most reductive formal relationships.

Herbart's dismissal of the mimetic model follows from general considerations: "It will be evident that if the artistic value of a work is to be correctly assessed, the part played by apperception must be discounted insofar as it plays no essential role in perception. In arguing that imitation can in no way be

47 There are, of course, at least equally as many counterclaims ridiculing the concept that art can be completely nonexpressive.
adopted as a principle of aesthetics, we are merely applying this basic premise to a specific case" (ib.). It seems that Herbart is consigning imitation to the past, because apperception and mimesis are of one essence. Herbart further qualifies his position on the mimetic model: "The realisation of an idea is different from imitation; anyone in whom the dual forces of thought and volition are at work is superior to the mere imitator in proportion to the intensity with which the two combine in him: the imitator always comes second to the one he copies" (ib.).

The stance that Herbart ultimately adopts is to decry the notion that art must mean something. He acknowledges that representation is popular because of its explicatory function but simply denies that this function is necessary for aesthetic apprehension: "What a task of musical expression Haydn took on in The Creation and The Seasons! Fortunately, his music needs no text; it is mere curiosity that impels us to know what he has tried to illustrate. His music is simply music, and it needs no

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48 A detailed explanation of this could be made along the lines that both the apperceptual mode and mimesis involve externally imposed considerations which are essentially irrelevant to the appraisal of a work of art.

49 What is perhaps noteworthy here is that this superiority is not automatic but rather proportional.
meaning to make it beautiful" (p.454). Expressive considerations in music had been, Herbart complains, given too much emphasis when what matters is the music itself:

So it is that even knowledgeable musicians still argue as though the basis of music were not the universal laws of simple or double counterpoint, but the emotions that music may well arouse, and for the expression of which, should the composer so wish, it may hence be employed. What was it that those artists of ancient time strove to express when they explored the potential of fugue, or, again, those of still remoter times when, by their skill, they created the various architectural orders? They did not wish to express anything at all; their ideas were limited to an investigation of the art itself. But those who rely on interpretations betray their distrust of man's inner nature and a preference for outward appearances.\(^\text{50}\)

(ib.)

Despite the plausible rejection of \textit{mimesis} and its relegation to the status of mere interpretation (which does not convey the essential psychology of art), this verdict of Herbart's is open to several possible criticisms. A significant one is that nonexpressive intention is, without any attempt to provide supporting evidence, definitively attributed to artists of the remote past. Criticisms of this sort arise perhaps even more

\(^{50}\) This is quoted in Hanslick,1854, p.16.
obviously in the case of Hanslick,1854.

Hanslick,1854 is most concerned to put the emotions in their proper place as far as music's message goes.\textsuperscript{51} Music has limitations but, it is implied, so too does the emotional range:
"There are ideas which, though not occurring as feelings, are yet capable of being fully expressed by music; and conversely, there are feelings which affect our minds but which are so constituted as to defy their adequate expression by any ideas which music can represent" (p.24). Hanslick explains that the only part of the feelings that can be conveyed by music is their dynamic properties, i.e. "the motion accompanying psychical action, according to its momentum" (ib.), bearing in mind that this motion is but an accompaniment to the feeling proper. This conclusion is full of potential, as Budd,1980 demonstrates:

These dynamic characteristics that music can reproduce are not peculiar to the emotions. Other processes in the natural world, as in a musical work, may end more or less suddenly; may increase or decrease in strength; may involve growth to a culmination or climax. So the features of emotions that music can reproduce, their dynamic properties, have nothing

\textsuperscript{51} Dahlhaus,1977 issues (p.124) the reminder that the early chapters of Hanslick,1854 were published separately even before the later ones had been drafted and concludes that many of the points in the work should be read in the context of the individual chapters in which they arise rather than in the light of the work as a whole. Owing to the force and consistency of Hanslick's thought, this approach is eschewed in the present discussion.
specially to do with the emotions, but are features of many other processes as well. Therefore the conclusion should be that there is nothing that music can represent, in the sense of copy, which particularly concerns the emotions, unless the particular ways in which emotions progress are distinctive of them. In point of fact Hanslick holds that there is nothing extraneous to the musical notes that can properly be called the subject that a "pure" musical work represents.

(p.32)

A central argument for Hanslick, Budd notes (ib.), is that music "can never present the thought that is the core of a definite emotion, the thought that a definite emotion always contains". 52

Budd points out (p.33) in this connection that one must ask if it is valid for Hanslick to state that each definite emotion has at its core a specific thought and complains that Hanslick does not actually say what does constitute a definite emotion but only gives what he considers to be examples of definite emotions. Even if music could specify emotions, this would not be, for Hanslick, music's priority: "The initial force of a composition is the invention of some definite theme, and not the desire to describe a given emotion by musical means" (Hanslick,1854; p.52). The

52 Hanslick points out (pp.34-5) significantly: "The feeling of religious fervour is rightly considered to be the least liable to musical misconception."
first port of call of the musical inspiration, the theme (melody), is the composer's imagination. Imagination had been expounded on earlier, in perhaps rather artless terms: "An art aims, above all, at producing something beautiful which affects not our feelings but the organ of pure contemplation, our imagination. ...A musical composition originates in the composer's imagination and is intended for the imagination of the listener" (p.11). This may be somewhat uninformative but Hanslick goes on (p.12) to draw out of it a further strand of thought:

"Grant that the true organ with which the beautiful is apprehended is the imagination, and it follows that all arts are likely to affect the feelings indirectly." It must also be remembered that Hanslick does not deny all connection of music with the emotions, only the explicitness of the connection:

Every real work of art appeals to our emotional faculty in some way, but none in any exclusive way. No canon peculiar to musical aesthetics only can be deduced from the fact that there is a certain connection between music and the emotions. [...] The crux of the question is the specific mode in which music affects our feelings. [...] A poet or painter would hardly persuade himself that when he has ascertained the "feelings" his landscape or drama awakens, he has obtained a rationale of the beauties contained in it. He will seek to discover the source of the irresistible power which makes us enjoy the work in this particular form and in no other. Writers on this subject are by no means
justified in confusing emotional impressions and musical beauty (instead of adopting the scientific method of keeping these two factors apart as much as possible) [...] (pp.13-14).

The emotional appeal of music is as it were divine in origin and lacks "worldly associations"; it impresses itself upon the human consciousness secretly and subversively (p.15). Hanslick warns, however:

It is only the unscientific procedure of deducing aesthetic principles from such facts against which we protest. Music may, undoubtedly, awaken feelings of great joy or intense sorrow; but might not the same or a still greater effect be produced by the news that we have won the first prize in the lottery, or by the dangerous illness of a friend? So long as we refuse to include lottery tickets among the symphonies, or medical bulletins among the overtures, we must refrain from treating the emotions as an aesthetic monopoly of music in general or a certain piece of music in particular.

(ib.)

Hanslick cannot deny music's power, a prime manifestation of which is the arousal of emotions. This must, however, be kept separate from the question of musical beauty: that is the scientific approach. Hanslick is in the business not of opposing

53 Hanslick later notes (p.75): "The act in which the direct outflow of a feeling into sound may take place is not so much the invention of music as its reproduction."
but rather of systematically refining the early Romantic agenda concerning music's preeminent capabilities.

Hanslick also has much to say about the status of "pure music". Still discussing whether music can represent feelings, Hanslick designates (pp.26-8) a musical analysis (of Beethoven's *Overture to Prometheus*) as being itself the "subject" of the piece: the music has nothing to tell beyond the analytical detail and the only other subjective indication is its title.\(^{54}\) The merit of this conclusion is that all "false constructions", i.e. imposed interpretations, are obviated (p.28). The next observation he makes is a significant and perhaps unusual way of introducing a consideration of instrumental music's status: "No other theme of instrumental music will fare any better than the one which we have selected at random" (ib.).\(^{55}\) The reason for this looks logical but also dogmatic:

> We have intentionally selected examples from instrumental music, for only what is true of the latter is true also of music as such. If we wish to decide the question whether music possesses the character of

\(^{54}\) Cf. also pp.113-15.

\(^{55}\) It is important, when confronted with phrases such as "the plastic character of every musical theme" (p.34), to ask, what precisely is a musical theme for Hanslick? No clear answer seems to be given, except that melody seems to be the main element considered.
definiteness, what its nature and properties are, and what
its limits and tendencies, no other than instrumental music
can be taken into consideration. What instrumental music is
unable to achieve lies also beyond the pale of music proper,
for it alone is pure and self-subsistent music. No matter
whether we regard vocal music as superior to or more
effective than instrumental music - an unscientific
proceeding, by the way, which is generally the upshot of
one-sided dilettantism - we cannot help admitting that the
term "music," in its true meaning, must exclude compositions
in which words are set to music. In vocal or operatic music
it is impossible to draw so nice a distinction between the
effect of the music and that of the words that an exact
definition of the share which each has had in the production
of the whole becomes practicable. An inquiry into the
subject of music must leave out even compositions with
inscriptions, or so-called programme music. Its union with
poetry, though enhancing the power of the music, does not
widen its limits.

(pp.29-30)

It is the latter part of this quotation which tends to be more
formalistic. It does indeed transmit a very positivistic
impression and hence poses problems. Without filling in the fine
details, one might meet some of the problems as follows. What is
true of instrumental music should also and equally be examinable
in the case of programme music or operatic music or solo
instrumental music with an accompanying inscription if one
considers primarily the music as the essential ingredient.

Leaving out the music with the inscription, for example, seems
extreme. A principal objection could be that it is actually unnecessary to omit any category of music as being valid for initial investigation with respect to aesthetic matters because all categories can in a sense be looked on as forms of instrumental music. Also, while Hanslick is preoccupied with separately evaluating music and language, there is conceivably scope to evaluate them as a whole but still with a concentration on music. Many philosophical arguments are possible here and it is partly with this recognition that one can open the field of autonomistic musical aesthetics, taken in its sum, as being a focused but multi-faceted approach and explanation of what the effect and meaning of music really consists in.

Music, for Hanslick, "is at once the most imperative and the most indulgent of all the arts" (p.92). This logically follows from his idea of the "truly musical listener", whose "attention so greatly absorbed by the particular form and character of the composition, by that which gives it the stamp of individuality among a dozen pieces of similar complexion, that he pays but little heed to the question whether the expression of the same

56 These points might also be raised in the case of Zimmermann,1865 (see discussion below).
or different feelings is aimed at" (p.90). This is perhaps one of the clearest formalist concepts in the whole of Hanslick, 1854. There is much at stake that Hanslick should propose his ideal musical listener: "the kingdom of musical beauty" (p.64). It is significant how Hanslick uses (ib.) this phrase: he describes Italian sacred and secular Renaissance music, the art of polyphony of the Dutch school and the efforts of J.S.Bach as being "but small provinces within the kingdom of musical beauty". The thought, perhaps an advancement from early Romanticism, is that one does not find all of the musically beautiful in any one work but (apparently) in the totality of music. This is embodied in the drive for novelty: "The delightful belief in the imperishableness of music must, of course, be given up" (ib.n4). Hanslick reinforces the point about considering the totality rather than the individual example of music (or individual part of such example):

Now the most essential condition to the aesthetic enjoyment of music is that of listening to a composition for its own sake, no matter what it is or what construction it may bear. The moment music is used as a means to induce certain states of mind, as accessory or ornamental, it ceases to be an art in a purely musical sense. The elemental properties of music are very frequently confounded with its
artistic beauty; in other words, a part is taken for the whole, and unutterable confusion ensues. Hundreds of sayings about "music" do not apply to the art as such, but to the sensuous action of its material only.

(p.101)

This amounts to a very clear statement of the objective of the chapter in which it occurs, entitled "Musical contemplation".

Hanslick's text is very rich and one other point, among many, may be mentioned here. In saying that nature cannot provide an adequate model for music, Hanslick states potently: "There is nothing beautiful in nature as far as music is concerned"

(p.112). This admits of considerable explanation on Hanslick's part. He proceeds along the lines that any art should not merely slavishly copy nature but provide a remodelling of the beautiful, preexistent prototype, for example a landscape, provided by nature. Music, however, is outside of this principle:

But what is there in nature that could ever induce the composer to exclaim: What a magnificent model for an overture, a symphony! The composer can remodel nothing; he has to create everything \textit{ab initio}. That which the painter or the poet gleans in contemplating the beautiful in nature, the composer has to draw from his own fertile imagination. He must watch for the propitious moment when it begins to sing and ring within him; he will then enter heart and soul into his task and create from within that which has not its like in nature and which, unlike the other arts, is truly not of this world.
This is *par excellence* Hanslick's doctrine, that the musically beautiful is entirely an interior motion or state, uninfluenced by external beauty. Early Romantics might not quite have agreed with his formulation of this but they may at least have been able to accord with his exclusive elevation of music beyond aesthetic worldliness.

Zimmermann, 1865 offers (p.40) a particular definition of aesthetic concepts as "the constatation of pleasurable or unpleasurable feelings" within the "presentation" (which term seems to signify either the work of art itself or the mental conception of it or else some kind of cause or substance); the feelings constitute an "additional activity", an automatic reaction, if one will, and the first element of the aesthetic experience. 57 Aesthetic features are, precisely, only images and not copies. The additional activity is therefore independent of

57 Bujic, 1988 notes (p.40): "According to Zimmermann, philosophy is an investigation of abstract ideas needed in order to establish norms for scientific, aesthetic and ethical investigations. Forms are, according to him, primary categories which underline all aspects of mental activity. In radicalizing some of Herbart's postulates he contributed towards Herbart's unjust fame as a dry formalist, as some of Zimmermann's views were uncritically attributed to his teacher. He exerted some influence on Hanslick." Zimmermann was in fact the dedicatee of Hanslick, 1854 and later reviewed it, occasioning Hanslick to make some alterations.
(the degree of truth in) the content of the images.

The following passage evokes Hanslick’s critique of music and emotion:

Not knowing the content of our presentation makes the feeling itself seem undefined. The same additional activity may well have the most varied presentational content. In fact, it would seem that an identical effect must arise from identical conditions: the same presentation must produce the same additional activity. But if the content of the presentation i.e. the presentation itself remains unknown, who is in a position to say that the presentation is identical in two different instances of the feeling arising?

(p.41)

This approximates to Hanslick’s explanation of music's inability to specify emotion. Zimmermann goes on (p.42) to compound the difficulty by proposing the case where the aesthetic idea and the additional activity are joined. This means that the aesthetic idea is itself modified by the changing additional activity, with the result that not only is the feeling indeterminate but so is the feeling subject. The case of music is not offered, but then, one feels, this remains an abstractive discussion in the tradition of Kant.

Zimmermann also takes on the task of explaining "composite art". He theorises in scientific terms:
The beautiful takes the shape either of form, sensibility or thought, and from these arise in succession metrical, linear, planar and plastic variations of beauty on the one hand, and on the other beauties of rhythm, light, colour, modulation, sonority and thought. [...] it is one of the first conditions of an aesthetic relationship that its constituent parts are capable of being compared, and so it comes about that the constituent kinds of beauty mentioned above cannot be mingled, but at most combined i.e. united to form a single whole, yet always in such a way that constituents of an identical nature together form a unity of that nature. And what is more, this will the more easily happen the closer the connection (from higher points of view) between constituents that are in any case heterogenous and therefore appear more compatible.

(p.46)

These structural precepts underlie the aesthetics of mixed media:

The only incompatibility is between those pairs in which the gaps in the presentation have to be filled by two different, disparate spheres of the presentation, say, painting and poetry, or music and poetry. In the former case the gaps in the spatial form are already filled by visual sensations, and cannot therefore be filled a second time by thoughts. In the latter case the gaps in the temporal form are already filled by auditory sensations, and cannot therefore make room a second time for definite presentations. Simultaneous empty formal presentations may well include colour-sensations in the intervals, while successive empty rhythmic presentations may well include musical or poetic sensations, but not both together, and always in such a way that each affirms its own validity and unites with other elements of the same kind to form an aesthetic whole. One or the other, the visual sensation or the thought, the musical or the poetic, must then be reduced to forming a simple medium, a representative of the other i.e. become a sign instead of being itself significant.
Zimmermann offers a specific example of these principles:

the sonorous element in poetry is quite different from the sonorous element in music. In music it is the ultimate consideration, while in poetry it appears against a wider background, viz. the thought of which it is, as a word, the sign. The sonorous element in music can claim independent validity, while the same element in poetry has only a validity subordinate to the thought.

The most obvious question at this point is, how does one decide which element becomes significant? For the case of music

Zimmermann offers the following conclusion:

a trend which, even in music, tends to emphasise the thought (in the poetical sense of that word) can only be prejudicial to the sonorous (i.e. specifically musical) element in music. Thoughts are easily paired together, but this is not true of thought and music. In that case we have a marriage in which one of the two - thought or music - becomes henpecked. If the thought is not a function of the music, the music is inevitably reduced to being a function of the thought. The former is only justified in the way it has been done by the Minnesingers and Mastersingers, in a folk-song, or happens even today in the Italian opera when a single melody is fitted with any number of different texts. The text is there for the music, and music pays no attention to it. What unites them is a common rhythmic form that allows

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58 Hanslick, 1854 says the same: "The connection of poetry with music and the opera is a sort of morganatic union, and the more closely we examine this morganatic union of musical beauty and definite thoughts, the more sceptical do we become as regards its indissolubility" (pp.45-6).
both to pursue their ways in the same rhythm. In the reverse case, on the other hand, the independent beauty of musical sound is abolished and this leads logically to the spoken word.

(p.47)

The "common rhythmic form" is invoked to explain music's tolerance of verbal accompaniment. This is perhaps formalism at its most consistent level. Forms are the basis of aesthetics and can, in addition to being contemplated, be constituted to make an integral system, the various facets of which thoroughly complement one another. In constructing this conceptual structure Zimmermann goes possibly even further than Hanslick's extremism.

The deliberations of Herbart, Hanslick and Zimmermann certainly are unified. Formalism is put forward as an edifice which accounts for the exaltedness of music in every respect. Representation is dismissed, without being dallied with, and any problematic questions are met calmly and positivistically. Autonomistic musical aesthetics, as considered in the present work, is informed by the approaches of musical formalism but they do not give complete information as to the autonomy aesthetic. Before enlarging on this point, however, it is useful to detail a few specific criticisms which have been levelled at formalism,
taking Hanslick, 1854 in particular.\textsuperscript{59}

Supicic, 1971 urges (p. 194) that the most radical formalists cannot deny music's expressiveness; they are forced into this by shifting the concept of expression to different planes, "talking about the metaphysical (Schopenhauer), transcendental, noumenal, subconscious aspects of music, or about its relation to the dynamics of human feelings (Hanslick)". Walton, 1988 appears to be on a similar track:

Hanslick's purism is not pure. He allows metaphorical descriptions of music ("flight", "reapproach", "increasing and diminishing strength"), which arguably point to important links between music and the outside world. Metaphors can easily occupy a great deal of our discourse about music, if we let them. We speak of "ascending" and "descending" motives, "thick" and "thin" textures, "strain" and "repose", "conflict" and "concord", "movement", "return", "destinations", "renewal", "soaring" and "whispering" melodies, "throbbing" rhythms, etc. This will be of little consequence if the metaphors are no more than ways of speaking, colourful means of describing music's formal or acoustic properties. But they may well be essential, immortal. What is said when one speaks of ascent or descent or movement or destinations in music may necessarily involve reference to spatial phenomena. If it does, this fact will be welcomed by those who hope to find a subject matter for music.

\textsuperscript{59} Cf. also the possible criticisms discussed above.
Whatever the merit of these criticisms, it is perhaps the alleged paradoxes they seek to expose that lead Stecker, 1984 to assert: "It seems to me unnecessarily paradoxical simply to deny that music expresses emotion. The question should be: what is asserted when we say that music expresses emotion?" (p. 413). This may perhaps be held to moderate the extreme formalist position.

Autonomistic musical aesthetics, and by this is usually meant the aesthetics of instrumental music, is informed by musical formalism. Formalism was not the sole preserve of the nineteenth century: the theories of Chabanon, for example, which were radical for their time, also have a formalist tinge. The autonomy aesthetic was formulated using a range of emphases, form being but one. It could, for example, be said that an early Romantic emphasis was religion (Wackenroder). The essential or common idea is rejection of representation, except perhaps in the sense of the representation of the nonrepresentational: "Clearly, music's abstract nature is not compromised by allowing abstract

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60 The answer to this question is, in addition to Stecker's discussion, dealt with, for example, in Budd, 1985 and Budd, 1995.

61 At least in the present work these two concepts are considered to be very close.
music to be about something, if what it is about is itself abstract" (Budd, 1995; pp. 169-70). There is indeed good cause for frequent recourse to an analogy of music with abstract art, but any attempt at a rounded picture of autonomistic musical aesthetics must take note also of the elements of form, religious fervour, etc. in addition to generating its own criteria which can assess the extent to which the autonomy aesthetic is manifest in the art and art theory of music (and, indeed, extending to the arts in general).
Historiography, objective and methodology

Historiology and the history of musical aesthetics

It might be desirable to think that in an ideal world one would be able to reconstruct the past in the terms of those who experienced it. Then there would be the possibility of imprinting the insights of the present upon it. Those dedicated to presenting an authentic, contemporaneous picture would have the freedom to do so, and those whose priority would be to establish a philosophy of the past with a view to using all knowledge to date in order to illuminate it (and perhaps the present and future as well) would have a similar freedom. But is this actually achievable? For one thing, information about the past is (necessarily) incomplete. For another, reconstruction (to any degree) is itself historically conditioned. These and other parameters colour the historical picture. What, then, is the ideal which can be generated?

The above situation embodies both the history-of-ideas and philosophical approaches. Carr, 1961 gives (p.83) an idea of the dynamics of the situation: "History is movement; and movement

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62 See opening arguments, this Chapter.
implies comparison." Is the history of ideas more static and authenticity-minded (in the narrow sense) than philosophy? Davies (probably paraphrasing Carr)\textsuperscript{63} comments (p.163): "history ...is concerned not as is sometimes supposed with unique events, but with the interaction between the unique and the general." Thus it would be left to the history of ideas, \textit{qua} the painstaking examination and collation of sources as individual testimonies, to supply the unique, while the infusion of philosophy and critique contextualises it.

These questions must be applied in defining the study of autonomistic musical aesthetics, especially with the present work in mind. The autonomy aesthetic is simultaneously a particular aesthetic position and also something with wider human applications,\textsuperscript{64} and this is its dichotomy. As with other subjects of study, the term "reception history" suggests itself.\textsuperscript{65} It is through a consideration of this that issues

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} See, for example, p.63.
\item \textsuperscript{64} See earlier discussions of Casey, 1973 and Heremerén, 1983. A definition and critique of autonomistic musical aesthetics, in the light of notions examined in the \textit{Introduction}, is offered in the next section.
\item \textsuperscript{65} In particular, the title of the present work, "Autonomistic aesthetics of instrumental music, 1800-1810: context, precedence and reception", invites a definition of how one connotes the "reception history" of aesthetic approaches (for example as compared with that of musical works).
\end{itemize}
relevant to the determination of the nature of the present work certainly may be addressed.

Dahlhaus, 1977 comments (p.108): "Nowadays no-one even remotely familiar with the discussions of aesthetic autonomy would dispute the proposition that it is not a principle divorced from and lording over history so much as a phenomenon that has historical limitations and is subject to historical change." But perhaps it is, in a sense, both of these things. One of the themes of the present work is to what extent the autonomy aesthetic presents itself throughout the history of musical aesthetics.  

At the investigative level, the precept that philosophy (aesthetic theory) is not necessarily one with artistic practice must be observed in order for an account of any aesthetic position to be viable. But there is not always a gulf between theory and practice. Martienssen, 1979, for example, closely

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66 The history of musical aesthetics should not be narrowly defined as solely a modern concern (see, for example, Dahlhaus, 1967, p.vii: "...music aesthetics is essentially a phenomenon of the nineteenth century." A similar example is that abstract art is not an invention of the twentieth century and was not even new in Plato's time (Tatarkiewicz, 1962; p.238).
relates aesthetics and artistic practice:

Part at least of the strength of the Formalist approach lay in its ancient and respectable tradition. Classical art, which it was originally framed to support, is not only Formalist but formal: Plato had considered that beauty could be discerned even in simple geometrical shapes; symmetry, rhythm, repetition, proportion seemed obvious characteristics for anything that could be called beautiful in the ancient world, and art was nothing if not beautiful. In a later world too, for likeness and representation had no place in music and architecture and must therefore be ultimately unnecessary.

(p.144)

One possibly extreme consequence of Martienssen's argument here is to suggest the approach, "look at the art and you will find the aesthetic." Such an approach is in the present work suggested (Ch.4) in the case of eighteenth-century instrumental music, i.e. the deduction of the existence of autonmistic aesthetics, for example as an intention of the composer or, more pertinently, as an objective feature of the work, from "internal evidence" of the work itself. It is to be stressed that this suggested approach must remain merely tentative since, it can be asked, how does one go about divining the extent to which a given musical work engages with the aesthetic notion of autonomy, on the
strength of musical evidence alone? Yet one must take on board comments such as the following by Bonds, 1991:

This change in perception [of instrumental music] is due in no small part to changes in the music itself. Haydn's and Mozart's late symphonies, to take but one example from a specific genre, are far more ambitious in scope than comparable works by such earlier composers as Giovanni Battista Sammartini or Johann Stamitz - or by Haydn and Mozart themselves, for that matter.

(p.163)

The vague-sounding "far more ambitious in scope" can nevertheless be given technical precision. Budd, 1995 attempts to relate the point to the philosophical tradition:

The remarkable flowering of artistic genius that went hand in hand with the dissolution of the chain that bound music to language was itself sufficient to undermine scepticism about music's capacity to constitute a self-sufficient art of high value. The vindication of pure music's eminence as art was achieved not by theory but by art. This was no accident. For, as Hume and Kant emphasised, there are no a priori principles of taste, so that a description of music as an independent art - a description not based on its actual achievements - could not carry conviction. Furthermore, the principal theoretical obstacle to the recognition of music divorced from words as an art on a par with the other great art forms fell with the abandonment of the assumption that the true or highest aim of art is the seductive presentation of the most significant moral or religious truths.

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67 This is perhaps a crude way of formulating a question that admits of many different aspects.

68 See, for example, Rosen, 1971 and Ratner, 1980.
One does not have to agree point for point with everything in this quotation in order to appreciate its first and final sentences. As for the remainder of Budd's points, descriptions of music's aesthetic autonomy prior to the eighteenth century, say, may or may not have carried conviction. They must, however, at least be accounted historically. They must, as it were, aspire to being historical facts, regardless of whether they accord with the aesthetics of Hume and Kant. What Budd is raising here may indeed provide an example of a historical problem in the present work. Is it appropriate to apply post-Enlightenment aesthetic thought to earlier aesthetics, especially when they are examined for signs of resonance with the autonomy aesthetic?  

Another considerable view is that all works of art cannot help but be mimetic of society, and therein lies part of their meaning. Thinking in these terms, all music is said in some way to reflect or contain its environment.  

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69 The next section offers advocation of the autonomy aesthetic as a model for music.

70 However, to say that music is in some way mimetic of society is not the same thing as saying that it reflects or contains its environment.
environment, social and biological. Kivy, 1990 qualifies this:
"Music alone is of the mind and of the world. It is not about the
world, or about anything else, except, perhaps, itself" (p.67).
Perhaps this - music's being of the world - is also what is meant
by Dahlhaus, 1977: "Of course one can hold theoretically that it
is events, meaning acoustical occurrences taking place within
social contexts, that constitute the reality of music, and not
works as boiled down into texts" (p.133). So it would appear that
music must acquire some of its significance by being seen as
social text. It is the application to music of Carr's dictum:
"As soon as we are born, the world gets to work on us and
transforms us from merely biological into social units"
(Carr, 1961; p.31). The claim that social influence and
environment, or perhaps, rather, what Supicic, 1971 calls (p.202)
"the human element", inherently exists in music appears to
exclude the notion that the autonomy of a musical work might be
deduced simply by inspection of the music itself. A kind of
"social ontology" of music is therefore envisaged. Both
approaches can be used, or postulated, however.

Dahlhaus, 1977 would like to see "a history...with
historiographical principles rooted in art itself” (p.17). If one takes there to be an intimate connection between actual musical repertoire and aesthetics, it becomes plausible to say that a history of music is, or ought to be, (also) a history of musical aesthetics. Aesthetics and music history are inseparable. The intellectual history of music informs and comments upon style and repertory histories.\textsuperscript{71} It is a most necessary part of the musicological apparatus. To what extent, then, is the history of musical aesthetics a reception history? Dahlhaus says of social history and reception history that "the method derives from the claim that if we are to understand music historically we must regard it in terms of its social function, i.e. as a process that comprises not only the texts of works but their performance and reception as well. In this view it is not music \textit{per se} (text and work) that has history; rather, history is the property only of society, which includes music among its vital processes" (p.27). But performance and reception of musical works are bound up with their innate aesthetic qualities. Taste is the result of the

\textsuperscript{71} Style and repertory histories become tools for the history of musical aesthetics, but they are not absolutely required.
encounter of the contemporary audience with the aesthetic inherent in the style of a musical work. Aesthetics is thus very significant to the question of reception history. Dahlhaus notes (p.33): "The present-day experience of a work written a century-and-a-half ago is obviously not the same thing as the acquisition of a music-historical fact, no matter whether the aesthetic perception takes due account of the intervening time-lag." This can also be affirmed in relation to musical aesthetics: the musical aesthetics of, say, 1800 are first experienced philosophically, by being critically aware of (intervening) influences that separate the modern reader from an unblemished picture of the thought of the period.\textsuperscript{72} In order to improve the historical dimension, it is also necessary to take the history-of-ideas approach of assembling a detailed picture in trying to take account of source after source.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{72} There are too, of course, ways in which these influences can enhance the apprehension of musical aesthetics.

\textsuperscript{73} The history-of-ideas approach might be approximated in something like the following elements: Source A says x; Source B, contemporaneous, also says x with some riders; Source C's account of x is essentially the same as A's; therefore x is current in the period. The deduction of x's currency can rest on a literalistic interpretation of A, B and C. Philosophy can then inform this approach by cross-referencing modern (and intervening) viewpoints with the literary exegesis of the sources chosen. Where one process begins and another ends, or whether one is ignored, or whether they dovetail, can be a flexible matter.
Dahlhaus' proposal (p.39) that "authentic" and "inauthentic" texts each have equal historical status does not translate very well with respect to the aim of the present work: to provide a discussion of aspects of a critical change in musical thought which took place in the second half of the eighteenth and especially in the first decade of the nineteenth century. In order to do this, the sources chosen have been mainly contemporary (for example Wackenroder and Hoffmann), historical (classical and early eighteenth-century, for example Plato and Shaftesbury), and modern research. In other words, applying Dahlhaus' proposal to a history of musical aesthetics of a particular period does not work completely because it would not then be purely a history but a philosophy as well. One must be quite clear at any given moment to what extent one is concentrating on philosophy or on history, or on the synthesis of the two. But there is more to say. Philosophical reflection supplied by intervening texts (loosely analogous to "inauthentic" texts) can historically condition any approach to situating a

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74 See Dahlhaus' remark (p.87): "For history, like philosophy, is by nature a self-reflecting discipline that can use the tools at its disposal to objectify and study its own premises."
particular aesthetic within a particular period. So it would appear that one has to take intervening texts into consideration.\textsuperscript{75} The main concern, however, should be the primary sources because they are closest to the aesthetic which it is sought to document. However inaccessible the primary sources may be, whether due to historical conditioning or simply sheer inscrutability, the effort to recreate the thought processes they embody is a key point in qualitatively evaluating musical aesthetics with respect to historical significance and relevance to modern times. No worthwhile philosophical reflection can take place without this drive for authenticity. It may, for example, take the form of the commentator's attempt to project himself into the contemporary mind.\textsuperscript{76} The ideal, therefore, which may be sought is the ever better integration of the approaches of the history of ideas and philosophy. The question is how (or whether) to prioritise each.

\textsuperscript{75} This has been done in the present Chapter, a good example being the discussion of the nineteenth-century musical formalism of Herbart, Hanslick and Zimmermann.

\textsuperscript{76} Dahlhaus notes (pp.58-9) that the historian cannot try to be something he is not. It is always "himself" he is projecting. See also Carr's remarks: "Study the historian before you begin to study the facts" (Carr,1961; p.23); "The historian, even before he begins to write history, is the product of history" (p.40).
Definition and objective

Autonomistic musical aesthetics is most readily applied in the case of instrumental music. Budd, 1995 considers (p.133) that "nothing essential is lost if the investigation of music's power as an abstract art is thought of as focused upon purely instrumental, nonrepresentational works that are not intended to serve any nonmusical function." The present work concentrates its inquiry in just this way. Instrumental music is taken to be *ipso facto* nonrepresentational, even in the face of representational intention. Dahlhaus, 1978 notes (p.32) that *Tristan und Isolde* was for Nietzsche "the opus metaphysicum...no listener would survive the work if it were presented as the symphony it actually is."

The ideas of the early Romantics, notably Wackenroder, Tieck and Hoffmann, were mediated through Schopenhauer to Wagner and Nietzsche, and beyond. But the present work is a selective history of the aesthetics of instrumental music, with particular emphasis on the autonomy aesthetic, to 1810, the year of Hoffmann's famous Review: it is a history without (most of) the nineteenth century but historically conditioned by the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. This history is, where possible, based on an analysis of how contemporary thought was made manifest and applied to the often vexed questions of musical aesthetics. But the historiographical parameters imposed by the fact of there having been changes in art and thought since 1810 are also real. The modern perspective is, admittedly, coloured by the Romantic apotheosis of music and its aftermath. The present work also attempts to find precedents for this standpoint, which the Romantics accepted. It is a reception history insofar as it focuses on the intense period of reception of instrumental music as the most powerful musical phenomenon (and for some the most powerful artistic medium), concentrating on sources from Kant, 1790 to Hoffmann's Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (1810), the latter notable for its length, imagination, and novelty and urgency of content. This (period) is designated "Reception" and forms the subject of Ch.4. So the present work is not a reception history in the conventional sense of being both a social and aesthetic history of a musical work or aesthetic from its inception to its modern-day status: it is rather a reception history of aesthetics, without the
sociological implications teased out.\textsuperscript{77} The analysis of the significance of the reception of the autonomy aesthetic (Ch.4) is only made possible by the judicious use of the history of ideas. The history of ideas and philosophy must be mutually complementary in such an endeavour.

The autonomistic explanation of music offers an account which is fundamentally different from mimetic and rationalistic models. It has been seen how visual art succeeds in being divisible into representational and (progressively) abstract modes.\textsuperscript{78} With music, however, the issue is complicated by the thought, present throughout the history of musical aesthetics, that the relationship of music to nonmusical factors such as texts and programmes (and perhaps even stage scenery) is representational. This meant that much music was representational. Music whose representationality could not easily be distinguished was therefore inferior, often to other

\textsuperscript{77} Dahlhaus,1977 seems to express the same point: "However, the real problem lies not in disclosing the weaknesses of formalism but in removing them without sacrificing its pivotal methodological idea: how to write an art history that is a history of art" (p.129). Emphasis added. But Dahlhaus concludes with Adorno: "It is precisely music's autonomy that makes it such an eloquent commentator on society" (p.114).

\textsuperscript{78} See Osborne,1976.
(vocal) music which had the benefit of clear indicators as to its imitative and expressive content. The present work attempts to point out the insecurity, which is explicit or implicit in even profoundly representationalistic sources, concerning the supposed capacity or duty of music to present to the mind definite conceptions.

Art is not completely independent if it is obliged to perform a function. Representationality forces art to be functional. This is not to say, however, that functional art cannot be great, just that its greatness is not fully dependent on its functionality. And where art is not functional its greatness has nothing to do with functionality. Not all art is autonomous. But music is not always analogous to other arts which admit more easily of being representational or otherwise functional. It is certainly analogous to their abstract modes, though. This view was clearly a part of the nineteenth-century experience.

For many commentators there is music and then there is autonomous music. Representational music is in this scheme not autonomous. But music *qua* music is autonomous. The music to which
the words of a libretto are set can exist as autonomous music.

Scruton, 1983 claims (p. 69): "It is wholly natural to listen to and appreciate the music of the Ring long before one has a complete - or even a partial - understanding of its representational claims." Scruton goes on (ib.) to say, even more radically, that "later, one's understanding of the music is enriched primarily through an increasing grasp of thematic, harmonic and structural relations, rather than through knowledge of its representational framework." The best apprehension of music is in musical terms. This leads straight to the fundamental question, what is music? If music is bound up with other media, for example in opera, its representational function becomes a potential possibility. In other words, if the total spectacle of an opera is deemed to be music *in toto*, then it seems reasonable to allow that music could be seen to be doing something to elucidate the spectacle of which it is a part. By extension, then, some textless music can have a programme which the music intentionally embodies. That would be called representational music. However, if music is, whatever the

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79 I.e. if music is seen as the *raison d'être* of opera, its primary element.
circumstances, "expressively organised sound", simply a structure (or nonstructure) of notes, then representation, as an interpretation coming from without the work, may be seen as unnecessary to the apprehension of the work, maybe even false.

It is this latter position, of music's being, essentially and independently, "expressively organised sound", whatever the circumstances, which is favoured in the present work and adopted as a means of investigating the wealth of musical aesthetics. In the history of aesthetics from classical antiquity to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the status of music changes from mimetic handmaiden to the art that is the least representational and, eventually, the most exalted. This is not, however, always a uniform progression, as even the most casual reading of sources shows.  

Having attempted in the foregoing arguments to supply some idea of the historical and philosophical problems of an account of autonomistic musical aesthetics, it becomes expedient to

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80 Even operatic music can be nonrepresentational and still consist in the complete spectacle.

81 Some selection criteria for the sources consulted in the present work are offered in the next section (the final section of this Chapter).
argue more definitively how, for the purposes of the present work, music is autonomous.\textsuperscript{82} Literally, this means that music gives its own law to itself (Kant).\textsuperscript{83} Also, that music is independent (Hoffmann).\textsuperscript{84} The idea of music as a language for Rousseau,\textsuperscript{1761} depended (p.56) on the relative familiarity of musical elements, especially "melodious inflections".\textsuperscript{85} Music becomes its own dictionary: it represents reality by the correspondence of its musical conventions with emotional or other, primal associations. This very probably is and has been the perception of a great many listeners. Harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, textural, timbral, registral and sometimes even structural gestures become stereotyped as formulae in the listener's imagination. Memory and taste produce real meaning. Thus is the idea of music as an albeit wordless language

\textsuperscript{82} Some would say, possibly, that the autonomy aesthetic of music means that music ought to be autonomous. For the purposes of the present work it is held that music is autonomous, that there is justification for the idea that it ought to be so.

\textsuperscript{83} See especially Kant,\textsuperscript{1790},I,pp.168-83. Kant uses this phrase to characterise all artistic genius, including representational genius.

\textsuperscript{84} The terms "autonomy" and "independence" are generally equivalent in the present work. In the following discussion they are treated apart according to their occurrences in Kant and Hoffmann respectively.

\textsuperscript{85} See discussion in Ch.2.
perpetuated. Musical meaning is not accepted on its proper terms but instead forcibly reified, converted to intelligible reality.

Autonomistic musical aesthetics disturbs the parallels between music and language. The fundamental meaning of music is only musical. The sustained presence, especially in post-1700 music, of a highly articulated tonality, prior to its dissolution after Wagner and Liszt, has made it plausible-sounding to argue for the idea of music's having language-like features. But (with respect to musical aesthetics) what obtains for one style or even language of music must obtain for all. Music is music and language is language. Perhaps a certain formulaic predictability of tonal styles, expectation and resolution etc., has created a kind of folk memory within which, consciously or not, associations and representational identifications (which need not necessarily be linguistic) are constructed. It may be, ironically, that music is accommodated to the demands of language precisely because words cannot adequately describe the

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86 See, for example, Cooke, 1959.
87 In modern parlance harmony is the "language of music".
88 The example in mind here is Western art music but the point can be equally well applied to music of other cultures.
experience of music. The history of musical aesthetics may be a history of the extent to which this is recognised.

Autonomistic musical aesthetics is certainly antirepresentational in spirit, and this is reinforced after considering what music has the capacity to do. One can use various musical elements in order to resemble a sound object, such as the cry of a cuckoo. But even in this, possibly one of its most convincing levels of representation, the music cannot unmistakeably specify that the representation is of a cuckoo and not, say, another, identical sound object. At its best (alleged) representational powers, music is limited in what it can portray.

The question immediately arises, can representation be fettered and yet remain essentially representation? Where the most specific kinds of representation, particularly, for example, visual modes, are concerned, the representation may lack some sensory communication, for example the inability of a painting directly to represent sound. One does not on that basis classify

89 One could argue, though, that Wackenroder, for example, came closer than most to describing the musical experience.

90 This question is posed in order to introduce the notion of whether autonomy and representation are mutually exclusive.
the painting as nonrepresentational. In music, however, the balance lies in the direction of lack of specificity. The visual arts can try to represent sound, for example the parallel lines drawn about the mouth of a cartoon character to indicate speech or shouting, but how can music traverse the intermediate boundary in order to depict visual properties? It has to rely on association for this. So does the convention of the lines indicating the cartoon character's shout. But the point is that the cartoon gives ever more complete information about the cartoon character or person than ever representational music could. And music ought not to have to rely so heavily on associations in order for it to be a representational art.

Present in Kant's moral philosophy as the "purification of the will" (Caygill, 1995; p.89), autonomy is for Kant (as for Shaftesbury) a necessary condition for the free judgement of taste (Kant, 1790; I, p.220). In what sense does music give the law to itself? This is difficult. Scruton, 1983 notes (p.37):

"Indeed, it has been more usual to give a negative than a positive definition of the absolute in music. The best way to speak of a thing that claims to be 'absolute' is to say what it
is not." But one must also think in positive terms. The early Romantics did, deemphasising logic and conforming even reason to their effusive manifestos.\textsuperscript{91} Can a positive, logical account be found, though? Perhaps mainly, or only, by means of a set of positivistic assertions. An example is that the subject of music is music. Music (for the early Romantics) is the most mysterious and therefore the most progressive and precious of the arts. Music is seductive: it draws the attention to itself. And so on with music's powerful properties. Is the assertion that music is autonomous a positive or negative one? Friedrich Schlegel wrote (Day and Le Huray eds., 1981; p.247): "All pure music must be philosophical and instrumental. ...Must not purely instrumental music create its own text?" Instrumental music, like abstract art, is a philosophy.\textsuperscript{92} It actuates its own philosophical text.\textsuperscript{93} Music, then, autonomously acquires its own meaning. This meaning is independent of other sorts of meaning.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{91} See especially the discussion of Wackenroder in Ch.3.

\textsuperscript{92} Cf. Tatarkiewicz, 1962: "It is not enough to say that modern art with its cosmic pretensions is inspired by philosophy; it wants itself to be a philosophy" (p.236).

\textsuperscript{93} This is perhaps a compelling reason why a history of music ought also to be a history of musical aesthetics.
What is music independent of? Hoffmann wrote: "When music is spoken of as an independent art the term can properly apply only to instrumental music, which scorns all aid, all admixture of other arts, and gives pure expression to its own peculiar artistic nature" (Charlton ed., Clarke tr., 1989; p.236). Music is, or ought to be, free from mingling with other arts. It should have options. But it should also be free from classical aesthetic doctrine. Hoffmann did not, however, conceive of all instrumental music as falling into this category. It seems (pp.236-7) that he reserved the crown of aesthetic autonomy only for music which eschews the representation of "circumscribed sensations or even events" (p.236). Music is, as already argued previously, independent of the representation of definite concepts and ideas. It cannot depict the sense of a text or the scene of a picture. Neither can music convey definite emotions, though it is undeniable that the arousal of emotions is often part and parcel of the musical experience. If one is to say that music represents

94 This may imply that music is a language, but a unique one. It must be noted that the idea that musical meaning subsists in any music is an assumption. It seems that one cannot pin down precisely what musical meaning is. For some, autonomy would also imply absence of any notion of meaning.
indefinite emotions, perhaps they may as well be called musical emotions. Music often appears to be mood-laden.\textsuperscript{95} Music can also, it is thought, represent on the basis of its analogy with movement. But in this one can at best still only hear something moving, not any particular thing. Other arts can be more precise in depicting exactly what is supposed to be moving.

Music's autonomy may be both positively and negatively defined. Indeed, one may see more negative than positive definitions but that need not matter as to the end result.

Instrumental music is autonomous music \textit{par excellence}. The Romantic view of instrumental music in relation to the other arts was that "it is the highest of the arts, because it speaks the inarticulate, mysterious language of the soul. By its very nature it has the closest affinity to the fluctuating, ineffable quality of the inner affective life. Thus it is most able to suggest, embody, symbolise and stimulate this inner stream" (Hosler, 1981; p.240). The present work attempts to detail aspects of how this view came about.

\textsuperscript{95} See, for example, Pratt, 1975.
Methodology, and source selection

Dahlhaus, 1978 expresses (p.63) a central premise of Romantic musical aesthetics: "literature about music is no mere reflection of what happens in the musical practice of composition, interpretation, and reception, but rather belongs, in a certain sense, to the constituent forces of music itself." The substance of music depends on its categories of reception, especially in the case of instrumental music in the 1790s (ib.). Dahlhaus is pinpointing what he takes to be a particularly Romantic phenomenon. It in turn explains why Romanticism cannot be properly understood without reference to music: "the pathos used to praise instrumental music was inspired by literature: were it not for the poetic conceit of unspeakability, there would have been no words available for reinterpreting the musically confusing or empty into the sublime or wonderful" (ib.).96

Taking a cue from the Romantic interest in literature as an integral part of the understanding of music, one must ask what is the importance for the exposition of musical aesthetics of

96 Dahlhaus adds (p.67): "Romantic poetics feeds on the idea of absolute music as much as the idea of absolute music, conversely, is nourished by poetry."
general literature in other periods? A central feature of the present work is that sources which do not discuss music primarily (or, in some cases, at all) are considered to be potentially helpful in the investigation of musical aesthetics. For example, treatises on other arts are explored for their affirmation of doctrine, whether tending towards *mimesis* and intelligible meaning or towards autonomism (an immanence of feeling and inner reference). Another vital feature is that apparently mimetically-oriented texts are scrutinised for what they reveal - even if only "by default" - of autonomistic musical aesthetics. This is necessary in order to recognise some texts' ambiguity concerning the autonomy aesthetic. These two features taken together considerably widen the resources used in the present inquiry.

The present work may in one sense be regarded as an anthology of source readings chosen for a single purpose: to delineate the contradiction of utilitarian musical aesthetics on the one hand and autonomistic musical aesthetics on the other. This delineation is goal-directed towards Hoffmann's writings, since they show eminently how inspiring and yet also how
logical Romantic criticism could be. But if it is an anthology
the present work is also a history, charting, through a selection
of classical, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources, the
aesthetic reception of instrumental music. This is done only via
aesthetics and not sociology. The present work does not seek to
provide a critique of modern-day thought on the autonomy
aesthetic but rather, where desired, to use this thought
critically to illuminate the historical development of
autonomistic musical aesthetics. For this reason philosophy is
involved at an appreciable level. The work is therefore what
might be termed a philosophical reception history. It is a
chronology which is informed by philosophy. One part of the
chronology (Ch.2) deals with what are taken to be largely
mimetically-oriented sources while the other (Chs.3-4) examines
more autonomistic sources.

Each source is dealt with more or less completely. Passages
from the source are quoted according to whether they are thought
to display more or less of a favourable attitude towards
autonomistic musical aesthetics. The discussion in Ch.2 of
selected classical sources is necessary in order to detail the
fundamental aesthetic background to eighteenth-century thought. Attitudes in the works of Plato and Aristotle towards music as art are discerned by (i) examining their general theory of art (most notably in *Republic*, Book X), and (ii) noting references to music in the context of (i). Despite the fact that Plato and Aristotle and others often treat music simply as a moral medium, it is important to seek in their general aesthetics a measure of sympathy with the autonomy aesthetic, wherever this may be found, and apply this sympathy to the case of music. This is done, for example, by considering the respects in which the mimetic doctrine is critically evaluated and qualified, etc. Naturally, contexts which discuss or might have a bearing on the aesthetic situation of instrumental music are treated with interest. The problems are always discernment, incorporation of any findings into the history of ideas, and the philosophising of the whole picture. The history-of-ideas approach is most marked in Chs.2-3, which provide an intellectual backdrop to

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97 Autonomistic musical aesthetics is often acknowledged negatively, i.e. the terms of autonomy are given but ridiculed. This is why, in theory at any rate, no sources should be excluded or ignored because they are primarily contrary to the autonomy aesthetic.
Ch.4. The concern in Chs.2-3 is to give a flavour of how contemporary writers, in whatever category, saw musical and, to some extent, general aesthetics, in all its variety.

The sources discussed in the body of the present work\(^98\) can be divided into four groups: (1) classical and early medieval (Boethius); (2) eighteenth-century British, French and German, both pro- and countermimetic; (3) ideas of genius and the British influence on Continental thought (Dryden, Shaftesbury, Kant); (4) aspects of the critical reception of the Viennese classical trinity, especially by Hoffmann.\(^99\) Although the sources selected for the present work in no way exhaust the possibilities of what might have been chosen, a somewhat representative selection has been aimed at, with a particular intention sometimes of discussing texts which are not ordinarily considered to be part of the investigative canon of autonomistic (or any) musical aesthetics.

\(^{(1)}\)

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98 I.e. excluding the (explanatory) source readings in the present chapter.

99 In the ensuing discussion of source selection, references are to the numbers of these source groups. In terms of the present work, the correspondences to the chapter organisation are as follows: (1) - Ch.2; (2) - Chs.2-3; (3) & (4) - Ch.4.
Plato, Aristotle, Horace and "Longinus" provided a base for art theory and literary criticism whose principles would prevail until the advent of the post-Enlightenment. It is not the intention of the present work to supply a survey of ancient music theory but rather to examine the presentation of the mimetic ideal in these selected classical writers and/or to check what attitudes they display towards instrumental music. The principle of selection of the four writers mentioned above is that their doctrinal formulations were foundational to art theory up to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (at least until the 1770s).

In addition, three other writers - Aristoxenus, Boethius and Lucretius - were selected, in order to examine their attitudes to music *per se*, given that the principle of imitation subsisted. The results show that classical and early medieval writers were well aware of the inherent power of music.\(^{100}\) Of Aristoxenus' theoretical efforts Neubauer, 1986 notes that he "promised to anchor his claims in the phenomena themselves, by starting with accurate sense observations" (p.44). Lucretius' suggestion that

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\(^{100}\) St Augustine was for devotional reasons reluctant to allow himself to acknowledge the lure of music. See Strunk, 1952, pp.73-5.
music originally came about as an imitation of bird song
complemented the onomatopoeic theory of language and took root
for centuries until eighteenth-century critics pointed out that
music in fact has no prototype in nature (p.133). Boethius'
"harmonic tie between body and soul allows the stirring of
emotions through music and forms...the foundation of affective
theories of music" (p.14). 101 Each of these three writers,
however, tries to vindicate music in itself and in order to do
that is willing to expound on the activity of the senses, even
setting classical doctrine to one side where necessary.

(2)

In Ch.2, British, French and German mimetically-oriented
writings are dealt with in chronological order. In Ch.3 a more
dynamic organisation is presented, by nationalities. The present
work operates through the presentation of source readings and
does not primarily attempt to show eighteenth-/early nineteenth-
century regional characteristics of the dissolution
of mimetic aesthetics. 102 The organisation into nationalities

101 Boethius is the only early medieval writer considered in the present work. The main thrust of the argument is classical thought and its survival in the eighteenth century.
in Ch.3, however, serves the end of variety of presentation and helps by pointing towards regional concerns as a possible background for Ch.4. For the present summary, each regional grouping is dealt with separately, in the first instance those writings which are taken to be largely mimetically-oriented.

**British (excluding Dryden and Shaftesbury)**

Hogarth, 1753 is quoted in Lessing, 1766 (p.123). Hogarth adhered to the "proportion of parts" theory of beauty (Atkins, 1951; p.336). His work formed part of the eighteenth-century renaissance of art and art criticism in Britain, the topical questions being (i) the relation between poetry and painting, (ii) the reappraisal of what constituted essential elements of beauty in art (pp.343-5). This renaissance was "planned" (Lipking, 1970; p.11): "Looking for forbears, artists both make and find the history of art" (ib.). The logic of British criticism, however, for example in Hogarth, 1753 and Burke, 1759, could not get to grips with empirical psychology. The processes of the mind were made to have "visual and emotional

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102 For such an attempt see, for example, Hosler, 1981.
"What had changed between Du Fresnoy and Reynolds was a matter of context, the kind of system within which doctrine might be embodied. The authors of the eighteenth century looked for new ways to make old ideas convincing" (p.39). This cannot be an absolute generalisation, though it is true of Reynolds. Reynolds admired "Longinus" work (Atkins, 1951; p.187). Reynolds, 1797 bound himself by reason, "insisting in general on the guidance of reason (even for deciding when reason was not to be the test), also emphasizing the need in appreciating great art for resorting to 'a higher sense' and 'a greater reason'" (p.363).

Reynolds tried to remain loyal to his intellectual pedigree while at the same time taking account of contemporary developments. But this did not mean embracing the central concerns of the autonomy aesthetic. "Imagination and emotion, even when they are given special liberties, always serve the higher goals of truth and of instruction" (Mahoney, 1978; p.134). Imagination and emotion are not free from didactic purpose in Reynolds' thought.

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103 As opposed to those concerns which are grounded in experience of externals, in empirical data.
Twining, 1789 differentiates "between arts whose media are 'iconic',...in that they resemble what they denote, and those which [like music] are significant only by convention" (Abrams, 1953; p.14). Twining was keen to understand and cling to what he took to be the spirit of Aristotelian doctrine, yet realised that, in eighteenth-century musical aesthetics, "expression" was increasingly doing duty for "imitation". In this scheme of thought the way forward for musical aesthetics, already pointed to, for example, in Smith, 1777, was "the notion that the place to look for the meaning of music could only be in men's responses to it" (Lipking, 1970; p.219). Among the many lucid and interesting points that Twining makes is, for example, his effort to contrast eighteenth-century instrumental music with its ancient classical forbears by contending that the latter was more vocal in style and therefore more imitative (Twining, 1789; p.50).

This appeal to human nature in the judgement of art, instead of recourse to the application of rules, is evident in Burke, 1759. Burke was influenced by Continental inquiries into the nature of beauty, the interrelations of the arts etc.

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104 See also Abrams, 1953, p.92.
(Atkins, 1951; pp. 333-4). Burke, 1759 "followed new lines of critical inquiry; and it is in its suggestiveness, rather than in its positive teaching, that the merits of the work consist" (p. 337). Lipking, 1970 notes interestingly (p. 173) that Burke's view of the effects of poetry and rhetoric "made Reynolds uncomfortable". This would surely have been all the more disquieting for Reynolds since he relied partly on Burke for criticism of his own writings (p. 180). One point of interest of Burke, 1759 for the present work is his deep acknowledgement of the power of sound. Burke is in this and other respects proto-Romantic.

Smith, 1777 presents a comprehensive treatment of instrumental music aesthetics, indeed it may be among the first significant works to do so. Smith's argument reposes in the realm of the strictly musical: the emotions which music has the capacity to imitate he calls "Musical Passions" (II.13, p. 192); imitable sounds are "musical sounds" (II.17, p. 195). It is only on this basis that Smith admits the concept of imitation, which, he continually emphasises, is less viable a model for instrumental music than it is for vocal music. He notes later:
But if instrumental Music can seldom be said to be properly imitative, even when it is employed to support the imitation of some other art, it is commonly still less so when it is employed alone. Why should it embarrass its melody and harmony, or constrain its time and measure, by attempting an imitation which, without the accompaniment of some other art to explain and interpret its meaning, nobody is likely to understand?

(II.29; p.203)

Smith is thus, like Chabanon, aware of instrumental music as being a problematic case as far as conventional theory went.

Murray,1977 notes (p.82) that Blake's intellectual quarrels with Reynolds built up over many years. Reynolds' engagement with the past "is not yet either truly historical or Romantic; that is, it is less an interest in the pastness of the past, or in the past as an exotic alternative to the present, than it is an interest in those aspects of the past that could be used to guide or ornament the present" (pp.83-4). Blake was hostile to this approach, seeing Reynolds'"reasoned eclecticism...as self-contradiction and even hypocrisy" (p.84). Blake,1808 is, for instance, disapproving of the practice of imitation of contemporaries (p.309). He is especially critical of Reynolds' views on genius, which he finds too methodical and unspontaneous
Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century criticism in English forms an impressive body of thought with regard to instrumental music aesthetics and all of the doctrinal reorientations which affected it. Some British works, like Beattie, 1776, for example, found their way to the Continent. The present work does not examine the interrelations of Western European musical aesthetics as such: that must be an ongoing study, one which is certainly rich in possibilities.

French

Thomas, 1995 conceives music's mission in the eighteenth century as follows: "Because of the crucial place music occupies in the narratives used to imagine the origin and history of culture, it will afford insight into the eighteenth century's conception of and attitude towards knowledge, representation, and meaning" (p.10). Rousseau, 1761, in keeping with this mission, "begins from the premise that the importance of vocalisations lies not in the physical capacity to produce sound or imitate it, but in the specifically human ability to use vocal sounds as
signs" (p.53). Rousseau's animosity to unintelligible music\footnote{Of which, in eighteenth-century theory, instrumental music was the prime category.} is strikingly evident in the brief Ch.17: "In dropping its oral tone and sticking exclusively to the establishment of harmonics, music becomes noisier to the ear and less pleasing to the heart. As soon as it stops singing, it stops speaking. And then, with all its accord and all its harmony it will have no more effect upon us" (Rousseau,1761; p.65). Rousseau would appeal to the heart but maintained that the best way for this was through vocalisation, song, melody; "unmeaning" instrumental music was subordinated to this requirement.\footnote{Oliver,1947 even notes: "What actually happened was that Rousseau carried his definition of melody as musical discourse to the ridiculous extreme of suppressing the word musical entirely" (p.66).}

Diderot,1775/6 occupies a significant place in Diderot's mature output. It is his "last important contribution to art criticism" (Wilson,1972; p.678) and in it "there is much to be learned about [his] aesthetics" (p.679). Diderot advances "one step nearer an aesthetic that insisted on greater moral earnestness" (ib.). Thomas,1995 says of Diderot's musical aesthetics: "Whereas for Condillac or Rousseau the link between
music and passion was validated in a primitive scene, for Diderot that connection holds within it the future promise of culture" (p.10). This at any rate accords with Diderot's faith in posterity. The choice of Diderot,1775/6 for discussion in the present work, as opposed, for example, to some of his more specifically musical writings, is made on the basis of expanding the range of sources for the history of musical aesthetics.107

Morellet,1771 is concerned with a logical exposition of the capacity of music to be an imitative art. Music is likened "to a metaphorical or onomatapoetical language. The musician chooses objects in nature that can be imitated by sounds or motion so that both the objects and their imitation have one element in common. He admits that this type of imitation implies resemblances or rather analogies, a weak form of imitation" (Maniates,1969; p.126). Morellet,1771 must be read very particularly with both representational and autonomistic doctrines in mind. It is quoted and developed in Chabanon,1779 (pp.299 ff.). Chabanon's discussion is lucid and innovative, arguing that "music may have effects and exhibit a certain

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107 See especially Oliver,1947, Ch.V.
representational capacity, but it does not contain any natural
or predetermined meaning" (Thomas, 1995; p.32). There is much to
be considered in French musical aesthetics, however; Oliver, 1947,
for example, notes: "Like so many other French critics, Chabanon
was forced to follow the lead of the *Encyclopédie* in spite of
himself" (p.147). Eighteenth-century French musical aesthetics
certainly constitutes, on the philosophical level, a subtle,
sometimes perplexing mixture, but its contribution to the early
nineteenth-century formulation of musical absolutism must
nonetheless be investigated.

**German (excluding Kant and Hoffmann)**

Winckelmann's writings were very influential, exalting
ancient Greece and classical ideals: "Beauty is divine: it is
reflected in the beautiful minds, bodies and statues of the
Greeks and the best paintings of Italians such as Raphael. This
beauty is ideal in the many senses available to Platonising
aesthetics: it had been an ideal realised in ancient Greece,
under a serene sky, in a free society, where men and women could
develop perfect bodies and harmonious minds" (Wellek, 1955;
pp.149-50). Winckelmann, 1755 recommends to the artist the
imitation of classical models: "The concepts of totality and perfection which he discovers in the nature of antiquity will refine and give concrete shape to the diffuse concepts he abstracts from the nature of today: he will learn to combine the beauties he finds in it with ideal beauty, and, with the help of the sublime forms which are constantly present to him, he will then be able to legislate for himself" (p.38). The history of musical aesthetics is also a history of art theory. Neither one can neglect the other. Although Winckelmann,1755 does not discuss music, it forms an apt preamble to Lessing,1766. Lessing was opposed to deductive principles in German philosophy which followed the lead of Batteux, but still concluded that poetry is equally as imitative as painting (Abrams,1953; p.13). Lessing's work had profound effects on the development of German literary life (Wellek,1955; pp.167 ff.). Winckelmann,1755 and Lessing,1766 together constitute a significant contribution to German classicism of the period.

When one moves to a consideration of Wackenroder's work, the

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108 Ch.I of Lessing's work begins with a quotation from Winckelmann,1755.
picture changes substantially. Wackenroder's writings are significant not least for their influence on Hoffmann (Charlton ed., 1989; especially pp.12-14, 40-6). Art is conceived as a spiritual environment, art religion: "I desire for myself no glittering earthly happiness; but is it not even to be granted unto me to live once, O holy art, totally for you?" (Schubert tr., 1971; p.86). Dahlhaus, 1978 notes: "The origin of Wackenroder's art religion would seem to lie at least partially in the layer of pietism and Empfindsamkeit that was of central importance to the prehistory of Romanticism as a whole" (p.90). Wackenroder's worship of art is, for all intents and purposes, literal ("almost unmetaphorical" - p.81). Dahlhaus explains how Wackenroder's understanding of the musical experience is Romantic:

The kind of listening that Wackenroder describes in "Joseph Berglinger" must seem contradictory to a reader who has grown up with the aesthetic categories of the twentieth century. On the one hand, he speaks of intense concentration on the matter itself, the musical phenomenon, the topic; on the other, of "perceptible images and new ideas" suggested by the music. And both Wackenroder and Tieck [...] describe their impressions on hearing symphonies in a language characterised by its almost rampant metaphors. Yet one misunderstands the descriptions if one reads them with the undifferentiated mistrust a "formalist" has for all kinds of "hermeneutics". It is important that, in the terminology
of the time around 1800, they are neither "historical" nor "characteristic", but rather "poetic": they tell no story, and they avoid naming a specific, well-delineated pathos or ethos as whose expression the music is intended to be. Instead, they are meant to be attempts to speak of the poetic (not in the sense of "literary", but "metaphysical") nature of music in analogies that intertwine themselves into mysterious and labyrinthine figures, as though indicating that music is a "language above language".

(pp.82-3)

Wackenroder's thought is compatible with formalism, though this requires a little imagination: "The essence of all art is the poetisation of the emotions" (Schubert tr.,1971; p.192).

Wackenroder sublimates music, thereby bringing it to the centre of Romanticism. The Romantics would plead the cause of instrumental music as the prime example of why music should be given independent consideration.

(3)

The concept of direct sensory appeal instead of reason as criterion for the appreciation of art flowered in the late seventeenth century. "Longinus"' work helped in this emphasis on emotional rather than exclusively rational terminology in voicing the aesthetic experience. Out of this atmosphere sprang the notion of "taste", in a renewed sense, propagated by Dryden and
later taken up by Shaftesbury.\textsuperscript{109} Shaftesbury injected an
absolute requirement for taste:

\begin{quote}
[...\] only the sort of autonomy which was present only in a free polity conduced to autonomous judgement in other matters. Judgement in moral and political characters correlated with judgement in cultural matters. If autonomy was required to grasp character in moral and political forms, then it was required to grasp expressive forms as well. In short, liberty was required for taste. 
[...\] Shaftesbury suggested that a true public was found only under conditions of liberty. It was impossible for those who were not free to form judgements of any legitimacy since, if they were not free, their judgement had to be a reflection of some authority outside themselves. [...]

Concomitantly, under conditions of freedom, the progress of taste and politeness was irresistible.
\end{quote}

(Klein,1994; p.212)

Thus Shaftesbury's denunciations of "enthusiasm" in the political and religious spheres had an aesthetic point as well.

Kant takes due account of Shaftesbury's position as well as that of Wolff and his followers. Kant finds that the

quality of a judgement of taste concerns neither the interest in the agreeable (taste) nor that in reason (aesthetic); it is a judgement that pleases "apart from any interest". With respect to quantity, the judgement is universally valid; it pleases universally, but with reference neither to the sum of individual feelings (taste) nor to an objective good (aesthetic). In a

\textsuperscript{109} For these points see Osborne,1968, pp.105-6.
judgement that something is beautiful, the subject is neither charmed by the object (taste) nor instructed by its perfection; [...] the modality of a judgement of taste holds that something beautiful is necessarily so; it is an object of necessary delight, but not because it is "in possession of a definite objective principle" nor because it rests on an individual sense of necessity.

(Caygill, 1995; p.55)

The object of contemplation is apprehended disinterestedly. This is well in keeping with an autonomy aesthetic of instrumental music. Kant appears to be carefully (even unconsciously) laying foundations which instrumental music aesthetics can draw on.

(4)

A study of Hoffmann's music criticism benefits from the intellectual background which scrutiny of the preceding groups of sources has attempted to supply. Not unimportantly, Hoffmann's famous Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony can be said to be the apex of the present work. Some supporting sources are used, for example Mozart's letters (Anderson ed., 1966) and two Haydn biographies (Griesinger, 1810 and Dies, 1810).

In the Review of Witt's Fifth and Sixth Symphonies Hoffmann affirms the status of instrumental music: "the symphony, especially following the impetus it received from Haydn and Mozart, has become the ultimate form of instrumental music - the
For Hoffmann the issue is finally forced by Beethoven's genius: "Man wrestles with wild forces and seeks to civilise them. Beethoven's music reflects this struggle between the natural elements and the human will, this new-found desire to aspire to a position of control previously held by the Creator alone" (Schafer, 1975; p.80). It is the untempered genius which makes this possible that the world must now reckon with. Romanticism was the answer and Hoffmann's Review - described by Charlton ed., 1989 as "epoch-making" on all counts (p.236) - a seminal part of that answer.

**Concluding remark**

The present work may be thought to run on two separate tracks. On the one hand there is the picture of the autonomy aesthetic, in its application to and sublimation in instrumental music, built up by the detailed exposition of selected sources, comprising a unified treatment and yet also a series of individual statements. On the other there is a prehistory of the

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110 Charlton notes (ib.n5) that this remark of Hoffmann's stems from the essay on instrumental music in Wackenroder, 1799 and from the general outlook of the AMZ.
Romanticism of Hoffmann's Review, this document being seen as an example of the culmination of newer artistic and philosophical traditions which had emerged from the late seventeenth century onwards.

Ch.2 of the present work discusses mimetic aesthetics, from classical antiquity to Reynolds. Ch.3 discusses autonomistic aesthetics, from Burke to Wackenroder. Ch.4 traces the philosophical engagement with genius and how this vitally informed instrumental music criticism.
CHAPTER 2 -

CONTEXT: MUSIC AND THE ANTI-AESTHETIC
**Introduction**

A principal reagent in the emergence of late eighteenth-century autonomistic musical aesthetics was the antimimetic idea, present in various forms and to varying extents in European writings. Hence the necessary preliminary in the outline of the development of these aesthetics will be an examination of the original theories of imitation and other associable issues in classical doctrines.

This exposition is based on a reading of selected classical sources with two central questions in mind. The first consideration must be what pedagogical ideas of imitation as a doctrine can be found, since it was on this doctrine, *inter alia*, that much eighteenth-century aesthetics were to build and rely upon before their eventual rejection (and consequently the rejection of this classical doctrine itself). Secondly, it is obvious from the reading itself of these sources that there may legitimately\(^{111}\) be asked of them similar questions to those which it is imperative to ask in the cases of later writings. These

\(^{111}\) In the sense that there is sufficient scope or coverage in the classical sources considered of issues which directly or indirectly touch on the subject of pure instrumental music.
questions concern attitudes towards the validity of pure instrumental music as an experience in itself, a concept fundamental to autonomistic aesthetics.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{112} If newer perceptions of the nature of works of art in general, characterised by nonreferentiality (necessarily with an antimimetic approach) and therefore autonomy and especially visible in certain late eighteenth-century thought and onwards, are denotable by "autonomistic aesthetics", it is clear that the "problem" of instrumental music was indispensable to contemporary and further discussions of these aesthetics (see Ch.3). The examination of any discussions of this problem (if they may be interpreted as such) in classical aesthetics is for the sake of completeness.
Plato and Aristotle

An examination of the classical doctrine of imitation/representation (mimesis) and general theory of art\textsuperscript{113} is evidently an essential background to eighteenth-century thought but there are other, perhaps less immediately striking aspects of the classical discussions which are also necessary in order properly to qualify or contribute to the main doctrine (or principle) of art. The range of such aspects in Plato and Aristotle is very wide and whether or not they were consciously perceived and even transformed by eighteenth- (and nineteenth-) century writers they require a level of analysis on an equal footing with and in some

\textsuperscript{113} The examination of mimesis in Havelock,1963,Ch.2 rightly discusses its broad contextuality. It also attacks the familiar notion of Book X's being a theory of art but does not do so on completely convincing grounds. Havelock may be correct in claiming that the comparison between poet and painter is not made "on aesthetic grounds" (p.29) but the imaginative leap in the next, rather assumptive point is too great: "In fact, it is not too much to say that the notion of the aesthetic as a system of values which might apply to literature and to artistic composition never once enters the argument. Plato writes as though he had never heard of aesthetics, or even art." There is the provocative point (p.33n37) which, in seeking to repudiate the notion of mimetic art in Plato (poetry, Plato, it is argued, would tell us, is merely "that version of mimesis composed by a man who does not know what he is doing"), would seem to undermine such elements of the present discussion as connections between morality and art etc. and invalidate a range of modern discusional sources (for example Tate,1928). Without entering a detailed analysis of this position, it is held that the present discussion is not undermined by Havelock's specific arguments. Some brief objections are possible in their regard. It is, for example, clear that Havelock is very liberal about what he takes to be the modern sense of "art". The concept of a work or of a world of art seems radically to be denied Plato. And also, Havelock's construing of priorities in Platonic concepts is surely as particular as anyone else's (though this aspect does not come to the surface). However, the value of the (often controversial) arguments in general in Havelock,1963 is not doubted.
respects technically similar to that applied to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetics.\textsuperscript{114} Classifiable aspects devolving from the central topics of concern (the status, role and accepted mimetic method of the arts) include morality (the moral effects of the arts, education), appearance and reality (remarks on this underlie \textit{mimesis} but also include moral aspects such as true and apparent justice, pleasure etc.), theory of skills\textsuperscript{115} (the concentration by the individual on one specialisation), abstractive theories (abstraction, theory of forms, universals), ideal imitation (\textit{Republic}, Book X - with the famous expulsion of poetry from the ideal state\textsuperscript{116} - and comments elsewhere in Plato and in Aristotle), poetic/artistic inspiration (necessity of divine possession, inspiriting, moral effects), movement (and virtue, pleasure), moral and aesthetic autonomy (kinds of knowledge) and the theory of goodness and the Good (with virtue, beauty, order, proportion etc.).\textsuperscript{117} Answers to the second line of

\textsuperscript{114} These aspects are of course deserving of comparison with other writings earlier than the eighteenth century which are outside the present scope, particularly those writings which are examinable for early manifestations of autonomistic musical aesthetics, especially concerning instrumental music.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{techne}: see n12.

\textsuperscript{116} A qualified expulsion. See below, and Tate,1928.
inquiry in the present reading,\textsuperscript{118} which may be thought of as a somewhat different type of investigation (and its results possibly less influential with regard to the eighteenth century),\textsuperscript{119} will emerge from these devolutions and also from copious comments, occurring throughout Plato and Aristotle, on the effects and status of music.

Mimetic theory is so normal that it is even incorporable into dialectic technique (see, for example, \textit{Laws},897). The predominance of \textit{mimesis} is well illustrated by the criticism in \textit{Republic},377d ff. where the worst possible fault of the stories referred to (and, by extension, of imitative arts in general) is misrepresentation, "like a portrait painter whose portraits bear

\textsuperscript{117} These aspects and "theories" may, certainly in Plato, be perceived not so much as organised, systematic thought but, in some cases particularly, (merely) as discernible concepts not set forth dogmatically.

\textsuperscript{118} See p.x ("two central questions").

\textsuperscript{119} While many late eighteenth-century Romantic writers may have reverted to and become enthused of medieval literature and thought, it is a moot point whether their readings of classical literature prompted them to assimilate or even perceive any elements which, albeit in an unsystematic and inconsistent framework, may be seen as conducive to autonomistic aesthetics or antimimetic theories. Since one of their principal precepts was the opposition of the classical doctrine of imitation and contemporary survivals of it, and considering the range of other inspirational sources available to them, it would appear that the idea of such writers having paused, as it were, to take a very balanced view of classical texts is less likely given the (heady) tasks they were engaged in.
no resemblance to their originals" (377e). This ideal of truth in the aesthetic realm is achievable in the moral realm using similar constructs (see the outline of the "true philosopher", 490-1). Aristotle takes imitation as a *sine qua non* in human nature (it is "instinctual") and therefore art (*Poetics*, 1448a, 1448b5-10,20-4, 1460b5-10).

Discussions of *mimesis* in Plato conventionally focus on arguments in the theory of art in *Republic*, Book X, though any exclusive concentration on these arguments and supporting passages (for example, *Sophist*, 235d ff.) would overlook other relevant points contained in aspects such as are outlined above.\(^{120}\) The arguments in Book X are well understood by considering ideas elsewhere on art and morality.\(^{121}\) Earlier, Socrates invokes the arts in the search for justice:

"For there is no fault or flaw in any science or art,\(^{122}\) nor is it its business to seek the interest of anything

\(^{120}\) See pp.x-y. It has to be remembered that points relevant to *mimesis* and the theory of art are to be found in discussions which do not concern art at all but rather, for example, politics, metaphysics etc.

\(^{121}\) Since it may be regarded as principally on moral grounds that (existing) poetry was expellable from the ideal state.

\(^{122}\) *techne*: it is controversial to take this as meaning the arts in the modern-day sense - "skill" is the normal best translation. The term has many meanings in Greek, for example an art or craft, a set of rules, or system of making or doing. See also Urmson, 1990, pp. 162-3.
but its subject matter; each is faultless and flawless and right, so long as it is entirely and precisely what it is."

[...]

"Yet surely," I said, "all forms of skill rule and control their subject matter."

Thrasymachus only agreed to this very reluctantly.

(Republic, 342b,c)

The equality "it is...what it is" suggests later intimations of ideality.\(^{123}\) The idea that a skill (\textit{techne}) can "rule and control" something is a part of the alleged moral effects of poetry, the visual arts and music which are articulated elsewhere. A pivotal characteristic of the theory of skills, that each individual should practise vocationally only one skill (369b-370c and cf. also the complaint regarding the concept of multiple expertise, \textit{Sophist}, 232a), is used to underpin the argument of the moral effects of \textit{mimesis} on the Guardians (\textit{Republic}, 394e ff.). As Tate, 1928 points out, the "important question" is, "are the Guardians to be imitative? Here the two senses of the term 'imitative' appear. For the answer is both 'no' and 'yes'" (p.17). Before discussing "the two senses", which

\(^{123}\) The ideal being as little removed as possible from truth, which can better be viewed in the context of "that which is" (see \textit{Sophist}, 237b to end).
are vital in Book X and elsewhere, it is appropriate to examine
the aspect of appearance and reality.

Adeimantus’ citation (of unnamed "sages") in *Republic*, 365c
is in context ironic:

"For it is clear from what they tell me that if I am just, it will bring me no advantage but only trouble and loss, unless I also have a reputation for justice; whereas if I am unjust, but can contrive to get a reputation for justice, I shall have a marvellous time. Well then, since the sages tell me that 'appearance has more force than reality' and determines our happiness, I had better devote myself entirely to appearances;"

This moral critique in relation to aesthetics is addressed again in Book X and in similar discussions. Of immediate relevance, though, is the exposure of this irony in 365c (quoted above):

"We must not agree, therefore, about the kind of thing that ought to be said about human life, until we have defined justice, and the inherent advantages it brings to its possessor irrespective of appearances."

(392b)

The appreciation of reality is more in keeping with the end view ("happiness"). Reality is inherent in the Good and is contrary to "the realm of change" (526d-e). On principle, change is

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124 The translation of this phrase in Lee tr.,1974, p.149n1 has been adopted in the present discussion.
actually destructive of happiness:

"After thus consecrating the whole list of dances, he [Guardian of the Laws] must henceforth refrain from altering any feature either of the dancing or the singing: the same state and the same citizens (who should all be the same sort of people, as far as possible), should enjoy the same pleasures in the same fashion: that is the secret of a happy and blessed life."\(^{126}\)

*(Laws, 816)*

This life is the life of truth:

"Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. Let anyone who intends to be happy and blessed be its partner from the start, so that he may live as much of his life as possible a man of truth."

*(Laws, 730)*

Taking these points into account, reality and truth are far closer to partaking in the criteria of independence, sufficiency and perfection which define the Good (see *Philebus*, 67a; also 20d, 60c) than is the world of appearances.\(^ {127}\) But appearance is not

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\(^{125}\) Plato knew and responded to the "doctrine of flux" of the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus. See Woozley, 1967 and Stokes, 1967.

\(^{126}\) The case here against change in the arts appears to be amoral, in contrast to that in *Republic*, 424c (citing Damon).

\(^{127}\) In *Letter* 7, 342 representation (*mimesis*) is the last mentioned of three basic means of acquiring knowledge of something that exists (the first two being the name and verbal definition). These three means are more remote from the actual object of knowledge (e.g. a circle) than "knowledge and understanding and belief". There is a notable emphasis on the temporariness of
to be relegated entirely.\textsuperscript{128}

"If a painter, then, paints a picture of an ideally beautiful man, complete to the last detail, is he any the worse painter because he cannot show that such a man could really exist?"

"No, certainly not."

"But haven't we been painting a word picture of an ideal state?"

"True."

"Is our picture any the worse drawn, then, because we can't show how it can be realised in fact?"

"No."

"That, then is the truth of the matter. [...]"

\textit{(Republic,472d-e)}

What seems to be a kind of ideal imitation (where the object is ideal) is being used as an aesthetic analogy for a political description. This passage does not, however, just defend (or propose) ideal imitation and ideality; it also in a way defends the very phenomenon of "appearance making" in general (irrespective of ideal or nonideal senses) as having integrity as a route of access to the desired object. Given the normality of the representation. It is susceptible to being erased or destroyed and this is the most tangible example given of something that cannot happen to the actual object (presumably, in the case of a circle, to its "form"). Though verbal assignations and definitions are no better than representation as means of acquiring full knowledge (here the example is of visual representation), it is with the (substitutive) idea of representation of the object in a likeness instead of confronting "its essential being" that the dissatisfaction occurs (342-5).

\textsuperscript{128} Or perhaps, to put it slightly differently, it is not to be rendered abnormal even by comparison with that which is (truly) real.
of mimesis as artistic method, the enquiry whether the
distinction between ideal imitation and the rest of imitation
(which is but a pale shadow of it) is indispensable for
understanding the doctrine of imitation in the sense of imitation
per se is significant. This distinction may be said to result
from Plato's abstractive theories, specifically the theory of
forms or universals.

A classic outline of the theory of forms occurs in Republic,
476-7. Various stated purposes of the theory are isomorphic:

"I use this principle to distinguish your sight
lovers and art lovers and practical men from the
philosophers in the true sense, who are the subject of
our discussion."

129 The gist of certain parts of Aristotle, Poetics, 1447 is that poets must make imitations. Mimesis at least permeated the arts, if not also dialogic technique, dialectic etc. Thus it was a familiar contemporary concept. Prospects of nonrepresentational concepts in classical theory are outlined further in the present discussion.

130 The "realist" formulation of the theory, also the basic approach of Aristotle (see Woozley, 1967). Only Plato's version is discussed here. Commentators feel that Plato's theory of forms was neither fully fledged (Havelock, 1963; Kraut, 1992) nor predominant (Ryle, 1967). See Kraut, 1992, p. 14 for a concise account of various scholarly positions. The present discussion is concerned with such features of the theory of forms as are deemed discernible, without primarily considering their overall coherence.

131 Book V, which is not specified in Tate, 1928 as antecedent to Book X. Nor does Tate mention 476-7 (for example as the foundation for notions of "knowledge" and "opinion" - see p. 22).
(476b)

"For all its banter, the argument is merely saying that things fall into two classes. On the one hand there are things which can only ever exist for some purpose; on the other hand there are those things which are the purposes for which the members of the first class come into existence at any time."

*(Philebus, 53e)*

The true philosopher\(^\text{132}\) must "not confuse particular things and that in which they share" *(Republic, 476d)*, the latter being the form *(eidos)* or idea *(idea)*\(^\text{133}\). The one who recognises the Forms (being the qualities\(^\text{134}\) from which all "particular things" which participate in them originate - for example, a beautiful thing participates in the Form of Beauty, "beauty itself" *(476b-c)*) possesses knowledge whereas one who suffers from confusion is, not ignorant (antithetical to knowledge) but an opinion holder.

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\(^{132}\) The primacy of the true philosopher is importantly argued in Book V,2. Weighty approval of this mentality is given in *Letter 7*, 340. The unique political significance of the philosopher is a central conclusion of *Republic*, Book VII (521b). Perhaps one of the most telling comments is Socrates' advocacy of calling all (true) philosophers "divine" *(Sophist, 216b-c)*.

\(^{133}\) These Greek words as used in Plato are not always predicable of the Forms. See Kraut, 1992, p.7n32; also p.7n29. That the complete objectivity of the Forms necessitates their being denoted by "form" rather than "concept" is discussed interestingly in Havelock, 1963, pp.261-4.

\(^{134}\) Or objects, eternal and preexistent realities which, as the models of physical objects define their identities (as in the notorious Form of the Bed, Book X, 596b-597d). A useful distinction occurs in 507b: "the particulars are objects of sight but not of intelligence, while the forms are the objects of intelligence but not of sight."
According to the discussion 477-80 opinion falls somewhere between knowledge (correlated to "that which is") and ignorance ("that which is not"). Not only is knowledge correlated to "that which is" (being in the very nature of knowledge), it "knows what is as it is".\(^\text{135}\) The opinion holders "have eyes for the multiplicity of beautiful things and just acts, and so on, but are unable, even with another to guide them, to see beauty itself and justice itself"; they "cannot be said to know any of the things they have opinions about" (479e). In this discussion the opinion holders' position (or predicament, since they are deemed "unable to see") is not given in terms of an adherence to the world of appearances but it perhaps well could have been, especially in the light of Book X.

In Book X the first question to be answered is, what is representation? (595c). The theory of forms was, it would seem, by then taken for granted: "we always postulate in each case a single form for each set of particular things, to which we apply the same name" (596a, and see also 507a-b). Book X may be

\(^{135}\) Lee tr.,1974 importantly points out (p.271,n3) that "the Greek word (gignosko) [knows] has a suggestion of knowledge by direct personal acquaintance."
Describable as using the theory of forms as a basis in order to work out moral-aesthetic problems posed by mimesis.

The initial point regarding production is that "no craftsman could possibly make the form itself" (596b). Socrates assumes the Forms and describes the kinds of imitation (or perhaps craft) of a bed, but does not accord these kinds equal functional status. Describing the results of representation, he states that though "the things he creates are not real...there is a sense in which the painter creates a bed"; it is "an appearance of one" (596e). This apologetic process of constant qualification in respect of the phenomenon of appearance is carried forward to the carpenter who makes a particular bed, of whom if "what he makes is not 'what a bed really is', his

136 Imitation falls into the category of productive expertise (the other category being acquisitive expertise). See Sophist, 219a-c.

137 Socrates shortly states that the Forms are created by God (597c). Havelock,1963 suggests (p.270) that this conclusion is "incautious" (but see p.32, n28).

138 I.e. he fails to take into account the idea that, though an actual, particular bed is of a more "practical" order of utility than a painting of a bed, it is just as much an imitation or model of the Form of the Bed as the painting is. The different, purely aesthetic utility of the painting would therefore also be ignored or devalued. This is perhaps one way of criticising Plato's gradation of imitation in ideal and nonideal kinds.
product is not 'what is', but something which resembles 'what is' without being it” (597a). The imitative inequality is specified in 597d-e but firstly Socrates maintains "that there are three sorts of bed" (597b), the second and third sorts, it would seem, being based on the perceived distinction between the nonessential resemblance (carpenter) and the appearance (painter). The first sort, "ultimate reality" (597a), is made by God but even this example is not immune from being used to illustrate the dissatisfaction with appearance as such, as is seen in the posing of and answer to the question of why it is not possible to create more than one Form of Bed. The carpenter does make or manufacture something (a bed) while the artist does not, but "represents what the other two make" (597d-e). Therefore all "representative artists" are "at third remove from reality" ("the throne of truth") (597e). These points are conclusive in regard to the basic enquiry ("What is representation?") and may usefully be summarised thus:

139 597e: "We are agreed about representation, then."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originator of object (whether it be actual or of thought)</th>
<th>Designation of (&quot;object&quot;)</th>
<th>Does the originator &quot;create&quot;,&quot;make&quot; or &quot;manufacture&quot;?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>&quot;real bed-in-itself&quot; (&quot;in nature&quot;) - i.e. Form</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter (craftsman)</td>
<td>&quot;particular bed&quot;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist (special kind of craftsman)</td>
<td>representation of bed</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is the basis for the finer points which are outlined in the remainder of the argument (598 ff.).

The idea that "the artist [here, for the moment, painter] represents what the other two make" (597e) is open to qualification. It is (emphatically) the craftsman's artefacts and not the Forms which are represented by the artist (597e-598a).

140 Apparently, judging from the introduction 596b-e, in a derogatory sense (this is possibly verified in 598c-d). It is not specified in 596d why there are "various ways" of creating everything there is (according to the example) and what these are.
Even still further qualification is presented. The artist does not even represent the artefacts themselves but rather perspectives or "superficial appearances" of them (598a-b).

Whether the remove of representation from reality is deemed to be arithmetically calculable (597e), the key point developed is as follows:

"The art of representation is therefore a long way removed from truth, and it is able to reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is of a mere phenomenal appearance."

The "little grasp", which describes the feeling of incompleteness, inaccuracy or uncertainty resulting from having just perspective (and not the complete object), is in this argument immediately translated into the situation of the artist who represents that of which he does not have understanding: \(^{141}\)

"For example, a painter can paint a portrait of a shoemaker or a carpenter or any other craftsman without understanding any of their crafts; yet, if he is skilful enough, his portrait of a carpenter may, at a distance, deceive children or simple people into thinking it is a real carpenter."

(598b-c)

\(^{141}\) It is not here stated if this can be taken to mean sufficient understanding, i.e., whether it is necessary for the artist to have a complete absence of understanding of the things he represents before Plato's severe criteria apply.
It is to be noted that it is not permitted that the artist be capable of making a skilful portrait that would deceive all comers; as his knowledge of his subject is imperfect, so must the discriminative powers of his audience be. The argument is further compounded when the alleged myth of the "master of every craft" is exploded (598c-d). Does this logically refer back to the artist's being the universal mirror? What is damnable is the charlatan's "inability to distinguish knowledge, ignorance and representation" (598d), the point probably being that taking (representational) artists seriously entails just that.

The discussion 595c-598d may be thought to deal objectively with general concepts and cases of representation. It is at this stage statable that this, which serves to introduce ideal imitation, is inessential to the understanding of imitation *per se*. 598d-608b, the rest of Book X, is the notorious deposition of (current) poetry on moral-aesthetic grounds. Two points may briefly be noted. That the artist represents not a Form but a particular "is only half the story" (601b-c). An apparently new actor in Plato's exposition, the user or consumer, is brought in (601c), allowing the criterion that "the quality, beauty and
fitness of any implement or creature or action [is] judged by reference to the use for which man or nature produced it" and that thus "the user of a thing has the widest experience of it" (601d).\textsuperscript{142} The maker or craftsman has the obligation to obtain correct belief or opinion, about what he makes, from the user, who has knowledge, but the artist has none of these things, having (with introduction of the moral dimension) "neither knowledge nor correct opinion about the goodness or badness of the things he represents" (602a). Another element in Plato's critique concerns which part of the human nature or soul it is that representation appeals to. Because of the contradiction that would be involved (602e-603a) reason is not the prime candidate, but rather some "inferior" part (603a-b).\textsuperscript{143} These two points clinch the nonadmission to the ideal state of (current) poets (605a-b).\textsuperscript{144}

It has been seen how Plato employs abstract structures in

\textsuperscript{142} Seeming to imply that the user has the closest contact with the reality or essence of a thing.

\textsuperscript{143} In Plato's theory of pleasure, reason is its opposite. The theory of pleasure will be discussed below.

\textsuperscript{144} And, it would seem, by implication, representational artists in general.
order to provide concrete details of the ethos of mimetic theory and process. This raises the question of whether abstraction possibly is also conceivable as applicable to art, however Plato chooses to think of or describe art. Before moving to the area of the second main inquiry of the present discussion, it is appropriate to round off this treatment of the first inquiry with an examination of Aristotle, *Poetics*.

With regard to *mimesis* *Poetics* begins from the viewpoint of genre rather than concept. Aristotle is initially concerned to elucidate the differences between several art forms:

they differ from one another in three respects: either in using different media for the representation, or in representing different things, or in representing them in entirely different ways.

(1447a)

What are called (ib.) "media" constitute the common technical heritage of the imitative arts, recognisably "rhythm, music".

145 *rhythmos*: here "measured time" or "rhythm", this can also be translated "arrangement", "condition", "order", "structure" (see Barker ed.,1984, p.225n131).

146 Barnes ed.,1984,II,pp.2316-17 translates "harmony" and "melody". See especially Barker ed.,1984: "Harmonia, outside musical contexts, means 'fitting together', 'adapting' or 'adjusting' one thing to another. The noun and its cognates have a number of important and overlapping musical uses, of which the primary one is probably that which designates the adjustment or tuning of the notes of an instrument. What is created by tuning is a 'fitting together' of notes, a structure of relations that can be used to form the basis of melodies. In Plato, harmonia conceived generally is the melodic counterpart to rhythm: it is the scheme of order that distinguishes the notes used in a
and formal metre", which may be combined or used separately as the case of the specific art decrees. In the second "respect", human action is deemed to be a central representable object or theme (1448a1-5).\textsuperscript{147} In the moral analysis which follows, the observer or consumer of the work of art is assumed to be the standard of normality, i.e. since good and bad human actions are represented, the subjects of these actions "must be represented either as better than we are,\textsuperscript{148} or worse, or as the same kind of people as ourselves" (1448a4). This classifies the arts or the individual works in a distinct class of art:\textsuperscript{149}

It is clear that each of the kinds of imitation I have referred to will admit of these variations, and they will differ in this way according to the differences in the objects they represent. Such diversities may occur even in dancing, and in music for the flute\textsuperscript{150} and piece of music from a mere collection of pitches" (pp.163-4; see also ff.).

\textsuperscript{147} Perhaps the object of imitation \textit{par excellence}. It does not seem conclusive, for example, that Aristotle wishes to exclude the physical world as providing material for representation and (perhaps because his treatise is principally about poetry and the dramatic arts) confine his acceptation of "representable objects" to the sphere of human action alone.

\textsuperscript{148} By a similar token it would seem that it is preferable that the representation be better than the represented object. See 1454b8-14; also cf. \textit{Republic},472d-e.

\textsuperscript{149} Where distinct classes may be defined.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{aulos}: the most important wind instrument, usually equipped with a double reed. "In general, the music of the aulos was dramatic and emotional: it was versatile in mood and effect, capable of blaring vigour, plangent lamentation or sensual suggestiveness, and was used to create
the lyre; they occur also in the art that is based on language, whether it uses prose or verse unaccompanied by music.

Discussion of the third "respect", the manner of imitation, is confined to literature - poetry and drama. It primarily notes the various representational perspectives: straight narration, narration mixed with representation, and dramatic representation (without narration) (1448a19-24).

Although the methodical, taxonomic approach in the Poetics does not seem to encompass or favour the expository formation of a conceptual structure (more dialectically achieved in Plato) of what mimesis means, general principles are constantly presented. In 8 (1451a16-35) some limits to representation are prescribed.

It is not seemly to represent everything which happens to one person as not every action or set of actions will provide unity of plot (16-20). Aristotle summarises:

vivid and diverse forms of 'representation'" (Barker ed.,1984; p.15).

kithara: this is one of a family of instruments, each of which consisted of a soundbox from which strings of equal length ran up over a bridge to a crossbar; ordinarily there were approximately eight strings (Barker ed.,1984; p.4); "from the sixth century, if not earlier, what we may call the kithara proper, or concert kithara, was almost always preferred for the purpose of public performance. ...it was quite large, often a metre or more in height, solid in construction, and capable of producing a substantial volume of sound" (p.14).

From the preceding discussion on beauty (1450b34-1451a1), unity is an aesthetic prerequisite.
Thus, just as in the other imitative arts each individual representation is the representation of a single object, so too the plot of a play, being the representation of an action, must present it as a unified whole; and its various incidents must be so arranged that if any one of them is differently placed or taken away the effect of wholeness will be seriously disrupted. For if the presence or absence of something makes no apparent difference, it is no real part of the whole.

(30-5)

The artistic method or norm, *mimesis*, is intimately bound up with the aesthetic aim.

In representational content, i.e. the assimilable matter of a work of art, is favourably compared to factual content, real-life events (1451a36-b7). For "it is not the poet's function to describe what actually happened, but the kinds of things that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are, in the circumstances, either probable or necessary." "The difference between the historian and the poet" is "that one tells of what has happened, the other of the kinds of things that might happen. For this reason poetry is more philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than history; for while poetry is concerned with universal truths, history treats of particular facts."\(^{153}\)

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\(^{153}\) Barnes ed., 1984, II, p.2323 translates "universals" and "singulars".
Presumably, poets and imitative artists tell more than history, which is or should be already known or accessible, does. There is truth that is acquirable from representations ("poetic truth").

In general, Aristotle's mimetic theory of art in *Poetics* is thoroughly summarised at the beginning of the complex 25:

Like the painter or any other artist, the poet aims at the representation of life; necessarily, therefore, he must always represent things in one of three ways: either as they were or are, or as they are said to be or seem to be, or as they ought to be.

(1460b7-10)

In the present discussion the priority has not been to explore all significant avenues generated by Aristotle's account of representation, but some of these may now be relevant when addressing the second line of inquiry (see p.x), how the case of music is treated, drawing on aspects so far encountered and others which may be useful.

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154 There is shortly also the qualification that there is no disgrace to the poet in writing about historical facts. See 1451b29-32.

155 The present discussion of *mimesis* (and its conclusion later, dealing with classical writers other than Plato and Aristotle) is, in addition to the introduction in Ch.1, intended to provide a sample fund of background concepts for the modern literature (eighteenth century onwards) discussed elsewhere in the present work.
In order to appreciate Plato and Aristotle's aesthetic attitudes to instrumental music many aspects (already introduced in the present work) are considerable - abstraction, the nature of artistic inspiration, the theory of pleasure and aesthetic theory postulating a conceptual structure in the light of which individual references to the status of pure music or sound may be assessed.

There are negative judgements on the idea of novelty for its own sake (Republic,424b-c and Laws,797 on moral-political grounds, Ethics,1175a5-10 on psychological grounds). But, even within the classical tradition of representational art (albeit it is rejected on moral grounds in Book X) that this would seem to necessitate, there are also references interpretable for a notion, such as it may be, of abstract art. In Republic,438e

The justification of this inquiry and the extent of its separateness from the foregoing account of mimetic pedagogy are not explicit considerations in the present discussion.

In the present work it is taken as axiomatic that the aesthetic appreciation of pure sound, embodiable in purely instrumental music, requires an effort of abstraction, at the very least an abstraction from the associationist mode of thinking necessitated by mimetic theory.

It is assumed here that, whatever representational elements there may be in a given abstract work, the whole work may not be taken to be representational. The present working definition of a work of abstract art lies in the band between a work which has some intentional representation and one which has none, inclusive. The final judgement on an abstract work must be that it is nonrepresentational. But see, for example, Osborne,1976 and the discussion in Ch.1.
there is the acceptance that each field of endeavour must be understood on its own terms, in the example given the intellectual act involved being "in consequence no longer called knowledge simply, but medical knowledge, by addition of a qualifying epithet". This raises no problems as to the apprehension of music\textsuperscript{159} but it seems now implicitly open whether visual art should in this light necessarily be representational: the grafting of external reality onto the canvas (the imitation of reality) by no means exclusively exhausts "visual knowledge".\textsuperscript{160} For Aristotle abstract art does not appear to be condemned out of hand but is instead more mildly denounceable:

The plot, then, is the first essential of tragedy, its life blood, so to speak, and character takes the second place. It is much the same in painting; for if an artist were to daub his canvas with the most beautiful colours laid on at random, he would not give the same pleasure as he would by drawing a recognisable portrait in black and white.

\textit{(Poetics, 1450a37-b2)}

\textsuperscript{159} What is required is "musical knowledge".

\textsuperscript{160} In the present discussion it is not sought primarily to investigate if mimesis certainly derived specifically as a result of either the visual or verbal senses, or a combination of both. It may be supposed briefly that music was thought to be imitative because of its role as an art or skill, since the verbal and visual analogies, in their moral-aesthetic implications, served also for the discussion of music.
Probable impossibilities are to be preferred to improbable possibilities. Stories should not be made up of irrational incidents; anything irrational should as far as possible be excluded, or if not, at least kept out of the tale proper.

(1460a27-30)

Taking first problems relating to the essentials of the poetic art: if the poet has depicted something impossible, he is at fault indeed, but he is justified in doing it as long as the art attains its true end, as I have described it, that is, as long as it makes this or some other part of the poem more striking. [...] It is a less serious fault not to know that a female deer has no horns than to make an unrecognisable picture of one.

(1460b23-6,31)

The principle of (political) ostracism is invoked to discount a particular possible facet of abstraction, disproportion:

The same refusal to tolerate that which stands out may be seen also in the other arts and sciences. A painter would not allow the symmetry of his representation of a living creature to be destroyed by making one foot disproportionately large, however magnificent the foot might be.

(\textit{Politics,}1284b7-10)

This comes from the ethical doctrine of the virtuous mean \textit{(Ethics,}1106a14 ff.\textit{)} and the avoidance of extremes \textit{(Politics,}1295a35-8,1309b17-1310a12\textit{)}. 159
Prior to considering how these indications concerning abstract art and other comments may bear on concepts of instrumental music it is suitable first to note what is offered regarding processes basically external to the finished work of art itself, namely theories of artistic inspiration (being antecedent and perhaps present to the artwork)\textsuperscript{161} and pleasure (consequent on it - the immediate reception history).

The normal (theorised) phenomenon of inspiration is that of the Muses:\textsuperscript{162}

"if a man comes to the door of poetry untouched by the madness of the Muses, believing that technique alone will make him a good poet, he and his sane compositions never reach perfection, but are utterly eclipsed by the performances of the inspired madman."

\textit{(Phaedrus,245)}

"You see, I understand the poets inform us that they bring their lyric poetry to us from certain gardens and glades of the Muses, by gathering it from honey springs, like bees, and flying through the air like they do. And they

\textsuperscript{161} Artistic inspiration has been, in both classical and more recent viewpoints, immanent to the artwork. For the purposes of the present discussion, inspiration is an immaterial factor external to the material or conceived artwork and temporally antecedent to it.

\textsuperscript{162} Nine goddesses, daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne. Some, like Euripides and Aeschylus, considered them to be synonymous with music itself. See, for example, Barker ed.,1984, pp.78,87.
are right. A poet, you see, is a light thing, and winged and holy, and cannot compose before he gets inspiration and loses control of his senses and his reason has deserted him. No man, so long as he keeps that, can prophesy or compose. Since, therefore, it is by divine dispensation and not in virtue of a skill that they compose and make all those fine observations about the affairs of men [...] the only thing they can compose properly is what the Muse impels them to [...] Each of them is hopeless at anything else. The reason is that they utter these words of theirs not by virtue of a skill, but by a divine power [...] the god relieves them of their reason, and uses them as his ministers, just as he uses soothsayers and divine prophets - so that we who listen to them may realise that it is not they who say such supremely valuable things as they do, who have not reason in them, but that it is the god himself who speaks, and addresses us through them.”

(Ion,534a-d)

The power of the Muse is likened to magnetisation (533d-e). It is contagious. But for all the apparently good results of divine inspiration, the same criticism of the poets as in Book X is applicable - poets, though maybe divinely inspired, nonetheless lack knowledge of what they say. In Aristotle an important element in the question of divine inspiration is realism in

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163 *Phaedrus*,245: "the noble effects of heaven-sent madness."

164 This image may bear comparison to the levels of imitation outlined in Book X. The image is clarified in 535e-536b.

165 See Asmis,1992,pp.341-3. The inadequacy of divine inspiration may be linkable to its opposition, like that of pleasure, to reason.
As far as possible, too, the dramatic poet should carry out the appropriate gestures as he composes his speeches, for of writers with equal abilities those who can actually make themselves feel the relevant emotions will be the most convincing - agitation or rage will be most vividly reproduced by one who is himself agitated or in a passion. Hence poetry is the product either of a man of great natural ability or of one not wholly sane; the one is highly responsive, the other possessed.

(Poetics, 1455a28-33)

The realistic element in performance is extensive to the actual composition or inspiration.

The concept of inspiration is linked to that of pleasure in that each opposes reason. The classic Platonic account of pleasure is Philebus, but the fundamental opposition of the "mental elements" of reason and pleasure is concisely given in Republic, 439c-d, 604. The central question in Philebus, whether pleasure is the good (11b-c), is perhaps contextualised in the definition of education in Laws, 653. Education, as "the initial acquisition of virtue", arises from a moral sensationism. Pleasure and pain must be properly "channelled" before the age of reason so as to achieve the "general concord of reason and

\[66\] The discussion in Ion is largely concerned with performance.
emotion" which is virtue. What is important is "the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love what we ought to love". 167 This is properly education. The (moral) consequence of the wrong use or occurrence of pleasure is specified in 655-6. Since the arts are moral instruments, the Athenian is "in limited agreement" about legitimising pleasure:

"Pleasure is indeed a proper criterion in the arts, but not the pleasure experienced by anybody and everybody. The productions of the Muse are at their finest when they delight men of a high calibre and adequate education - but particularly if they succeed in pleasing the single individual whose education and moral standards reach heights attained by no one else. This is the reason why we maintain that judges in these matters need high moral standards: they have to possess not only a discerning taste, but courage too."

(658-9)

This courage consists in fulfilling the requisite task - judging truly, uninfluenced by external factors (fear or favour) or internal (indolence, self-deception). The judge teaches the audience, not the other way about, and, importantly, must "throw

167 This would seem to be endorsed in Politics,1336b32-3: "I think something of the same kind is true in men's relations with each other and the things they see and hear. We tend to love at first sight." (Barnes ed.,1984,II,p.2120 makes the sense clearer.)
his weight against them, if the pleasure they show has been aroused improperly and illegitimately" (659).

In *Philebus*, 21-2 Plato dismisses the idea that life may consist purely of either pleasure or intellect, arguing instead for a life composing both (they are mutually dependent), and that intellect is to be preferred to pleasure. It is not stated that the life of pure pleasure can be held even fractionally, specifically, say, in respect of art or a portion of art.  

Four classes of things in the universe are postulated (23c-d, 26e-27b) and pleasure is in the class of indeterminates (27e-28a), those things which admit of the comparative degree of scale (24-25b), while the intellect is admissible (31a) to the "causal class", in which is what "fashions" (27b) everything else.

There are physical and spiritual sorts of pleasure (31d-32c, 33c-36d). Included in the spiritual realm (the spiritual sort of pleasure is essentially defined in 33d) are "drive, desire" and

168 As noted, art for Plato is a moral instrument, but there are also some indications of its appreciation for itself.

169 The uncreated or ungenerated causes. It is argued (28-30) that reason and intellect have more kinship with loftier issues such as the orderly regulation of the universe and "soul", the latter without which they "can never occur" (30c). Therefore, because of their inherent proximity to the causes they are deserving of inclusion in the fourth class.
authority" (35d). But in Plato's theology, this accentuates the undesirable dependence of body on soul:

"every pleasure and every pain provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body and to weld them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that truth is what the body says it is. As it shares the beliefs and delights of the body, I think it inevitably comes to share its ways and manner of life [...] Because of this, it can have no part in the company of the divine, the pure and uniform."

*(Phaedo, 83d)*

This summarises an essential problem for Plato with the concept of pleasure considered as such. Given this and objections typically outlined in *Laws* and *Philebus*, a vital question from the viewpoint of the thrust of the second line of inquiry in the present discussion, which is how music (and art in general) is appreciated on its own terms, is whether there are any legitimate pleasures-in-themselves, or, are all legitimate pleasures (purely) educative? Amidst detailed points of the theory of pleasure,\(^{171}\) answers to this question do occur. They are

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\(^{170}\) This encompasses apparently physical desires like hunger, thirst etc. because in order to experience them one, it is alleged, must have a striving towards the opposite which in turn necessitates a memory of what the opposite is. See also the theory of recollection in *Phaedo*, 72-77.

\(^{171}\) Plato's theory of pleasure is complex and a limited number of points is mentioned in the present discussion. Among other points in *Philebus* are true and false pleasures (36c-40, where a
appropriately discussible in the treatment of (the theory of) Plato and Aristotle's appreciation of instrumental music.

Plato's signification of music both as an imitative art with all the moral impact that this involves (*Republic*, 401d, 601a; *Laws*, 798) and, apparently somewhat independently of purely moral considerations, as a powerful controlling element (along the lines of inspiration) which, if unchecked, will lead to the depychologising of the recipient\textsuperscript{172} (*Republic*, 411a-b; *Laws*, 800), may contain if not ambiguity a certain edginess. Also to be discussed are Plato's various putdowns of music, some of which may address what he tries to say in general about the nature of music. But music, like painting, belongs to the "things for the soul" (*Sophist*, 224a) and the artist (*qua* imitative) is a "member of the soul's work force" which aids memory and

\textsuperscript{172} I.e. the spectator or consumer of a work of art.
perception \((\text{Philebus}, 39b)\). The soul is the immortal \((\text{Phaedo}, 70-106)\) part which is affected by moral influences \((107d)\), and it may feel its (peculiar) pleasures and pains prior to physical ones \((\text{Philebus}, 32b-c, 39d)\).173

In \textit{Republic}, 475d, "those who love looking and listening" do not fully enter into what they perceive. They "are delighted by beautiful sounds and colours and shapes, and the works of art which make use of them, but their minds are incapable of seeing and delighting in the essential nature of beauty itself" \((476b)\). In \textit{Laws}, 797 it is deplored that "the younger generation" will "worship anyone who is always introducing some novelty or doing something unconventional to shapes and colours and all that sort of thing". It is in \textit{Philebus}, 51-52c, the discussion of pure pleasure, that the foregoing passages are given definition. The sound world is importantly appreciated in the outline of the "true pleasures",

"which have to do with the colours we call beautiful, with figures, with most scents, with musical sounds: in

173 The point being that arguments concerning the first signification (of music as an imitative art) may outweigh (and probably outnumber) arguments concerning the second (of music as a powerful controlling element), since the mimetic ethos is well in place. There may be only a limited number of routes away from this position. One promising route lies in the abstractive possibilities in the theory of pleasure.
short, with anything which, since it involves imperceptible, painless lack, provides perceptible, pleasant replenishment which is uncontaminated by pain. [...] By 'beauty of figures' I mean in this context not what most people would consider beautiful - not, that is, the figures of creatures in real life or in pictures. 'No', the argument says, 'I mean a straight line, a curve and the plain and solid figures that lathes and rulers and squares can make from them.' I hope you understand. I mean that, unlike other things, they are not relatively beautiful: their nature is to be beautiful in any situation, just as they are, and to have their own special pleasantness, which is utterly dissimilar to the pleasantness of scratching. And I mean that there are colours which are analogously beautiful and pleasant. [...] by 'musical sounds' I mean unwavering, clear ones which produce a single pure phrase: they are not relatively beautiful, but are so in their own right, and they have innately attendant pleasures."

(51b-d)

It is this passage which ought to be borne in mind when reading such defences as the following:

"most men do maintain that the power of music to give pleasure to the soul is the standard by which it should be judged. But this is an insupportable doctrine, and it is absolute blasphemy to speak like that."

(Laws,655)

There seems to be a curious emphasis here on "the power of music

\[\text{\footnotesize\[174\] This "majority view" is classically given in Laws,667. In the outline there of the attraction of the imitative arts, their central pleasure is said to lie in the accuracy derived from correct proportioning (which is objective).}\]
to give pleasure to the soul", as if music were somehow recognised by Plato as a special case. It is admittedly special in that it needs to be kept on a tight rein. This is well indicated by a comment in 700 describing music as "being the proper place to start a description of how life became progressively freer of controls". The "insupportability" or perhaps merely illogicality of the pleasure-giving quality of music as the normal criterion is justified in the following terms:

"Music composed in an undisciplined style is always infinitely improved by the imposition of form, even if that makes it less immediately attractive. But music doesn't have to be disciplined to be pleasant. Take someone who has right from childhood till the age of maturity and discretion grown familiar with a controlled and restrained style of music. Play him some of the other sort, and how he'll loathe it! 'What vulgar stuff!' he'll say. Yet, if he's been brought up to enjoy the strong appeal of popular music, it's the disciplined kind he'll call frigid and repellent. So as I said just now, on the score of pleasure or the lack of it, neither type is superior nor inferior to the other. The difference is simply this: the one musical environment is invariably a good influence, the other a bad."

(802)

Although this appears to dispose of pleasure in this respect, the argument remains a little uneasy. In arriving at the moral
conclusion about "musical environment" Plato first says that "music doesn't have to be disciplined to be pleasant." And the hypothetical complaints levelled at the "disciplined" and "popular" sorts of music could be deemed too unequal in order to make the desired point.

Other comments on the nature and status of music reveal in further ways its alleged dependency on moral and rational structures. Music occurs only from a mixture of indeterminacy (in which class pleasure is) and limit (Philebus, 26a). Regardless of this mixed nature, music is full of speculation,

"since it produces harmony by trained guesswork rather than by measurement: for example, consider the playing of stringed instruments, which uses guesswork to pinpoint the correct length of each string as it moves. Consequently, there is little in it that is reliable, much that is uncertain."

(56a)

This charge of imprecision gives rise to that of lack of purity (62c). These points suit the status of the "mere musician tuning strings" (Republic, 412a) whose work is far less important than the right educator's (the moral-educational "music and harmony" is much more important than the physical).

In general, the difficulty of determining precisely the
extent of any positive commitment Plato has to autonomistic
aesthetics is evident in the face of passages, such as the
following, in which he considers it deplorable

"to rob tune and rhythm of words by using stringed
instruments and pipes on their own without singers. When
this is done, it is extraordinarily difficult to know
what the rhythm and harmony without speech are supposed
to signify and what worthwhile object they imitate and
represent. The conclusion is inevitable: such practices
appeal to the taste of the village idiot. It is this
fondness for speed and dexterity (as in reproducing the
noises of wild animals) which prompts the use of pipes
and lyre otherwise than as an accompaniment to dancing
and singing. Using either instrument on its own is in
fact sheer showmanship and has nothing to do with art."

(Laws,669-70)

These situations belong for Plato to the realm of theory (670).

To use instruments solo would be to divorce them from their moral
context, because of the absence of representation.

Perhaps few overall conclusions may be drawn from Plato's
treatment of the question, is music autonomous? This question
possibly never posed itself for Plato in that form. It is
difficult to envisage its doing so in the context of an artistic

\[175\] psilei: "bare". The Greek word was often used to denote playing an instrumental solo
(Barker ed.,1984; p.154n81).
ethos of dependency (representation). Yet, as the present discussion attempts to show, the abstract concepts which can support autonomistic aesthetics are taken into account by Plato in answering other questions at least. One must constantly remember that there are moral strictures within which art is bound, the moral discussions of art seeming to a large extent to be unanimated by its inspirational side. Even with these thoughts in mind, it can be suggested that in merely recognising viewpoints destructive to the moral-mimetic argument, Plato would seem seriously to be acknowledging their existence.

In Aristotle's definition of the range of imitative arts (Poetics, 1447a14-18) (instrumental) music is the only art which admits of any exceptions (which are not imitative). The separateness of music from other components, moral or technical, in a work of art may be more marked for Aristotle than for Plato, especially given the trouble Aristotle takes to apply the moral endeavour to music rather than the other way about: Aristotle repeatedly points out the pleasurable effects of music (Poetics, 1450b15-16, 1462a15-16) and only then asks if there is something more (Politics, 1337b27-1338b8, 1339b35-42).
In a discussion of intentional and nonintentional virtuous acts, Aristotle appears to ascribe nonintentionality\textsuperscript{176} and therefore autonomy to works of art: "Works of art have their merit in themselves; so it is enough for them to be turned out with a certain quality of their own" (\textit{Ethics},1105a26-8). The same type of argument concerning particular or special knowledge as in Plato\textsuperscript{177} applies: "pleasures differ in kind...it is impossible to enjoy the pleasure of a just man unless one is just, or that of a musical man unless one is musical, and so on" (1173b28-31). Aristotle comments also: "pleasure is not the Good, and that not every pleasure is desirable;...that there are some pleasures that are desirable in themselves, being superior either in kind or in respect of the sources from which they come" (1174a9-11). Such passages as the foregoing would seem even within the mimetic ethos strongly to argue for a theory of the independence of the arts, or of music particularly.

As a preliminary to examining the tenor of Aristotle's specific views on solo instrumental music it is necessary to take

\textsuperscript{176} In the sense that works of art cannot be intentional analogously to the way that virtuous acts are.

\textsuperscript{177} For example, \textit{Republic},438e.
into account some of the perceptions of how (pure) music functions in the other arts and in society. In *Poetics*, dealing notably with tragedy, "enriched language" is that "possessing rhythm, and music or song" and "artistic devices" are classed according to whether they use "song" (1449b28-31). Although rhythm seems not to be perceived as necessarily a purely musical characteristic, music thus possibly being perceived merely as pitch, music capably adorns language. One wonders also if Aristotle is at all thinking of music in passages such as the following:

For the plot should be so ordered that even without seeing it performed anyone merely hearing what is afoot will shudder with fear and pity as a result of what is happening - [...] To produce this effect by means of stage spectacle is less artistic and requires the cooperation of the producer. Those who employ spectacle to produce an effect, not of fear, but of something equally monstrous, have nothing to do with tragedy, for not every kind of pleasure should be demanded of tragedy, but only that which is proper to it; and since the dramatic poet has by means of his representation to produce the tragic pleasure that is associated with pity and fear, it is obvious that this effect is bound up with the events of the plot.

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178 Barnes ed., 1984, II, p. 2320 has "harmony".

179 A more holistic view is presented in *Politics*, 1341b24-6.
The question to be asked here is whether music can be seen to be more of a spectacular nature or more of the nature of something especially and perhaps essentially helpful to the outline of the plot itself. This is perhaps even more posable with regard to what is said about the tragic constituent element of thought, which includes all the effects that have to be produced by means of language; among these are proof and refutation, the awakening of emotions such as pity, fear, anger, and the like, and also exaggeration and depreciation. It is clear, too, that in the action of the play the same principles should be observed whenever it is necessary to produce effects of pity or terror, or of greatness or probability - with this difference, however, that here the effects must be made without verbal explanation, while the others are produced by means of language coming from the lips of a speaker, and are dependent on the use of language. For where would be the need of a speaker if the required effects could be conveyed without the use of language?

Aristotle's distinction between those effects which can and those which cannot be conveyed by language is not especially clarified here, but appears somewhat arbitrary. It may be surmised that the sense is that (easily) verbalisable emotions are communicated through language while those emotions which do not so readily
admit of verbal explanation or paraphrase are not to be dealt with linguistically. Aristotle here seems to be short on specifying exactly how those effects which must be conveyed nonverbally are to be so conveyed and precisely what nonverbal means exist (or which ones Aristotle has particularly in mind). While it is not here said that music is nonverbal, it is to be remembered that it is an accessory to language,\textsuperscript{180} which can exist without music.\textsuperscript{181} The further question to be asked, then, is whether music's accessoriness to language means that it is merely a dispensable component of language or also that it cannot exist without a linguistic context, or whether it means, conversely, that music has in fact a separate existence.\textsuperscript{182} There would seem to be some support even for both positions.

Perhaps the classic Aristotelian discussion of music is \textit{Politics}, VIII.\textsuperscript{183} In VIII.3 the four usual educational subjects


\textsuperscript{181} I.e. it can exist without (externally imposed) music in the sense of "organised sound" with an intentional, man-made basis. Language of course may have inflection.

\textsuperscript{182} I.e the fact that music is an external quality which is added to language means that its preexistence is given stature and worth of independent preservation. See previous note.

\textsuperscript{183} Book VIII is perhaps incomplete - see Sinclair tr., 1962, p. 299.
are enumerated (1337b23-6): reading and writing, drawing and physical education (gymnastics) are more obviously useful (1337b25-7, 1338a15-19) than music is (1337b28, 1338a19). But music is instead part of the end of leisure, which is the basis of working activities (1337b30-5) - music is relevant to "education for leisure". The very question "What is the (practical) use of X activity?" is (if constantly asked) actually unbefitting for free and intelligent people (1338b2-3).

A more considered statement of the problem is that "it is not easy to define either what the effect of music is or what our object is in learning it" (1339a15-16). Three possibilities are offered for this (1339a17-26): (1) it is an amusement or relaxation; (2) it is solely an edification; (3) it assists leisure and intellectual stimulation. The solution is that music participates in all three (1339b11-1340a8). In this passage it is significantly stated that

184 Since one would ultimately rather be at leisure than work.

185 In further arguments in VIII is introduced the question of appropriate or typical attitudes of slaves and the free respectively towards music.

186 As the third possibility, Barnes ed., 1984, II, p. 2124 has "the enjoyment of leisure and mental cultivation".
We all agree that music is among the most delightful and pleasant things, whether instrumental or accompanied by singing, so that one might from this fact alone infer that the young should be taught it.

The poet Musaeus says "singing is man's greatest joy". Hence because it makes men feel happy, it is very properly included in entertainments and in the pastimes of social intercourse.

(1339b19-24)

Music is worthwhile "from this fact alone" (of its being "most delightful and pleasant"). But this emotionalism seems to be susceptible to the mimetic analogy (1340a19-40). The basis of the argument is very clear:

Now in rhythms and in tunes there is a close resemblance to reality - the realities of anger and gentleness, also of courage and moderation, and of the opposites of these, indeed of all moral qualities; and the fact that music heard does indeed cause an emotional change in us is an indication of this.

(19-23)

Feeling pleasure or pain in respect of imitations is hardly at all dissimilar to so feeling in respect of reality (or of the realities which underlie the imitations). While tactile objects are not in any way analogous to moral "objects" or qualities,

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188 There is some doubt (29-38) in the case of visual objects. Visual appearances may have this
the auditory objects constituting music are, the "moral qualities...represented in the very tunes we hear" (39). This is the reason why music must be employed in education. It is tolerable there because it is pleasurable. And it helps in saying something about the human psyche:

Moreover there is a certain affinity between us and music's harmonies and rhythms; so that many experts say that the soul is a harmony, others that it has harmony.

(1340b17-19)

Aristotle's approach to music and morality seems in general to be more experiential than that of Plato and this type of approach is applied to the question of instrumental music in the concluding discussion (VIII.6-7).

Educationally, one should play an instrument and not simply listen to a professional musician (slavishly) play (1340b20-3, 1341b8-19). Without playing oneself it is almost impossible to be a good judge of others' performances (1340b24). Logically, good judges will be adept at distinguishing good music from the effect, but only slightly, and it is a subjective thing. Shapes and colouring do not represent but rather indicate character, the indications being reflected in the visible signs of one's emotions. Nevertheless it does matter what one sees.
popular sort that "appeals to slaves, children, and even some animals" (1341a15) and perceiving when professionals are pandering to the (poor) taste of the audience. Bearing in mind such critical structure and the moral arguments previously noted, flute music is the first to be condemned:

We must not permit the introduction of wind instruments into education or any that requires the skill of a professional, the cithara and suchlike, but only such as will make good listeners to musical education and education in general. Furthermore the pipes are not an instrument of ethical but rather of orgiastic effect, so their use should be confined to those occasions on which the effect desired is not intellectual but a way of working off the emotions. We may add to its educational objections the fact that playing on the pipes prevents one from using the faculty of speech.

(1341a17-24)

Thematic elements occur here. The function of purely instrumental music is channelled in the direction of emotional release. Also, instrumental music is set off against vocal production. The recognition, such as it is, of instrumental music's autonomy

\[ \begin{align*}
189 & \textit{kithara: see n41.} \\
190 & \textit{katharsis: "purification", "purgation" (Barker ed.,1984; pp.177,180).} \\
191 & \textit{Barnes ed.,1984,II,p.2127 translates "use of the voice" for Sinclair's "using the faculty of speech". What is meant is that speech and song on the performer's part are precluded by his playing on the flute.}
\end{align*} \]
occurs negatively. A complaint against older instruments is that, as well as requiring great skill (already an uneducational factor - intelligence being separate from dexterity (1341b6-7)), they "merely titillate the ear" (1341b1). But it is no harm to evoke certain feelings through music (1342a15) and VIII.7 is devoted to legitimising some of the effects which music has by means of its harmonic (modal) and rhythmic structures.

Plato and Aristotle's views on instrumental music are reached through discusional modes of morality, mimesis, epistemology and others. Both appear to have attempted to mould the phenomenon of instrumental music to fit an ethical system, perhaps without ever thinking they were doing so or ever conceiving of this phenomenon as a unique case in the arts even as in the midst of other unique cases. Any perceived problem with the concept of pure music is not as yet stated in terms of an obvious lack of ascribable semantic content to sounds-in-themselves. Instead, notional difficulties are articulated through an essentially socio-moral medium, artists being skilled craftsmen and their works inculcatory. Incipient ideas of art's basic autonomy may survive within that system, but it required
a reconstruction of the theory of art itself before such ideas could properly be examined.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{192} This is one of the reasons why objections such as Havelock's (see n3) to the idea of Plato's having, say, in Book X, propounded a theory of art must be taken seriously and continually debated.

The foregoing investigation of Plato and Aristotle's philosophy of art and music may in some respects be taken as prototypical of work undertaken in Ch.3.
Selected\textsuperscript{193} other classical sources

Although Aristoxenus (c.350BC\textendash?) was a pupil of Aristotle, his introduction in the *Harmonic Elements*\textsuperscript{194} to the nature of the study of harmonics\textsuperscript{195} bespeaks insecurity with moral-aesthetic assumptions. He is incredulous that this study is expected to "exalt moral nature" (p.26). He leaves it completely open to what extent "musical art can improve the moral character." Mimetic preconceptions seem to be set aside as Aristoxenus explores, expressly by empirical means, the nature of music itself. The distinction drawn between vocal and instrumental melody (see definition, p.27) is perhaps not seen or considered in Plato

\textsuperscript{193} This is not intended as in any way a comprehensive or substantial treatment of classical or early medieval theory. The selection here is prompted by citations in Neubauer,1986, which is very wide-ranging.

\textsuperscript{194} Strunk,1952,pp.25-33.

\textsuperscript{195} "Harmonics" concerned what laws or principles covered melody. For definition of its scope see, for example, the quotation in Barker ed.,1984,pp.239-40: "Thus Harmonics, for instance, is the science of the genera of melodic order, of intervals, *systemata* [scales], notes, *tonoi* [keys] and modulations between *systemata*,and it is unable to advance beyond this point. Hence we cannot seek to discover through Harmonics whether the composer - in the *Mysians*, for example - has made an appropriate choice in using the Hypodorian *tonos* at the beginning, Dorian at the end, and Hypophrygian and Phrygian in the middle. The science of Harmonics does not extend to such matters, and requires supplementation from many sources, since it has no understanding of the nature of appropriateness. Thus neither the chromatic nor the enharmonic genus carries with it the whole nature of what it is to be appropriate, through which the moral character of a musical composition is to be revealed: this is the task of the practitioner of the art. It is clear that the sound of a *systema* is different from that of a composition constructed within that *systema*, and the study of the latter is not within the scope of the science of Harmonics."
or Aristotle. The relation of music to language seems strictly analogous and not part of a mimetic apparatus:

The order that distinguishes the melodious from the unmelodious resembles that which we find in the collocation of letters in language. For it is not every collocation but only certain collocations of any given letters that will produce a syllable.

(p.29)

The amimetic approach informs the following empirical definition:

For the apprehension of music depends on these two faculties, sense-perception and memory; for we must perceive the sound that it is present, and remember that which is past. In no other way can we follow the phenomenon of music.

(p.30)

Aristoxenus' emphasis on the "intellectual apprehension" that underlies the science of harmonics takes the spotlight away from the visible representation which is notation (p.31). The (apprehensible) end product is less important than that (intentional factor) which apprehends (or gives rise to) it. This would seem to oppose the importance of the idea of the immediate products of art as having significant moral impact.

Book IV of *De Rerum Natura*, a didactic poem by Lucretius (c.99-55BC), while vigorously maintaining empiricism, seems to
emphasise mimesis in that the theories of sensation set out may perhaps be viewed as containing supportive physical evidence for the aesthetic structure of mimesis (not dwelt on in Book IV). In addition to the idea of the immediacy of sensation, the ideal of organic unity resulting from the primacy of reason is upheld: "eyes cannot recognise the nature of things. ...do not impute to the eyes this fault of the mind" (385-6). The "puddle of water" example (414-19) is reminiscent of Plato's mirror (Republic, 596b-e), though Lucretius' context is sensory rather than creative.

Lucretius' sensationist theories may have relevance to a theory of art via the following route. The sensationist precept (478-9) asseverates the reliability of the senses (error already having been ascribed to the mind (386)), which "cannot be refuted". Dreams are explained in terms of impedance of the senses' capability of refuting what is false (762-4). From there

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196 Primal in the coordinative sense. See 483-521.

197 This idea of organic unity occurs elsewhere, for example in "Longinus", On the Sublime, 10 and St Augustine, Confessions, X.7.

198 Plato's example concerns representation while Lucretius' point, arguing from the other end, is that in one's apprehension things are not necessarily what they seem, according to conditions.
Lucretius goes deeply in, first asking "why the mind immediately thinks of whatever the whim takes it to think of." The investigation, while not destructive of mimetic theory, is not especially concerned with it.

It is with such points in mind that the exaltation of nature and the advocacy of its imitation may be viewed in Book V. The mimetic theory of music's being derivable directly from the natural world (1379-91) completely lacks the moral agenda (if anything, it is hedonistic). The principle of this naturalistic\textsuperscript{199} mimetic theory is perhaps expressed thus:

For what is ready to hand, unless we have known something more lovely before, gives preeminent delight and seems to hold the field, until something found afterwards to be better is wont to spoil all that and to change our taste for anything ancient.

(1412-15)

In a specific model, nature here can correspond to "what is ready to hand" and "something more lovely before", "something found afterwards to be better" (in the sense of "something better found afterwards") possibly corresponding to something else which is

\textsuperscript{199} I.e. based on nature. The usage of the word in the present discussion is in its application also intended to exclude or at least deemphasise moral motives.
artificial. The temporal ordering - "what is", "before", "afterwards" - provides a more originist than perfectionist emphasis to the theory.

The style employed by Horace (65-8BC) in *Ars Poetica* is aphoristic and the work does not appear to be a unified treatment of any one point or set of points, though it is didactically written. The principles of consistency (25-48, 119-52) and preference for what is current (48-72) pervade Horace's theory of art (the discussion is in the main of literature). The poet/poem must feel/"contain" the emotions described (99-118). That is concordant with Platonic and Aristotelian theory.

What is interesting from the standpoint of the appreciation of pure music is the idea that visual senses are more trustworthy than aural:

However, the mind is less actively stimulated by what it takes in through the ear than by what is presented to it through the trustworthy agency of the eyes - something that the spectator can see for himself.

(180-2)

The context is that *verbal* information is less convincing than

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200 Moral perfectionism as in Plato and Aristotle.
visual, but the statement *per se* would appear to be susceptible of wide interpretation, and especially if extendible to the question of music. The context suggests the *moral* mind and it would thus appear that music may be excepted from moral inculcation. If the context does admit music, as objectively it might, Horace is thinking of music only in the sense that it contributes something to moral guidance. Other possibilities remain unexplored or simply not thought of.\(^{201}\) Another element of interpretation of 180-2 could be the simply derogatory approach where Horace regards music as inferior as an artistically affective (or effective) means. It is probably in the light of such a position that the much-vaunted "Horatian simile", "a poem is like a painting" (*ut pictura, poesis*) (361), should be considered. The simile would appear to present itself as eminently a mimetic-theoretical maxim. Already, Horace has suggested that "the experienced poet, as an imitative artist, should look to human life and character for his models, and from

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\(^{201}\) Horace could, for example, have conceived of the idea of music's being abstract. The evidence is, however, that he seems hostile to possible facets of abstract art, presumably because, for one, they would risk offending the principle of consistency (see, for example, 29-30). The moral-inculcatory sense in 391-407 would appear to refer not specifically to music alone but to moral words with music.
them derive a language that is true to life" (317-18). Since a visual type of acuity and resultant mental stimulation is required, poems may achieve this ideal of being true to life if they match their successful counterparts, paintings. The simile is put to immediate use in the *Ars Poetica* as a literary-critical norm.202

The main concern of "Longinus" (1st century AD?) in *On the Sublime* is "a certain excellence and distinction of expression" (1) which alone is the hallmark of (literary) preeminence and reputation. For "Longinus" the moral agenda in language (at any rate) is not enough - language should not be merely "to persuade the hearers, but to entrance them" (1). Differing somewhat from Plato and Aristotle, "Longinus" adds: "The extent to which we can be persuaded is usually under our own control" (1). Also, "the command of language" is essential (8).

"Longinus"' concept of *mimesis* might almost be said to advocate imitation thrice removed (if the model in *Republic*, X is assumed). What is suggested is "a spirit of emulation":

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202 For a searching and broad discussion on the influence of the Horatian simile in painting and literary theory, particularly from the mid-sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, see Lee, 1940.
Plato [...] drew upon countless tributary streams from the great Homeric river. [...] Now this procedure is not plagiarism; rather it is like taking impressions from beautiful pictures or statues or other works of art.

(13)

This more purely aesthetic-mimetic (as opposed to moral-mimetic) argument is used to conceptualise mental imagery:

dignity, grandeur, and powers of persuasion are to a very large degree derived from images - for that is what some people call the representation of mental pictures. In a general way the term "image" is applied to passages in which, carried away by your feelings, you imagine that you are actually seeing the subject of your description, and enable your audience as well to see it. You will have noticed that imagery means one thing with orators and another with poets - that in poetry its aim is to work on the feelings, in oratory to produce vividness of description, though indeed in both cases an attempt is made to stir the feelings.

(15)

Here, then, the reasoning would seem to be from the aesthetic as cause to the moral as effect, although earlier "Longinus" says (8) that "noble emotion" contributes to the sublime.203 Where imagination is paramount to reasoned or persuasive argument,  

203 "Longinus"’ tract is replete with mention of concepts which are not necessarily always or at all relatable to his mimetic doctrine (or possibly, in some respects, to mimetic doctrine in general). (Divine) inspiration is an important motive (13), there is the condemnation of novelties in literature, and, significantly, genius and emotion, as elements of the (literary) sublime, "are very largely innate".
our ears always, by some natural law, seize upon the stronger element, so that we are attracted away from the demonstration of fact to the startling image, and the argument lies below the surface of the accompanying brilliance.

(15)

Though the context is oratory, the statement invites an application to music. Nevertheless, "Longinus" cautions that "even in orgies of the imagination it is necessary to remain sober" (16). In any case, the status of pure music is not consistent for "Longinus" - certain kinds and contexts are decried:

Where the sublime is concerned nothing has so debasing an effect as broken or agitated rhythms [...] which drop right down to the level of dance music. For all over-rhythmical styles are at once felt to be cheap and affected; the monotonous jingle seems superficial, and does not penetrate our feelings - and the worst of it is that, just as the choral lyrics distract the audience's attention from the action of the play and forcibly turn it to themselves, so an over-rhythmical style does not communicate the feeling of the words, but only of the rhythm.

(41)

This is at least a tacit admission of music's attractive potential. 204

204 On the other hand, there is, for example, the discussion in 39. Sounds, "in themselves
"Longinus"' fundamental mimetic theory appears naturalistically inclined:

For art is perfect only when it looks like nature, and again, nature hits the mark only when she conceals the art that is within her.

(22)

By virtue of the argument vs. imagination model, nature is superior, and this purports to allow a certain hierarchy of art forms:

meticulous accuracy is admired in art, grandeur in the works of nature, and [...] it is by nature that man is endowed with the power of speech. Moreover, in statues we look for the likeness of a man, whereas in literature [...] we look for something transcending the human.

(36)

The basis for mimetic precepts (notably those concerning accuracy) appears in the beauty of nature. Nature is herself an artist, to be imitated (43).

For Boethius (c.480-524) (De institutionae musicae, I),

meaningless", "are mere semblances, spurious counterfeits of the art of persuasion, and not, as I have mentioned, a genuine expression of human nature". If "Longinus" appears here to dismiss pure music from his artistic-conceptual scheme, that would leave music as an art form significantly undefined.

Presumably in the fashion of the allegedly un plagiaristic senses of 13.

mimesis appears to be implicitly approved by reference to Platonic analogies or identifications of soul, universe and music: 207

From this may be discerned the truth of what Plato not idly said, that the soul of the universe is united by musical concord. For when, by means of what in ourselves is well and fitly ordered, we apprehend what in sounds is well and fitly combined, and take pleasure in it, we recognise that we ourselves are united by this likeness. For likeness is agreeable, unlikeness hateful and contrary.

(I.1, p.80)

"Likeness" in its context in I.1 appears not just to signify resemblance, but also consistency and perhaps even serenity, since the moral agenda is also upheld. 208

Any tacit support for mimesis is set within theories which lean towards sensationism and emotionalism. Boethius regards music as powerful (p.83), but also the appreciation of its power and pleasure must be tempered with an intellectual, scientific investigation (p.84): the abstractness of pleasurable melody does not suffice - it is necessary to understand scientifically.

207 Citing Timaeus, 37a.

208 Interestingly, the moral agenda, citing Republic, 424b-c, occurs after the cosmic theory has been stated.
expressible interrelationships of sounds. Reason is therefore indispensable:

Thus it is that reason's contemplation does not need the deed, while the works of our hands are nothing unless led by reason.

(pp.85-6)

This follows Aristotle's view that contemplation is the highest activity (Ethics, 1177).

In this selection, while Platonic and Aristotelian mimesis remains generally unchallenged, it would seem that, since there also appear to be other, perhaps unrelated, aesthetic concerns expressed by these writers, mimetic doctrine does not always come to the fore. Such writers and theorists as have just been discussed arguably gave the (probably, in general, valid) impression of accepting classical doctrines, without explicitly discussing, presenting or teaching them as such. In the eighteenth century they were, however, cited in support of both pro- and antimimetic arguments, depending on the emphasis of the contents of these earlier writings the eighteenth-century thinker

\[209\] Murmurings against mimesis, such as they were, would at this stage of intellectual history appear to have been of an implicit order. The question of their existence and precision is outside the scope of the present work.
wished to adopt. It was possible for eighteenth-century thinkers to treat of the same intellectual matter from different "doctrinal" perspectives.\footnote{Note, for example, Reynolds' discussion of Renaissance artists discussed also by Wackenroder, there being a (radically) different descriptive atmosphere and result of valuable conclusions in each case. The "intellectual matter" in this example is thus the works of art and precepts (authentic or imputed) of Michelangelo, Raphael etc. In the case of the early Romantics, perhaps a principal "doctrinal" concern was actually an antidoctrinality derivable from paying more attention to the inner world, which is inexplicable in its power. See Ch.3.}
**Mimesis in the eighteenth century: survival and formulation**

It is evident that the concept of *mimesis* survived into the eighteenth century, including the late eighteenth century (when emergent Romantic aesthetic thought may be seen as essentially hostile to *mimesis*). As to the question of its formulation, not every eighteenth-century writer saw it as permissible for the classical doctrine to undergo modern revision in order to satisfy the interests of aesthetic theory. Twining, 1789 contains a notable clarion call for the view that the express meanings in the original classical (particularly Platonic and Aristotelian) contexts be remembered and not subordinated to modern

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211 The present work does not treat of the doctrine of imitation as presented in works between Boethius and Hogarth (the first discussed in this section). It may briefly be mentioned that attitudes towards instrumental music in this intervening period did not always entail complete submission to vocal music and to mimetic doctrine. For example, the protagonistic writings in a first significant pamphlet war concerning the relative merits of French and Italian music (chiefly opera), Ragueneau, 1702 and Lecerf, 1704, give ample scope for the idea of instrumental music’s having some, perhaps even total separate worth. Hogarth, 1753 appeared first in London and then in translation on the Continent. The point of appearing to select the 1750s as a starting point in time, in respect of dealing with contemporary prevailing concepts of *mimesis*, has to do with the then proliferation of noteworthy treatises on or touching this subject, occurring after and sometimes building on standard mainstream aesthetic works (many from the French classical tradition - Boîleau, DuBos, Batteux). Although the most notable rejection of mimetic aesthetics in favour of more autonomistic aesthetic values seems to have occurred more as the eighteenth century was drawing to a close (the present work taking such a supposition seriously), an examination of what these values were reacting against should not necessarily take an exactly contemporaneous approach. I.e. it is necessary to take into account classic examples of the latter eighteenth-century tradition of the upholding of classical ideals and thus to use a loose time frame as to the examination of these examples. It is for such reasons that the present work has no pretensions to being a "reception history", in any precise sense, of autonomistic musical (or general) aesthetics.
requirements and reformulations. Thus the cause of historical authenticity would be well served.\textsuperscript{212} But the following discussion of selected eighteenth-century sources takes as a main point of interest particularly modern elucidations of the central doctrine, with their accompanying extraneous matter (perhaps as per Twining's reservations), if any, as well as considering the implications of the doctrinal content for the case of instrumental music (especially wherever it is possible explicitly to discern these implications).\textsuperscript{213}

\textbf{Hogarth, 1753}

Because of Hogarth's professional concerns as a painter, it is unsurprising that most of the artistic examples in this treatise are drawn from the visual arts. Yet there is also a sense in Hogarth's work that the central principle of art, imitation, is visual \textit{par excellence}, i.e. that verbal and musical imitations, if they are to be successful, must satisfy with

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{212} Twining was, after all, a scholar and translator, perhaps making it even more logical for him to plead for a sense of history and fidelity.
\item \textsuperscript{213} The selection comprises treatises first published between 1753 (Hogarth) and 1797 (Reynolds).
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picturesque clarity. Vision is "the great inlet of beauty" (p.13), and (visual) beauty is largely undiscussible by "mere men of letters" (p.iii), they being more suited to treat of "the broad, and more beaten path of moral beauty" (p.iv).\textsuperscript{214} Such an attitude of "source selectivity" is not, however, constantly maintained. (By the term "source selectivity" is meant the notion that the aesthetics of a particular art are commented upon with greater authority by the practitioners (or connoisseurs) of that art than by those unversed in the art, for example as advocated in Wallace, 1986 (see Ch.4).) Hogarth allows (p.3) that anyone may enquire into the pursuit of the nature of (visual) beauty, regardless of their previous level of knowledge (of visual art). One point of advocating source selectivity is that it can reinforce the impression that one sense or art form has priority over the others, so that the prevailing imitative doctrine may be thought of as assuming the (excellence of the) characteristics of that art or sense. In line with the general contemporary

\textsuperscript{214} By "moral beauty" Hogarth means beauty of character. Hogarth in this passage does not necessarily mean to deviate from Plato and Aristotle and divorce purely aesthetic and moral beauties. One consideration, in addition to the almost arbitrary putdown of the literati, may be simply that the treatise is of an often technical nature throughout.
acceptance of the imitative doctrine itself, Hogarth does not seem to imply that there are any (at least, chief) arts that are non-imitative.\textsuperscript{215}

On the other hand, imitative exactitude, whether historical ("blind veneration...paid to antiquity" - p.91) or in respect of the imitative accuracy of the work itself ("skilful" - p.91), is subordinated or set aside\textsuperscript{216} in a manner reminiscent of Plato's arguing for "ideal imitation", at one remove (\textit{Republic}, Book X): imitability owes more to taste than to the action of imitative precision\textsuperscript{217} - the teleological approach is what is important ("wherein they are continually discoursing of effects instead of developing causes;" - p.iv; "It will then naturally be asked,...the effects before them." - pp.iv-v). Also, part of Hogarth's self-imposed objective is to define the possibility of psychological failure or distortability of representation:

\textsuperscript{215} The observations in Woodfield's note to this facsimile edition, concerning Hogarth's polemicism, are to the point, but for present purposes the differences between Hogarth and the contemporary classical tradition are considered tangential to the principal detail of Hogarth's actual acceptance of the doctrine of imitation, it being only necessary, as with the cases of other writers, to state his specific presentation of the doctrine.

\textsuperscript{216} Ease of imitability is disadvantageous. See pp.57-8.

\textsuperscript{217} Reynolds,1797 also expresses this notion when he notes that the tedious reproduction of fine details in a picture, such as a great quantity of individual leaves on a tree, is aesthetically worth far less than the spirit and taste of the overall impression. See discussion below.
the setting forth, in the strongest colours, the surprising alterations objects seemingly undergo through the prepossessions and prejudices contracted by the mind. - Fallacies, strongly to be guarded against by such as would learn to see objects truly!

(p.5)

This will be done by reference to the teleology.

Hogarth addresses the question of the nature of beauty with Shakespeare's formula "infinite variety" (p.xvii). But disorganised variety is to be condemned, "for variety uncomposed, and without design, is confusion and deformity" (p.17).²¹⁸ For all his prescriptions of beauty's essential nature, though, Hogarth's particular aesthetic appreciations can remain quite vague ("and yet there is something so agreeable in their form,..." - p.33; "the nice sensation we naturally have..." -

²¹⁸ The effect, implicitly criticised by Hogarth, of uncomposed and undesigned (and therefore perverted) variety (otherwise the touchstone of beauty), seems to relate to non-iconic abstraction. The remainder of the discussion in (the short) Ch.II of Hogarth,1753 suggests that discernible composition and design are indeed prerequisites of beauty. As these discernible certainties would in Hogarth's account (at least) seem to be inherent in representation (and in nature as well), so beauty would appear to be opposed to abstraction in its ontologically nonrepresentational sense. In such theory, beauty is brought rather more firmly into the realm of the known, knowable and representable. Representations may still have a lower status than the objects or characteristics they imitate, but they are still beautiful, if not quite equally so as the originals (cf. discussion - p.17 - of real pyramids and, contrastingly in terms of aesthetic appreciation, architectural perspective views). The "confusion and deformity", here, perhaps, as abstraction, implicitly cannot share in representational or ideal beauty.
...because it is always found to entertain the eye" - p.97). This prompts the thought that the intuitionistic/ empiricistic approach implied\(^{219}\) may be an admission of inability to account for some beauties and thus of possible tolerance for certain levels of abstraction. But this does not necessarily presuppose a weakening or doubting of classical doctrine. The theoretical presentations (with whatever concrete examples) by those post-Batteux eighteenth-century authors who, for whatever reasons, remained favourable towards the doctrine of imitation, could admit, consciously or not, concepts contrary to the prevailing doctrine. Despite this, they were nonetheless successful in expanding classical doctrine or, perhaps rather, restating (aspects of) it expansively to suit modern needs. An example of such expansion occurs at the end of Ch.X:

> We have all along had recourse chiefly to the works of the ancients, not because the moderns have not produced some as excellent; but because the works of the former are more generally known: nor would we have it thought, that either of them have ever yet come up to the utmost beauty of nature. Who but a bigot, even to the antiques, will say

\(^{219}\) Shortly exemplified in Ch.XIII: "Experience teaches us that the eye may be subdued and forced into forming and disposing of objects even quite contrary to what it would naturally see them, by the prejudgment of the mind from the better authority of feeling, or some other persuasive motive" (pp.106-7).
that he has not seen faces and necks, hands and arms in living women, that even the Grecian Venus doth but coarsely imitate?

And what sufficient reason can be given why the same may not be said of the rest of the body?

(pp.66-7)

The classical principle of "imitation by parts"\textsuperscript{220} is set in the midst of other concerns, principally the modern one of the supremacy of modelling on nature. Hogarth uses the principle to expose the perceived fallacy of the exclusive use of surviving classical art for the derivation of principles of taste and beauty. It is not merely that nature is a better model, but that even the best classical imitations of nature cannot aspire to be even substitute models,\textsuperscript{221} and modern-day taste or fashion ("the works of the former are more generally known") cannot be

\textsuperscript{220} Or "imitation by compilation", where an ideally beautiful object (in this instance a human being as object) is imitated by putting together the most beautiful parts of each of many examples of such an object or of different objects, to make an ideal whole. This principle is also cited in other writings of the period. Doctrinal bases may be found in \textit{Republic},472d and \textit{Poetics},1454b8-11.

\textsuperscript{221} Hogarth (disdainfully) highlights a prime possible pitfall of using classical models: "Therefore were I to paint the character of a Charon, I would thus distinguish his make from that of a common man's; and, in spite of the word \textit{low}, venture to give him a broad pair of shoulders, and spindle shanks, whether I had the authority of an antique statue, or basso-relievo, for it or not" (p.86). This may be termed the "authenticity argument", where the authentic fidelity is to the object (or concept of it) itself, not to the art of classical antiquity (such fidelity to art of classical antiquity being conceivable as a kind of performance practice, not what Hogarth envisages for art).
ultimate guides.\footnote{See also p.31: "Nevertheless custom and fashion will, in length of time, reconcile almost every absurdity whatever, to the eye, or make it overlook'd."}

Hogarth sometimes seems preoccupied with laying general aesthetic bases, and where this is the case it may be asked what comparative relevance these could have to the aesthetics of instrumental music. The principle that "nature has thought fit to make beauty of proportion, and beauty of movement, necessary to each other" (p.73, developed pp.72-3) is concerned with the physics, as it were, of an aesthetic consideration.\footnote{Ch.V discusses the pleasure of motion on physical and intellectual levels. "This love of pursuit, merely as pursuit, is implanted in our natures, and design'd, no doubt, for necessary, and useful purposes" (p.24). The context here of physical and intellectual (for example, problem-solving) pursuits is presumably generalisable to include the pursuit of aesthetic excellence as pleasurable activity. And the perception of motion accentuates pleasure ("But the pleasure it gives the eye is still more lively when in motion" - p.27). This would appear somehow to contradict Aristotelian theory (Ethics,1154b21-31).} As such it is potentially inviting of an application to the case of instrumental music.\footnote{Music and sound are rarely mentioned. The analogous discussion of the sound world in Ch.XII (p.97) is for the purpose of fulfilling the catch-all explanatory statement (in the context of source selectivity) which opens the chapter ("Although...what would only be well-conceived by painters" - p.93).}

As well as expounding details of art and criticism, Hogarth puts forward philosophical critiques of imitation. The interest
of beauty must always surpass that of imitation ("We have, indeed, in our nature a love of imitation from our infancy...but then this...soon grows tiresom" - p.18) and the avoidance of regularity principle which is introduced (p.19) could thus be construed as asserting the superiority of beauty and perhaps equating or even identifying regularity with imitation. Such equation or identification would well accord with the condemnation of mechanical imitation (pp.141-2) and with the important and anticlassical recognition that imitation lies outside human necessity:

    Action is a sort of language which perhaps one time or other, may come to be taught by a kind of grammar-rules; but, at present, is only got by rote and imitation:

    (p.139, and see whole context)

    ...graceful movements...not being naturally familiarised by necessity, must be acquired by precept or imitation, and reduced to habit by frequent repetitions.

    (p.142)

Hogarth seriously criticised the standing of imitation, but, because, *inter alia*, of his perception of the standing of nature, apparently did not consider the overthrowing of imitation as artistic precept.
Winckelmann, 1755

This influential work begins by clarifying the veneration which ought to be accorded to Greek art. Winckelmann's "good taste" (Sect. I) encompasses the notions of ideal beauty which he professes the Greeks to have discovered. At the finish of the treatise, Winckelmann quotes Horace's definition of the "double aim" of the arts, which includes "profit", "delight" and "the giving of pleasure with some useful precepts for life", but not imitation. This is presumably either because imitation remains a sine qua non or because, having expounded the aesthetic idealism, which, Winckelmann says, originates from the Greeks, mere representation or copying is too lowly an end in itself to be put forward as a central aim of the arts. From the outset, the tonal difference between classical

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225 See, for example, Goethe, 1805.

226 The very title indicates the approval of the imitation of classical models (contrary to Hogarth who distrusted uncritical approval of them). Winckelmann's nonrestriction of imitation to "la belle nature" allows for the imitation of classical models to be counted as imitating Perrault's and de Piles' "le vrai" - nature in its ideal form. See "Nature, belle nature" in Saisselin, 1970, pp. 122-31, especially p. 126. Winckelmann's pickiness about "nature" becomes particularly evident at the opening of Sect. II (on contour).

227 Dorsch tr., 1965, p. 90.
doctrine and its embodiment as such in Winckelmann,1755 appears to be that classical doctrine chiefly concentrates on details and ethos of representation, Winckelmann rather on its grandiose implications. "Inimitability" occurs "by imitating the ancients" and "close familiarity" is conceivably a development of the Platonic "inside knowledge" required of the poet or artist in Republic, Book X (and elsewhere in Plato). Thus, in certain cases at any rate, aspects of classical doctrine are cited and, as it were, transfigured in order that Winckelmann's grandiosity of atmosphere, if not also of purpose, may be realised.

Winckelmann,1755 introduces the concept of ideal beauty with respect, in keeping with the advocated veneration of things classical, by citing the Neoplatonist philosopher and commentator Proclus (412-85). The classical formulation of the concept is held to have been derived from the Greeks' ready empiricism, from "frequent opportunities for observing nature" (p.36). The advantage of having ready and willing models as opposed to hired

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228 p.33.

229 Unhindered nature, most specifically the naturism pertaining to exercise and theatrical entertainment.
ones is that "varied, authentic and noble attitudes and postures"
would be displayed (for imitation). The heart of Winckelmann's thought (in its early phases) as to this matter, is that circumstances were ideal for ancient artists because the readily available natural poses brought with them real expression, which had to be otherwise provided anyway if the naturalness was somehow unobtainable:

Authentic expression springs from inner sentiment; and the draughtsman who wishes to convey this quality of truth to his academy will not achieve a shadow of it unless he himself supplies what the heart of an unmoved and indifferent model does not feel, and cannot express through an action appropriate to a given emotion or passion.

(p.35)

Thus, interestingly, the consideration of physical perfection leads (perhaps indirectly) to that of emotional perfection or authenticity.

But, in any case, ideal beauty consisted in "concepts which sought to transcend nature itself. Their model in this case was an archetype of nature constructed solely in the mind"

(p.38).\textsuperscript{230} Winckelmann is quite interested to tie in "imitation

\textsuperscript{230} The importance of whether ideal beauty referred, if framed in these terms, only or primarily to physical proportioning or was equally extensive to other representation may perhaps be set
by parts" with ideal beauty. Imitation by parts is called "the
way of the Greeks" because it "is the way to universal beauty and
its ideal images" (p.38). Imitation by parts occurs by default,
as it were, in relation to "negligent" Greek works of art, since
their positive side is that
great artists were wise even in their negligence, and even
their errors are instructive. We should look at their works
as Lucian tells us to look at the Jupiter of Phidias: at
Jupiter himself, and not at his footstool.

(p.33)
the illustration with Jupiter potentially indicating that
negligent works of art are even especially candidates for the
imitation by parts.231

"Expression" seems in Winckelmann to be related to imitation
in that it is, potentially at least, a supernatural extension of
imitation. Or, in the eighteenth century, using Winckelmann,1755
as example, expression and imitation seem to have been two sides
of the same coin.232 The expressional suppression admired

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231 Like the blind man's heightened sensory perception, a work of art's being defective in one or few respects renders it liable to excellence in others and thus just as eligible as source material for imitation by parts as "perfect" works.

232 The "coin" being (French) classical aesthetics: see, for example, Saisselin,1970, pp.82-7.
3) in the Laocoon sculpture is, if one will, an aesthetic modification of what has been achieved through (the process of) imitation. That, in the case of Ctesilaus' statue of the dying gladiator, "one could tell...how much life still remained in him" (p.36) gives, in expressive terms, the context of what imitation was supposed to do, though perhaps with an admissibly exalted concept. Expression is an (or the) outward aspect of the internal, intentional (perhaps displayable as such) process of imitation. Commenting on the case of the Laocoon work, Winckelmann is able to bring to bear specific classical precepts on the issue of expression that in their original contexts bore rather on the question simply of representation:

   The expression of so great a soul far surpasses the forms of natural beauty; the artist had to feel within himself the strength of spirit which he imprinted on his marble. Greece possessed artists and philosophers in one and the same person, [...] Wisdom reached out its hand to art, and inspired its figures with more than ordinary souls.\footnote{A consequence of having "artistic wisdom" for those who have it is that they "know how difficult it is to produce works which are apparently so easy to imitate" (in support, Winckelmann quotes Horace, \textit{Ars Poetica}, 240ff.).}

   (p.42)
Notice the classical themes here: (i) the performer or creative artist is able to feel (here, at a deep, general level - "strength of spirit") the emotions etc. he tries to represent; (ii) the crucial importance of the philosopher ("lover of wisdom"), whose abilities ought to be inherent in all other (significant) occupations.

With the example of sculpture in mind, Winckelmann prescribes the expressive ideal:

> The calmer the state of a body, the fitter it is to express the true character of the soul: in all physical postures too far removed from the state of rest, the soul is not in the condition most proper to it, but subject to violence and constraint. The soul becomes more expressive and recognisable in powerful passions: but it is great and noble only in the state of unity, the state of rest. [...] But in this state of rest, the soul must be characterised by features peculiar to the individual concerned; it must be at rest yet at the same time active, tranquil yet neither indifferent nor lethargic.

(p.43)

The ideal is "active tranquillity" (see also p.44). Following from the aesthetic ideal comes the moral-psychological analogy:

In all human activities, violence and haste come first, and dignity and thoroughness come last. But the latter qualities need time to be appreciated, and are the prerogative of great masters; violent passions, however, are a recommendation in the eyes of their pupils.
Winckelmann's points are made using the same technical method, of the moral within the aesthetic structure, as some, perhaps similarly motivated, classical discussions.

In any case, expression would appear to remain merely one part of a "system" of artistic requirements:

The Greek painters are credited with draughtsmanship and expression - and nothing more. Perspective, composition, and colouring are denied them.

One thing is not clear from Winckelmann's succeeding account. Are these areas, in which classical artists are denied superiority (to the moderns) or even competence, facets of representation qua imitation? (That suggestion is supported by the fact that contour is the supreme criterion of beauty, as reached through the convention of imitation.) Or are they facets of an order extraneous to imitation and therefore perhaps on a more abstract level? This apparent lack of specification may prepare for Winckelmann's thoughts, however they may be seen as such, on abstraction.

Central to Winckelmann's level of abstraction is the
expression of "the soul itself", "character" (pp.51-2). At first there appears to be a thorough, uninhibited recognition of abstract art ("Painting extends to supra-sensory things, which are its supreme object" - p.51), but this is qualified by the necessity of allegory:

Parrhasius [...] painted the Athenians as both generous and cruel, frivolous and determined, courageous and cowardly. If such a representation is at all possible, it can be so only by means of allegory - that is, by images which convey general concepts.

But here, the artist is lost as if in a desert. The languages of the savage Indians, which are almost devoid of such concepts and contain no words for such things as gratitude, space, duration etc., are no worse off in this respect than is painting today. Every painter who thinks beyond his palette longs for some learned compendium he could consult, and from which he could extract significant and concrete signs to denote super-sensory objects. No complete work of this kind is yet available: the attempts so far made are too circumscribed to measure up to this grand design.

This is the reason why the greatest artists have chosen only familiar themes.

(PP.51-2)

To the extent that the Athenians' contradictions are abstract, Winckelmann and his putative artist are "lost". This apparent helplessness can be overcome only by recourse to allegory, but however potentially abstract allegory is, Winckelmann resolves it into representational components ("all those concrete images
and figures by which general concepts have been represented poetically" - p.53) in order to circumvent any perceived dangers of abstraction. The solution lies in the provision of a "mythological compendium" (pp.52-3). Further excuses for this line of thought are offered in the discussion of the allegedly prevalent "compulsive decoration" phenomenon:

Paintings on ceilings and above doors serve mainly to fill the space they occupy, and to cover those areas which cannot be gilded over. They not only lack all connection with the station and circumstances of their owner, but often actually cast a prejudicial light on these.

It is thus the horror of a vacuum which fills up empty walls; and pictures devoid of thought must make good the deficiency.

This is the reason why the artist, left to his own devices, will often, for lack of allegorical images, select subjects which tend to satirise rather than to glorify his patron; and perhaps as a safeguard against this, the latter will shrewdly calculate that it is better to ask for pictures with no meaning whatsoever.

(p.53)

That the artist should freely choose satire rather than glorification may not be forcefully or cogently argued, but either choice probably makes little difference to the main point.

Perhaps what is most interesting in respect of the artist's choice is that the aesthetic evil (abstraction in the sense of
lack of semantic content) is less than the moral one (imputation).

It is in the context of the foregoing arguments and issues that one may consider the single minute, even trifling reference to instrumental music (p.34). Had Winckelmann appraised instrumental music as significant in respect of these arguments and issues, it would seem less likely or acceptable for him to have followed classical precedent\textsuperscript{234} in describing (classical) flute playing merely as a "physical evil" (because of the alleged resulting facial distortion). In other words, Winckelmann would not, in the midst of a discussion of the ethos of instrumental music, have stressed, or possibly even mentioned the (by-product,) facial distortion. But instrumental music's status is not defined or acknowledged in this reference.

Winckelmann,1755 loses by being seen solely as an apotheosis of classicism. It is, like other, contemporary treatises, a complex aesthetic reference. The support of representational doctrine is there, but this does not exclude

\textsuperscript{234} "Physical" criticisms of flute playing occur in Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1341a24-6.
nonrepresentational concerns, although these are dealt with in
a very referential manner which continues to hold art to
standards of intelligibility or interpretability.

Rousseau,1761

Rousseau's classic offers, in addition to a primary focus
on linguistic theory, a substantial (and related) treatment of
musical aesthetics, "particularly the issue of the relation
between melody and harmony which so preoccupied him in his
disagreements with Rameau". It is therefore interesting, when
considering Rousseau,1761 and Rousseau,1768, as well as other
Rousseau writings not dealt with in the present work, to remember
the scholarly difference as exemplified between Heartz,1980:

Rousseau could not, and did not, in his theoretical
writings, acknowledge the growing independence and power
of "pure" instrumental music. The omission led him into
many contradictions.

(p.272)

235 Dent,1992 gives (p.181) 1760-1 as the date of the final form of this work.

236 ib. The present work does not deal with the Rameau-Rousseau controversy. Useful is
Verba,1993, which sets the controversy in the context of a latter eighteenth-century musical
dialogue, centering largely on the philosophes.
and Day and Le Huray, 1981:

In fact, Rousseau was by no means as blind to the value of both harmony and instrumental music as he is often made out to be: this is evident enough from his later admiration for Gluck;

(p.90)

The focus of the present discussion is to outline in what respects Rousseau upholds the doctrine of representation (which prevails in his references to music). However, Rousseau's strongly individualistic statements concerning the meaning and role of music and sound inevitably force also a significant and open-minded evaluation of his thinking in respect of instrumental music. This evaluation may in fact be essential to the understanding of Rousseau's attitude to the doctrine of representation.

Rousseau's aesthetics are immediately informed by pure sensationism: means of interpersonal (and also, presumably, wider social) communication are derivable "only from the senses, the only instruments through which one man can act upon another"

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237 In order to discuss Rousseau's position, it is not necessary to adopt Heartz's rather emotive line of thought.
Rousseau's critique of speech ("Although the language of gesture...What sounds might she use to work such magic?" - p.6), which suggests dependence on visual representation,\textsuperscript{238} may even in its early declaration be felt to extend logically towards being effective also in the theory of pure music.\textsuperscript{239} Perhaps much more keenly anti-aesthetic, though, is the requirement that

"in the most vigorous language, everything is said symbolically, before one actually speaks" (p.7).\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{238} Such dependence being anti-aesthetic. Rousseau mentions (p.8) Horace's thought in this regard and (somewhat individualistically) uses it to bolster the idea that sounds are most effective when they operate to produce visual impressional qualities: "sounds are never more forceful than when they produce the effects of colours" (p.8).

It may be remembered also that Rousseau is comparing vision and hearing as "the only passive organs of language [i.e., presumably, means of contact - language itself - or of being contacted] among distinct individuals" (p.6). Hearing, being also the reception of pure music as well as language, has thus already, anti-aesthetically (since for the Romantics, and, discernibly, in the pre-Romantics, the appreciation of music could be at the level of a mystical experience and therefore hardly passive), been relegated merely to passivity, or perhaps, rather, hearing has not been taken as an essential part of a whole receptive process whose nature is ultimately not a passive one.

\textsuperscript{239} For Rousseau here, sounds are associated with convention and a lesser degree of expressive conveyance. The conventionalism of sounds, as in spoken language, might not (by extension or analogy) have an obvious impact on the theory of pure music. However, the comparative denigration of their expressivity seems rather more powerfully to indicate the (little, or less) store set by Rousseau on the innate power of music. Perhaps Rousseau remained less than clear about what the nature of this power was or could be, or even about whether such a significant power existed at all.

\textsuperscript{240} The main point is Rousseau's requirement of some form of representation. Whether or not there is succeeding verbal substance, especially as explanation of the representation, is of little importance (as the whole context of Rousseau's examples from ancient history suggests).

If such requirement is construed as anti-aesthetic (i.e. the whole representationalistic ethos being viewed as destructive of autonomistic aesthetics, in general and of instrumental music), the absolute character it appears to assume in this context
Rousseau, in keeping with earlier criticism,\textsuperscript{241} subscribed to the passionate utterance theory of language, which again was, ultimately, applicable to music, classically summarising the processive role of the passions thus:

Pantomime without discourse will leave you nearly tranquil; discourse without gestures will wring tears from you. The passions have their gestures, but they also have their accents; and these accents, which thrill us, these tones of voice that cannot fail to be heard, penetrate to the very depths of the heart, carrying there the emotions they wring from us, forcing us in spite of ourselves to feel what we hear. We conclude that while visible signs can render a more exact imitation, sounds more effectively arouse interest.

(pp.8-9)

Despite the accuracy of visual gesture, Rousseau has now put it back in its place, quite possibly in the interest of overloading language, sound and music with a maximum of "burdens", as in Hosler's argument (pp.31-2). What would appear on Rousseau's part ("the most vigorous language") may lend added weight to Rousseau's aesthetic position.

\textsuperscript{241} See Hosler,1981, pp.31-2 in the first instance. Verba,1993, quotes (p.41) from Ch.2 of Rousseau,1761 as an important introductory example of Rousseau's subscription to the passionate utterance theory, but the present discussion includes a slightly earlier passage, from Ch.1 of Rousseau's work, as being a classic summary of the theory.
to be chopping and changing, almost displacing one
representationalist aesthetic position (visual) by another
(sound), must nonetheless be taken seriously. It may be construed
as evidence that at the very outset of Rousseau, 1761 a
representationalist aesthetic base (which may or may not be open
to flexibility as to the infusion of perhaps conflicting ideas)
is laid down. That Rousseau's base is (at this point at least)
thus may be indicated in a rearticulation of the sensationist
approach:

Give man a structure [organically] as crude as you please:
doubtless he will acquire fewer ideas, but if only he has
some means of contact with his fellow men, by means of
which one can act and another can sense, he will finally
succeed in communicating whatever ideas he might have.

(p.10)

The goal remains the communication of (specific) ideas.

The discussion particularly on music (from Ch.12) draws on
erlier assumptions (Chs.2-3), notably that feelings are our
first activity, even before reason. The social doctrine in Chs.9-
10, serving Rousseau's aesthetics, is based on the order of
passion and need: "He who willed man to be social, by the touch
of a finger shifted the globe's axis in line with the axis of the
universe. ...I see the birth of the arts;...The earth nourishes men; but when their initial needs have dispersed them, other needs arise which reunite them, and it is only then that they speak, and that they have any incentive to speak" (p.39), "The first tongues, children of pleasure rather than need" (p.46), but this can be curiously circumstantial: "In southern climes, where nature is bountiful, needs are born of passion. In cold countries, where she is miserly, passions are born of need" (p.46). It is social doctrine which Rousseau chooses immediately to preface the discussion on music with:

For a proper appreciation of their actions, men must be considered in all their relationships: which we simply are not capable of doing. When we put ourselves in the position of others, we do not become what they must be, but remain ourselves, modified. And, when we think we are judging them rationally, we merely compare their prejudices to ours.

(p.49)

This is the principle for a following example (the effect on the hearer of Mohammed himself reciting the Koran) of "authentic" feeling, though Rousseau does not appear specifically to connect

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Rousseau in this sentence does not seem to address the classically-founded precept that one should feel the emotions one is describing (or acting out). This is not necessarily deliberately anticlassical, since this passage, like others in Rousseau, is more individualistic than doctrinal in style.
this quality of authenticity with the aesthetics of language and music, apart from taking it (half) for granted.

Within this commentative structure Rousseau's anti-aesthetic observations must (somehow, at any rate) be incorporated. The anti-aesthetics may be "followed", in the musical section of the discussion in Rousseau, 1761 (Chs. 12-19), as a series of intermittent critical statements, beginning with anti-aesthetic condemnation on a pure and explicit level: "the power of music over our souls is not at all the work of sounds" (p. 53). Doctrinal weight and the alleged primacy of melody (in the full, Rousseau-esque sense) are soon brought to bear:

Music is no more the art of combining sounds to please the ear than painting is the art of combining colours to please the eye. If there were no more to it than that, they would both be natural sciences rather than fine arts. Imitation alone raises them to this level. But what makes painting an imitative art? Drawing.

243 Indeed, the social doctrine and insofar as it may be thought to bear on musical aesthetics may contribute significantly to Heartz's assertion that "Rousseau could not...acknowledge the growing independence and power of "pure" instrumental music."

244 Or perhaps to an extent intermittent, progressively qualificatory statements. The literary style within which pro- or anti-aesthetic statements is set in a particular work, say, of the period dealt with in the present work, is worthy of analysis. The style may also provide information in respect of the argumentative content.

245 Verba, 1993 discusses (pp. 38-48) Rousseau's far-reaching "doctrine of melodic supremacy".
What makes music another? Melody.

(p.55)

This is more qualified, but what immediately follows, in still further qualification, is obviously penetrated by the anthropological agenda with which Rousseau's aesthetics are riddled:

The beauty of sounds is natural. Their effect is purely physical. It is due to the coincidence of various particles of air set in motion by the sonorous body and all their aliquots, perhaps to infinity: the total effect is pleasing. Everyone in the world takes pleasure in hearing beautiful sounds. But if the pleasure is not enlivened by melodious inflections that are familiar to them, it will not be at all delightful, will not become at all voluptuous. The songs most beautiful to us will only moderately move those to whom they are quite unfamiliar. It is a tongue for which one needs a dictionary.

(p.56)

Rousseau thus inserts the concept of representation into music.

Representation is a necessary addition; perhaps it is even synonymous with melody.²⁴⁶

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²⁴⁶ For Rousseau, harmony fails because "Being only conventionally beautiful, it does not in any way please the completely unpractised ear" (p.56). He asks: "Of what is harmony the sign?" (p.57 - abstruse translation clarified). Even if one were to indulge in extensive acoustic calculations in order to arrive at the relationships of sound and harmony expressed in laws, harmony would still never be an imitative art. Imitation thus seems an eternal sine qua non of art (and many other passages in Rousseau support the argument of imitation's being a sine qua non). For a concise discussion of Rousseau's aesthetics of harmony see Verba,1993, pp.17-19,42-3.
(Attempted) explanations as to how music moves us persist in Rousseau's aesthetics according to older lines. Melodic sounds\(^{247}\) are (p.59) significative, "of our affections, of our feelings." Thus the moral-aesthetic character of classical emotionalism becomes once again evident in Rousseau's thought in Ch.15, clearly entitled "That our most lively sensations frequently are produced by moral impressions". But here Rousseau feels able to consider autonomistic aesthetics (in theory, at least) noticeably less covertly: "As much as one might want to consider sounds only in terms of the shock that they excite in our nerves" (p.59). Although this is perhaps just a complaint against physicalist assertions (see context), the level of acknowledgement given to aesthetics which oppose Rousseau's arguments seems at this stage of Rousseau,1761 increasingly formidable.

That Rousseau has, or feels that there are opponents of (at least his formulation of) traditional aesthetics is hinted at in the following further, even more explicit argument:\(^{248}\)

\(^{247}\) Rousseau seems not, or barely, to consider the question (or existence) of nonmelodic musical sounds. There is either speech or singing (cf. Ch.14).
If those who philosophise about the power of sensations would begin by distinguishing pure sense impressions from the intellectual and moral impressions received through the senses, but of which the senses are only the occasional causes, they would avoid the error of attributing to sense objects a power they do not have, or that they have only in relation to affections of the soul which they represent to us.

(pp.60-1)

This leads to a classic aesthetic statement: "For the ear does not so much convey pleasure to the heart as the heart conveys it to the ear" (p.61). And finally in this chapter, Rousseau finds general reasons for defending his doctrines:

I believe that through developing these ideas, we shall be spared stupid arguments about ancient music. But in this century when all operations of the soul have to be materialised, and deprived of all morality and human feeling, I am deluded if the new philosophy does not become as destructive of good taste as of virtue.

(p.61)

Rousseau's actually doing this gives his account of what seem to be older priorities which were in the eighteenth century.

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248 In this context Rousseau could of course merely be objecting just to some classical or other, noncontemporary authors (see, for example, Lucretius, Boethius in discussion above), but further references (see discussion below) suggest that he has a strong conception that there are actual current aesthetic trends destructive of the values he tries to uphold.

249 Here, for example, taste, morality and the passions, and the scholarship of ancient music as a hyperfocused antiquarianism.
conceivably beginning to find a terminal expression, as well as prefacing perhaps incidental excuses such as his alleged "false analogy", discussed in Ch.16.

Rousseau's anti-aesthetics, as traced in the present discussion, in a sense reach a logical culmination in the issue of the separation of language and music.\(^{250}\)

Thus melody, originally an aspect of discourse, imperceptibly assumes a separate existence and music becomes more independent of speech. That is also when it stopped producing the marvels it had produced when it was merely the accent and harmony of poetry and gave to it the power over the passions that speech subsequently exercised only on reason.

(pp.68-9)

From this passage it seems likely that Rousseau thought such a separation entirely artificial, in his argument (i) it being inadequate that language did not perceptibly have the benefit of having music subservient to and/or elemental in it, and, possibly implied, (ii) music being inconceivable apart from as itself a language. Because of the stated idea of the allegedly impoverishing effect of divorcing pure music from its traditional

\(^{250}\) Rousseau's musical aesthetics must, within the subject matter of Rousseau,1761, logically be brought back to language.
resting place, language, the passage stands as a key to Rousseau's anti-aesthetics (which are expressed equally with and without explicit or explanatory reference to the doctrine of imitation).

Finally to be noted is that there is embedded in Ch.16 a quite mysterious statement which seems to touch on abstraction: "It is one of the great advantages of the musician that he can represent things that cannot be heard, while it is impossible to represent things which cannot be seen" (p.64). Does this affirm or deny the concept of abstraction, or does it do both? The second clause appears to deny the possibility of visual abstract art, implicitly through upholding the principle of imitation's being a *sine qua non*. But it may be open to suggestion whether the representational doctrine put forward in the first clause (and concerned with the primacy of melody) necessitates, even if, again, by default, some notion of abstraction.

Rousseau,1761 figures as an essential document as to Rousseau's position in musical aesthetics. It is able to provide abstract discussion at the elemental level without needing a

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251 I.e. in the present discussion, being a particular method of presenting Rousseau's ideas.
structure of numerous case studies of musical and, as appropriate, other works of art. This generalising ability may have formed part of the lingua franca of contemporary aesthetic tracts, but without it the progress of musical aesthetics could have been of a different order.\textsuperscript{252}

\textbf{Lessing,1766}

Wellbery,1984 (p.4) regards Lessing,1766 as great principally because of its "otherness", but in the present discussion it is enough to note that Lessing,1766, owing to the complexity and variety of ideas it throws out, is not easily summarisable in compact terms. Its central focus appears to be the comparison of visual and verbal representation or evocation, of painting and poetry. This is comprehensively achieved, making, in the process, significant commentary on concepts of imitation, expression and, perhaps with obliquity similar to that postulated to obtain in other writers, abstraction. The essentially

\textsuperscript{252} For example, a proliferation of examples and case studies as being perpetually the norm in critical musical aesthetics might conceivably have deadened the discussional pace somewhat, as, say it could tend to do in older treatises where tens and hundreds of examples of, say, operas risk giving rise to the features of repetitiveness and obscuring of the main argument (whatever that is).
representationalist framework is nevertheless stated with such all-consuming vitality and predominant perspicacity that one is much tempted to follow Wellbery's appraisal.

Of the three classes introduced at the outset (p.58), it is perhaps the critic's perspective that Lessing most wishes to follow throughout. Horatian principles of circumspection and balance seem to guide the discussion, although Lessing is slow to acknowledge Horace at all in any context. The Horatian simile permeates the discussion as well as Simonides' antithesis (cited initially - p.59), even given the later reservation (p.108) that "A mere simile proves and justifies nothing."

Importantly for Lessing's topic, imitation can (in poetry and the plastic arts) be mobile, "progressive" (p.60). This constitutes a critical interaction with the concept of imitation. Lessing seems concerned to remark on possible refinements of the definition of imitation, and certainly not to challenge the concept *per se*.²⁵³ Perhaps the first significant refinement is

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²⁵³ By Chapter IV of Lessing,1766 (p.69), if not before, it is clear that Platonic and Aristotelian classicism is presupposed. It is probably in the context of the allegedly "other-worldly" structure of this work that observations, as perceived, on abstraction might be examined, their not therefore being (at least directly) interpretable as challenging to the central doctrine.
the modification of the pleasure of imitation, which arises not merely, or even principally from "the bare, cold pleasure arising from a well-caught likeness or from the daring of a clever effort", but from the portrayal of the beautiful, which acquires the "dear" and "noble" status of being "the ultimate purpose of art" (p.63). In this critique the subject of the work of art must itself be perfect.

This point is again put, forcefully, in the form of a denunciation of imitation as being end rather than means (which Lessing may have taken to have been the popular, misconceived view):

Has a costume, the work of slavish hands, just as much beauty as the work of Eternal Wisdom, an organised body? Does it demand the same faculties, is it equally meritorious, does it bring the same honour, to imitate the former as to imitate the latter? Do our eyes only wish to be deceived, and is it all the same to them with what they are deceived?

With the poet a dress is no dress; it conceals nothing; our imagination sees through it at all times.

(p.78)

It is precisely because of the expressional problems in the Laocoön classical model sculpture (in the context of that eighteenth-century aesthetic hobbyhorse, drapery) that Lessing
can apply to the painting-poetry comparison the principle of imitation's being, in the first instance, means. But Lessing still continues to hold the truistic and perhaps somewhat circular precept that "One imitates in order to resemble" (p.81). And imitation persists as a normative concept.

Another point in the presentation of the imitative doctrine, made somewhat as if to suggest an innovation, concerns (hyper)realism:

We might suggest that as there were more wheels than one, so in the [Homeric] description just as much more time must be given to them as their separate putting-on would actually itself require.

(p.100)

This is in the context of "the proper subjects" of painting being "bodies with their visible properties" and those of poetry being actions (p.99). But realistic imitation on this level is perhaps thought by Lessing to be (in general) only suggestible.

The "poetic picture" (p.96) is heavily qualified (pp.104-5), its power deriving (relationally) from "the [outward] beauty

\footnote{In terms of process, painting and poetry are on a par: "Of what the artist can put together only part by part the poet can only set a copy in the same way" (p.117). Imitation is normative, and perhaps imitation by parts is for Lessing the classic sense of representation (although see argument pp.105-6).}
itself”, from which the painter and the poet "can assure to us" "the degree of life and resemblance in the picture” (p.105).

Moreover, the poetic picture gains from the presence of the actual object described, argued in respect of the case example (p.105) of the verses about the "bright golden flower", but by itself can only convey the laboriousness of its own creation ("I hear in every word the toiling poet") since it says "little or nothing". For Lessing, music remains representational, perhaps along the lines of Rousseau's primacy of melody as representation (although the commitment to melody is unstated in Lessing, 1766), since music is a quality of poetic language: "The musical painting which we hear in the words of the poet it is not possible to translate into another language" (p.96). Music contributes to the action-building poetic process. Its alleged representational ethos is, albeit perhaps indirectly, felt to be maintained in Lessing's thought. Music qua concept seems obliged to contend with (be accounted in) various complex arguments concerning language, signification, time and space. One example of such an argument is that on the failure in poetic illusion which underlies the questioning of the viability in poetry of the
principle of imitation by parts ("whether, however, all these characteristics can be easily gathered into one living picture or not, that might be to him a matter of indifference" - p.106). Lessing's use of these arguments does not necessarily, explicitly or inexplicitly, lay him open to being drawn into the arena of a radically new aesthetic, though they might in themselves potentially point forward despite or even in their adherence to classical doctrine.

One significant issue in Lessing, 1766 is the definition of the work of art, significantly in the sense of defining the scope of art, and this task would seem often to lead to notions of abstraction forming part of the discussion, even if they are not articulated as such. For instance, the possibility of the autonomy of the work of art is offered in conjunction with the theory of common bases of painting and poetry (p.83). From the definition of the work of art which (in some respects, obscurely) \(^{255}\) opens Chapter III comes the assessment of what connotes artistic significance:

\(^{255}\) See the "independent considerations", p.66. Why "the supreme moment of an action" should not lend itself to expression is not immediately explained.
Now that alone is significant and fruitful which gives free play to the imagination. The more we see, the more must we be able to add by thinking. The more we add thereto by thinking, so much the more can we believe ourselves to see.\footnote{256}

(p.67)

Abstraction is therefore encouraged within the representational sphere.\footnote{257} The Laocoon sculptural model is employed to test these concepts of imagination and further refinements such as the following observation on the unity of time in (visual) art:\footnote{258}

"As this single moment receives from Art an unchangeable continuance, it must not express anything which thought is obliged to consider transitory" (p.67).

In criticising Virgil, Lessing makes the point (p.81) that "arbitrariness", presumably referring to flexibility in

\footnote{256} The obscure point (see preceding note) may be explained in the sentences immediately following: "In the whole gamut of an emotion, however, there is no moment less advantageous than its topmost note. Beyond it there is nothing further, and to show us the uttermost is to tie the wings of fancy and oblige her, as she cannot rise above the sensuous impression, to busy herself with weaker pictures below it, the visible fullness of expression acting as a frontier which she dare not transgress."

\footnote{257} The thrust of the debate at this point on the nature of the work of art is that beauty is the end of art - see p.87, where, curiously perhaps, religion is stressed as having been an "outward compulsion for the ancient artist" (in contradistinction to the immanence it was to have for the Romantics) and art, \textit{qua} supporter of religion, sought more after the symbolic than the beautiful.

\footnote{258} This further observation constituting, if one will, a refinement of the imitative doctrine.
description ("changes", which "would yet be merely arbitrary"),
interferes with resemblance and therefore with the whole
imitative process. This criticism would appear almost to
necessitate a recognition of abstraction, which may be required
in order to make critical distinctions in points concerning even
representationalist doctrine.\footnote{259}

On the other hand, Lessing denounces (pp.91-2)
unintelligibility both in poetry and painting and asks (p.97),
"what more does the painter want than visible subjects in order
to fill his canvas?" The abstraction of portraying different time
periods in one visual frame is denounced (p.107) as fantastic:
"an invasion of the poet's sphere by the painter, which good
taste can never sanction." What in one art is permissible is in
the other an abstract and rude breach of limitation. Abstraction
could also be rejected (p.109) on grounds of (inaccessible)
subtlety of subject, such as Virgil's portrayal of Aeneas'
Shield. And discussions of Homer and Boivin (pp.111-12) suggest

\footnote{259 It is evident from the first section of the present chapter, on the aesthetics of Plato and
Aristotle, that classical thought needed the recognition of artistic and intellectual abstraction in
order properly to describe the (representational) doctrines it propounded.}
that Lessing is trying to find a position for abstraction in his scheme of aesthetic thought.

Lessing, 1766 succeeds, albeit somewhat repetitiously, in treating of a wide range of often highly separable concepts which have roots in classical representational doctrine, and is in this respect one of the broadest and also most complex documents of its period. The foregoing discussion has attempted to isolate concepts in it which remained relevant to classical doctrine.

Diderot, 1775/6

Like much Rousseau, Diderot, 1775/6 gives the impression of being permeated with Romantic thought, which appears to be turned on its head in order to serve the cause of broadening classical doctrine. In addition, Diderot, 1775/6 is superassured in its deliberations, this probably being in some way due to Diderot’s mindfulness of posterity.

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260 For dating, see Wilson, 1972, p.678.

261 Rousseau, 1768 is another significant document. It repeats some material from Rousseau, 1761 and from the Encyclopédie articles on music. Its independent material contains a level of equivocation towards newer aesthetics similar to that as discussed (above) in the case of Rousseau, 1761.

262 Diderot’s self-proclaimed position with regard to posterity is amplly considered in Wilson, 1972.
Like Lessing, Diderot here seems concerned ever further to qualify classical doctrine. The differences between the two writers' approaches to classical aesthetics are not particularly crucial. They show clearly, nonetheless, that in the eighteenth century the doctrine of imitation was susceptible of fine qualification (for example, in order to strengthen its acceptation). They also reveal that the central doctrine was at the base of an intellectual battleground which at its extreme admitted of two contrasting camps, those who were concerned to preserve or restore classical precepts and those who manifested uneasiness with (though not wholehearted rejection of) the status quo. Diderot's self-satisfaction may have been of a different order to Rousseau's. The present discussion concentrates on selected points in Diderot, 1775/6 which treat of imitation (and - undoubtedly, as Diderot would see it - something more).

It is therefore logical that one of Diderot's main priorities should be the elegant restatement of classical

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263 And not to overlook that many writers of the period do not admit of ready classification as belonging particularly to either camp, some writers seeming to cling tenaciously, almost, to each in turn.
Why is it that the works of the ancients have such noble character? It is because all of them had frequented the academies of the philosophers.

(p.142)

Commenting on the contemporary role of philosophers and art, Diderot raises the question of nature's bearing a different relation to the philosopher than it does to the artist:

Nature is more interesting for the artist than for me; for me it is only a spectacle, for him it is a model as well.

(p.143)

It is perhaps in the same spirit of enquiry that Diderot judges it proper (and perhaps also wise) to classify the arts:

I think that it takes more time to learn to look at a painting than to feel a poetic passage. Perhaps even more time is necessary to judge an engraving well.

(p.177)

This particular classification (as being among a number of many others possible) comes from technical criteria which seem similar to some used by Lessing.

Diderot regards art in its traditional significance:

Every piece of sculpture or painting must be the expression of a great maxim, a lesson for the spectator;
without this it is dumb.

Due to the aphoristic structure of Diderot, 1775/6, it seems to be left open whether a purely moral lesson is meant, though the context suggests that artistic technique is also implied. And the next passage in fact confirms that Diderot is speaking of both:

Two qualities which are essential to the artist are the moral and the perspective.

It is perhaps with the potential moral message in mind that Diderot lays stress on the desired ideality of imitation:

Every work which is dignified with praise is completely and throughout in accord with nature; it is necessary for me to be able to say: "I have not seen this phenomenon, but it exists."

And this fundamental requirement of idealistic imitation is perhaps even more vitally expressed in the notion of essential unalterability of the work of art:

A work must be ordered in such a manner as to persuade me that it could not have been ordered otherwise; a figure must act or take its rest in such a manner as to persuade me that it could not have acted otherwise.
This can be combined with the important perception (also in Lessing, 1766) that expression is (or should be) all-pervasive:

Expression, like blood and nervous fibres, winds and manifests itself in the whole of a figure.

Diderot shares in Lessing's extreme classicism, but the sense that one proceeds to have even more from Diderot's arguments is of attempted extension beyond the simply elegant redefinition of classical doctrine.

What further is it that Diderot pursues? It becomes apparent that his real quest is for the critique of beauty:

Beauty has but one form.
The beautiful is but truth elevated by circumstances which are possible, but rare and marvellous. If there are gods, there are devils; and why could not miracles be worked through each of them?!
The good is only the useful elevated by circumstances which are possible and marvellous.
Verisimilitude consists in a greater or lesser degree of possibility. Possibility consists in ordinary circumstances.

Diderot is thus able to assert that

What is true in nature is the basis of the
verisimilitudinous in art.²⁶⁴

(p.166)

The one passage in Diderot,1775/6 which says anything direct concerning music may in fact be another metaphor:

Wherever it is shameful to act as a model to art, the artist will rarely make beautiful things. One does not love music, as long as one is scrupulous about words.

(p.173)

While the second sentence seems as if it could be metaphorical in respect of the first, it would also appear to contain the independent thought that music can be recognised on its own, purely, without needing other media to complete the total artistic effect. And the first sentence seems to contain an implicit recognition of (the possibility of) abstraction, again, by default.
matters\textsuperscript{265} or devise as it were new modes of discourse in order to conserve traditional values:

Every seminary of learning may be said to be surrounded with an atmosphere of floating knowledge, where every mind may imbibe somewhat congenial to its original conceptions. Knowledge, thus obtained, has always something more popular and useful than that which is forced on the mind by private precepts, or solitary meditation.

(I.68-73, p.16)

This is one of the first significant remarks in what turns out to be a long train of invective against immanence of inspiration and creation. Of Reynolds' enmity to any antimimetic ethos one can guess from the following summary of purpose:

Thus I have ventured to give my opinion of what appears to me the true and only method by which an artist makes himself master of his profession; which I hold ought to be one continued course of imitation that is not to cease but with his life.

(VI.563-6, p.110)

Reynolds opts for the circular,\textsuperscript{266} repertoire-based aesthetics, defining taste as

\textsuperscript{265} Often weakly - see, for example, VII.723-8, pp.139-40.

\textsuperscript{266} In that the best artistic method lies in imitating the ancients, this being therefore a closed system within which "originality" is not highly prized, if at all (perhaps because it can contend too much with "truth").
regulated and formed by the presiding feelings of mankind, by those works which have approved themselves to all times and all persons.

(VII.610-12, p.136)

Reynolds states throughout that for the artist not to have received ideas from emulable examples\(^\text{267}\) would be a shortcoming, to the point of ridiculousness.

Servility\(^\text{268}\) in imitation is virtuous for Reynolds (I.209-10, p.20). On the other hand, "The true and liberal ground of imitation is an open field" (VI.258-9, p.101). Perhaps one of the most pervasive, and, from the point of view of autonomistic aesthetics of instrumental music, perhaps implacable and even insidious arguments in connection with the upholding of the doctrine of imitation is the appeal to truth:

The natural appetite or taste of the human mind is for Truth; whether that truth results from the real agreement or equality of original ideas among themselves; from the agreement of the representation of any object with the thing represented; or from the correspondence of the several parts of any arrangement with each other. It is the very same taste which relishes a demonstration in geometry, that is pleased with the resemblance of a picture to an original, and touched with the harmony of musick.

\(^{267}\) To include those from nature, the original fountainhead (VI.264-8, p.101).

\(^{268}\) Or perhaps simply fidelity.
(VII.162-9, p.122)

It may be that the appeal of music for Reynolds here is precisely the same as it would be for adherents of autonomistic aesthetics and of Romanticism,\textsuperscript{269} the difference being that Reynolds' "formula" ("touched...") is couched in terms that conform uncompromisingly to tradition.

A key passage on musical aesthetics in this work (which barely treats of the subject, even to the extent of giving contextual examples) was omitted in the 1797 edition:

The effect of elaborate pieces of music is not always understood or felt (whatever may be pretended) according to the expectation of those who have been taught what those arbitrary signs denote, and are meant to signify. It requires long habit to perceive the effect of the various combinations of sound, and the particular ends they are designed to attain, though the ground and foundation of the whole is in nature.

(X.107-8 80, p.178)

That music does not seem to conform to mimetic models of the other arts is explained away by craftsmanship and empiricism.

This passage may fit in very well with the earlier dictum that

\textsuperscript{269} And, indeed, that the early Romantics would have had no particular quarrel with the notion, as hinted at here, of truth's central importance.
"Nature herself is not to be too closely copied" (III.15, p.41).

There are gradable senses of "nature":

He who thinks nature, in the narrow sense of the word, is alone to be followed, will produce but a scanty entertainment for the imagination: [...] In short, whatever pleases has in it what is analogous to the mind, and is therefore, in the highest and best sense of the word, natural.

(VII.324-6,330-2, p.127)

Nature thus has a claim on the best operations of the mind, which is central to artistic endeavour:

The value and rank of every art is in proportion to the mental labour employed in it, or the mental pleasure produced by it.

(IV.1-2, p.57)

It is "general nature" which, as a basis for works of art, guarantees their immortality (IV.505-13, p.73). The exaltation of (authentic) nature goes so far, for instance, as to say that it is better to have a coincidence of the attitude required in one's model and the attitude which is natural to the model than to force the model into one's required pose, this having other benefits too (XII.468-74, pp.222-3), for "The art of seeing Nature, or in other words, the art of using Models, is in reality the great object, the point to which all our studies are
directed" (XII.511-13, p.224).

The purpose of art (painting, in any case) is "to strike the imagination" (IV.82, p.59), which may be attempted but only when the artist has "well established his judgment, and stored his memory" (II.65-6, p.27). This underlies the following statement, which occurs at the end of another, rare, key passage on musical aesthetics (XIII.206-19, p.235):

This is what I would understand by poets and painters being allowed to dare every thing; for what can be more daring, than accomplishing the purpose and end of art, by a complication of means, none of which have their archetypes in actual nature?

(XIII.216-19, p.235)

This understanding of Reynolds is a substitute for the more absolute permissiveness which was to arrive with Romanticism. But the very significant point of the whole passage, and one that damns autonomistic aesthetics perhaps more effectively than representationalist arguments taken by themselves, is that it is a matter of complete indifference whether the phenomenon of music's attractiveness occurs together with or in isolation from the other elements of poetry and "graceful action" etc.

In the context of the entire discussion of mimetic
aesthetics in Reynolds, 1797 a comprehensive range of elements is offered. For instance, there are refining observations on the concept of imitation by parts (VIII.461-5, p.159; XI.245-55, p.198), and the concept of novelty (for its own sake) is summarily dealt with: "novelty...soon destroys itself, and at any rate is but a weak antagonist against custom" (VII.716-18, p.139); "innovation...brings with it" "evil and confusion" (VII.721-2, p.139). It is also noted that imitation per se is not the highest point of perfection (XIII.169-71, p.234), being identified with "natural pleasure" (the pleasure taken in "the truth of the imitation" - XIII.107, p.232), which in its vulgar sense is predicable just of "the lowest style only of arts, whether of Painting, Poetry or Musick", affecting "minds wholly uncultivated" (XIII.134-7, p.233). The concept of "mind, or genius" (VI.231, p.100) is developed so as to ensure compliance with the principle of imitation of classic models (it is a "feebleness" - VI.240, p.100 - if outside influences encumber one, an indicator that one had no great intellectual powers to

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270 Elements which are encountered in classical discussions and which form bases for analyses of contemporary (eighteenth-century) tracts.
begin with). But the mind may surpass its influences, and this is all the better: "in the one he was a Genius, in the other not much above a copier" (XI.184-5, p.196).

A final and pertinent observation concerning musical aesthetics is offered in XV. Reynolds postulates the existence in music of an "agreement or compact,...with which the Critick is necessarily previously required to be acquainted, in order to form a correct judgment" (XV.405-8, p.277). The "compact" would seem to be an unspecified but generalisable technical property or qualitative combination.\footnote{Perhaps Reynolds simply means the qualifiable (in whatever manner), technical elements which distinguish, say, "the most refined Italian musick...from the inartificial notes of nature" (XV.414, p.277).} It is necessary for the critic and listener to reach an understanding of this, for "without such a supposed compact, we may be very confident that the highest state of refinement in either of those arts will not be relished without a long and industrious attention" (XV.415-18, pp.277-8). The point is reached through a consideration of taste, which, when "false or depraved", "is a thing as well known, as easily discovered, as any thing that is deformed, misshapen, or wrong,
in our form, or outward make" (VII.773-5, p.141), a "man of real
taste" being "always a man of judgment in other respects" (VII.
803-4, p.142) (the - classical - moral extension of having
taste). Music needs the medium of an intellectual apprehension,
a technical understanding before it can fully, or deeply be
appreciated The direct apprehension of music via the senses,
according as music was to be most powerfully apprehended, was
incomplete without engaging with music's "compact", its
"agreement" by which its understanding at the human level would
be facilitated.

A main portion of Reynolds' significant remarks are
virulently anti-aesthetic and provoked writers such as Blake, for
example. The basis of one important argument forms one of
Reynolds' main didactic purposes:

The purport of this discourse, and, indeed, of most
of my other discourses, is, to caution you against that
false opinion, but too prevalent among artists, of the
imaginary power of native genius, and its sufficiency in
great works.

(VI.627-30, p.112)

A particularly potent passage (VI.61-72, p.95), which disparages
the concept of total reliance on "native power", is followed by
incredulity that such a concept could actually be propounded:

Some allowance must be made for what is said in the gaiety or ambition of rhetorick. We cannot suppose that any one can really mean to exclude all imitation of others. A position so wild would scarce deserve a serious answer; for it is apparent, if we were forbid to make use of the advantages which our predecessors afford us, the art would be always to begin, and consequently remain always in its infant state; and it is a common observation, that no art was ever invented and carried to perfection at the same time.

(VI.73-80, p.95)

It may also be concluded that Reynolds' observations on taste are a logical extension of the "common observation” mentioned. Reynolds' conservatism, it would appear, goes so far as to necessitate the specifying of impossibilities ("We cannot suppose..."), and the interpretation of what art would be, were this ban to be enforced, seems to entail an apparent failure simply even to see other explanations and scenarios. Also, closing his work, Reynolds makes a careful point concerning new ideas which supports his attempt at stifling concepts of native genius:

In reviewing my Discourses, it is no small satisfaction to be assured that I have, in no part of them, lent my assistance to foster newly-hatched unfledged opinions
As Reynolds would have it, building on the past is still the first step towards progress.

Another point concerns what Reynolds would like to see as being the proper search for beauty. The qualities of "Science" and "Learning" "must not be sacrificed and given up for an uncertain and doubtful beauty, which, not naturally belonging to our Art, will probably be sought for without success" (VIII.616-18, p.164 - cf. also X.141-6, p.179). Again, for Reynolds here it is not enough merely to mention the uncertainty and doubt, and to condemn it. Such a beauty also will never be found. Reynolds' idea of beauty is the "object" of (at any rate, visual) art, being "an idea that subsists only in the mind...residing in the breast of the artist" (IX.71-5, p.171). The ultimate effect of the limitary communication of this interior beauty is to heighten public taste, which in turn, "if it does not lead directly to purity of manners, obviates at least their greatest deprivation, by disentangling the mind from appetite" and

272 In Reynolds' theory, this (precious) beauty does not admit of easy communication. Communication of it is partial at best, and at this level an achievement for the artist. Again, this may have Romantic overtones (for example, immanence), but it is set in a purely representationalist, classical frame.
"conducts" the thoughts finally to "Virtue" (IX.82-6, p.171). The moral end seems included here almost as an afterthought. Yet it is to be noted that Reynolds does not forget it.

Reynolds sometimes seems to allow some latitude (relative to points already mentioned in the present discussion), say, in respect of the imagination:

> Upon the whole, it seems to me, that the object and intention of all Arts is to supply the natural imperfection of things, and often to gratify the mind by realising and embodying what never existed but in the imagination.

(XIII.479-82, p.244)

But the bringing to light of what has hitherto been contained only in the imagination must still be seen primarily in the context of representationalist doctrine elucidated throughout.

Reynolds, 1797 clearly stands as one of the most positivistic documents of its specific period and indeed of the century as a whole. It is highly consistent throughout and maintains a peremptory style and alarmed stance. It would appear that Reynolds was very much aware of newer trends and, in the case of

\[\text{273} \] The separation of the mind and appetite might well be considered the point on which Reynolds' theory of beauty actually rests.
his immediate audience at least, sought to eradicate them.

Twining, 1789

Twining in this work pays allegiance to Harris, 1744, Winckelmann, 1764, Lessing, 1767-9 and Burney, 1776. These tributes (which are explicit) are in connection with points bearing on representationalist doctrine, except (apparently) that referring to Burney's remark on "so divinely composed and...expressively performed" instrumental music's needing "no words to explain its meaning" (p. 50, note s). Twining's tribute to Lessing (pp. xviii-xix) reveals his own concern for authentic presentation of classical doctrine without contemporary qualification. This concern notwithstanding, there is substantial coverage of the question of music as a particular case of representationalist doctrine.

Instead of denying the inherent power of music taken purely

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274 The translation itself was finished in c. 1785 - p. xvii.

275 Perhaps the point remains conservative, for poor instrumental music ("much unmeaning trash") obviously does require words "to explain its meaning". Categorising instrumental music into good and poor qualities conceivably obscures or damages the central point that all instrumental music, of whatever quality, as pure music retains its inherent inductive powers.
in itself, Twining takes rather the viewpoint that what music
does, does not quite come up to the standard of "imitation". This
is because "We discover not the likeness till we know the
meaning" (p.5). Music lacks the sounds categorisation of poetry,
"as sounds merely, and as sounds significant, or arbitrary and
conventional signs of ideas" (p.5). "Music...is...not imitative,
but...merely suggestive" (p.49,note s). The curious aspect of
Twining's critique of music's powers is that they seem allegedly
to lend themselves to appreciation only through intellectual
effort, the realisation that, having first apprehended other
conditions, one's imagination is free, on the part of the hearer:

in the best instrumental music, expressively performed,
the very indecision itself of the expression, leaving the
hearer to the free operation of his emotion upon his
fancy, and, as it were, to the free choice of such ideas
as are, to him, most adapted to react upon and heighten
the emotion which occasioned them, produces a pleasure,
which nobody, I believe, who is able to feel it, will
deny to be one of the most delicious that Music is
capable of affording. But far the greater part even of
those who have an ear for Music, have only an ear; and
to them this pleasure is unknown.

(p.49,note s)

The rest of Twining's commentary dealing with this subject does
not (although it might seem to) dispel the impression given in
this passage that intellectual effort must in the appreciation of pure music regulate, govern and surpass purely aural apprehension. Also, it would appear that Twining is anxious (pp.47-8) to qualify both the classical and contemporary approaches to pure musical aesthetics.

That Twining regards imitation as ingrained into the system of arts is evident from his remarks on poetry, where critical conceptual situations occur: "A total suspension of his functions as an imitator is hardly to be found" (p.23), "to observe the Poet varying...the quantity...of his imitation" (p.24). Twining may be concerned to improve the presentation of both classical and contemporary doctrinal accounts, and also to improve the idea in the case of the contemporary ones but even there to use classical principles. In note i (p.8), Twining quotes "a famous imitative line of Boîleau", stating that nobody ignorant of French could guess at what, if anything at all, was being imitated, "unless, indeed, the idea were forced upon his mind by the pronunciation of the reader." This qualification shows Twining still reliant on classical theory, the classical point, articulated through such arguments as those advocating that the
performer ought actually to feel the emotions he is supposed to portray etc., being that performance plays an important role in mimetic theory. Twining's designation of some (visual) arts as "strictly and clearly imitative" remains unimpressive until the eminent describability of visible objects is systematised (pp.9-10). The description of mental objects' being imitative is subject to certain qualifications (pp.15 ff.), such as the complexity of the object (passion) involved.

In upholding what he sees as correct presentation of doctrine, Twining criticises both writers whose stances are representationalist and possibly "ambiguous" as well (see criticism of Rousseau,1753 - p.56,note f), and more autonomist ones (criticism of Beattie,1776 - pp.58-9,note j). It is obvious, too, that en route to his classicistic vision of the arts, Twining makes some acknowledgement of the independent powers of music taken purely in itself. However, it also seems that this acknowledgement is chiefly, if not only, because of a desire to remain analytically objective and comprehensive in respect of the arguments by which he arrives at his aesthetic decisions.

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276 Twining appears to clinch the delineation of "the strictly imitative arts" in note n, p.10.
Conclusion

Mimetic aesthetics in classical and eighteenth-century thought affected or interacted with pure musical aesthetics (principally in their formulation as concerned with instrumental music as opposed to combinational music). *Mimesis* may be regarded perhaps as just one of a number of not, *in toto*, easily specifiable or categorisable enemies of autonomistic musical aesthetics. But also it may perhaps be regarded as *the* real enemy. The discussion has concluded with two British works which, though different in their approaches, provide evidence that, for some, the concepts of classical thought were not mere history but still firmly in control.
CHAPTER 3 -

PRECEDENCE: MUSIC AND THE AESTHETIC (1)
Introduction

In eighteenth-century aesthetics (particularly post-1750) autonomist theories occurred easily (and perhaps, in some senses, randomly) alongside representationalist ones. In the discussion in Ch.2 of (mainly) representationalist arguments, the historically based method of chronological listing was found convenient. Since a staple form of survival of classical representational doctrine was seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French classicism, which informed British and German criticism of the period, there is in some ways less need to show regional schools of thought (since there was one useful main European vehicle for classical expression); thus, the strictly chronological methodology has in the case of the representationalist arguments examined in Ch.2 some

277 Another way of putting this, it would seem, is simply that there was an atmosphere of debate. This construction has been sidelined in the present discussion on the grounds that it would perhaps imply that the autonomy aesthetic and the opposing mimetic doctrine were explicitly in the public arena of discussion, which, in the context that there was in the eighteenth century a number of social and aesthetic concerns, cannot readily be said to have been the case. One pointer as to which interpretation might be settled on, if that were required, might be the incidence of cross-reference (to other, contemporary discussions) in individual writings. But the selection of more autonomist writings examined in the present discussion would seem to suggest that, in the case of the majority of eighteenth-century writers, much independent-minded thought was the rule. Perhaps one significant reason for this was that those who favoured the autonomist outlook may have felt that the older (classical) theories (often stated in general terms) had first to be overcome rather than giving priority to contemporary mimetically-oriented arguments (which could possibly have been taken to be largely indistinguishable, making up a "deposit of faith").
But this need not mean that in the following discussion of (mainly) autonomist arguments, the same methodology must be followed. In the searching investigation of autonomistic aesthetics it would be productive not to adhere rigidly merely to a single research methodology. The answers which one is trying to uncover as to these aesthetics in their historical setting and significance may in fact be accessible only through a presentation of critical analyses which recognises alternative modes of historical discussion. In the following discussion (of autonomist arguments), the writings selected are dealt with chronologically within regional groupings. One advantage of this methodology is that it may reflect the latter eighteenth century's increasing diversity of aspirations, from stolid mainstream classicism through to German devotional piety. If research methodologies are applied simultaneously and with diligence, they should yield more results than the application of a single mode of discussion throughout.\footnote{Importantly, moreover, the employment of regional classifications in the present discussion is not meant to imply that there were necessarily regional schools of thought along these lines, nor is it meant to imply that the discussion should be thought of as necessarily tending towards such}
One other variation from the discussion of representationalist arguments in Ch.2 is that in the following discussion the concentration is, where possible, largely on contexts which concern music and sound. While it is possible to draw conclusions about instrumental music aesthetics from a wider variety of contexts, as has already been seen, it is again legitimate to vary the methodology for the sake of doing so and in order to concentrate on values of instrumental music aesthetics which arguably are most explicitly derived from contexts of music and sound.

an interpretation. Having said this, the regional groupings here are informally labelled according to tendencies which the writings therein may perhaps exhibit in the context of preceding and contemporary writings of their own nationalities ("British aestheticism", owing to the mid-eighteenth-century preoccupation of British writers, since Hutcheson, with discussing the beautiful, sublime and virtuous; "French polemicism", according as the writers examined reacted against the prevailing French classical climate; and German Romanticism, insofar as the writers are selected early Romantics).

279 It is of course still necessary to discuss, where appropriate, nonmusical contexts in order specifically to arrive at discoverable attitudes to musical and general artistic autonomy. A central thrust of the research methodology advocated here is that the potency of musical contexts increasingly in the later eighteenth century cannot be ignored both for its general as well as musical aesthetic implications. Thus the search for ideas also works in reverse. In other words, contexts of general aesthetics had always been potentially significant for what light they could throw on instrumental music aesthetics. In reverse, contexts of musical aesthetics - specifically instrumental music aesthetics - were, in this period especially, also becoming ever more important for what they could contribute to general aesthetic thought. Romanticism as an entire concept - literary, visual and auditory - cannot be discussed without some reference to contexts of instrumental music aesthetics, among many other aesthetic contexts (dealing with other arts) which are normally considered.
British Aestheticism

Burke, 1759

On one level it is difficult to know whether Burke completely or substantially rejects the doctrine of imitation, or whether it is in question that he should do so at all. A casual glance at the contents of this work reveals a definite advance on earlier theory, for example the idea that poetry is strictly imitative is dispensed with (V. VI). What is certain is that Burke is concerned with matters other than imitation and also that wherever the question of imitation is accepted or treated of, it is qualified or laden with some new emphasis. What is, in this context certainly, further important is that throughout the work he displays a positive respect for the power of pure sound.

Burke observes in the Preface that the empirical method is viable (for aesthetic investigation): "A theory founded on experiment and not assumed, is always good for so much as it explains. Our inability to push it indefinitely is no argument at all against it" (p. vii). This may seem rather low-key or incidental until another, significant statement of principle:
"Whatever turns the soul inward on itself, tends to concentre its forces, and to fit it for greater and stronger flights of science. By looking into physical causes our minds are opened and enlarged; and in this pursuit whether we take or whether we lose our game, the chace is certainly of service" (pp.viii-ix). The inward journey would appear to be intimately linked to the sensory realm which is the physical level. "All the natural powers in man...are the Senses; the Imagination; and the Judgment" ("Introduction. On Taste.", p.7). Perception is very much bound up with the physical, since the imagination is limited to sense data (p.16). A certain objectivity of effect is claimed for imagination:

    Now the imagination is the most extensive province of pleasure and pain, as it is the region of our fears and our hopes, and of all our passions that are connected with them; and whatever is calculated to affect the imagination with these commanding ideas, by force of any original natural impression, must have the same power pretty equally over all men.

    (p.16)

It would appear that it is the "original natural impression" for which objectivity is claimed, for the important result is that "consequently there must be just as close an agreement in the
imaginations as in the senses of men" (p.17). An important corollary as far as imitation is concerned is that the pleasure of resemblance is one of but two pleasures of the imagination (the other being precisely the "original natural impression", "arising from properties of the natural object" - pp.16,17). But it is nevertheless on the pleasure of resemblance that taste hinges (p.20). Corresponding to the "original natural impression" is "the force of natural sympathy" (p.29) for the passions, which also engages the imagination. It would therefore seem in the final analysis important to Burke that "we are conversant with the sensible qualities of things" (p.28). Those "works of the imagination" which are supersensible ("not confined to the representation of sensible objects"), concerned (also?) with moral qualities, "come within the province of the judgment, which is improved by attention and by the habit of reasoning" (p.29). This could do with further clarification, but it is notable that the senses remain "the great originals of all our ideas" (though it may be asked whether Burke knows what to do with pleasures that are "uncertain and arbitrary" and therefore not founded on "Taste") (p.31). The empirical method would, having stated its
principal objective recourses, appear to be crowned by the following "link" between the sensible (immediate impression) and supersensible (moral consideration): "The excellence and force of a composition must always be imperfectly estimated from its effect on the minds of any, except we know the temper and character of those minds" (p.36).

The importance of the physical basis of emotion is one factor which Burke uses at least partly to dethrone reason as the prime consideration in the experience of art:

I am afraid it is a practice much too common in inquiries of this nature, to attribute the cause of feelings which merely arise from the mechanical structure of our bodies, or from the natural and frame and constitution of our minds, to certain conclusions of the reasoning faculty on the objects presented to us; for I should imagine, that the influence of reason in producing our passions is nothing near so extensive as it is commonly believed.

(I.XIII, pp.71-2)

Reason's aesthetic role is diminished, the "delight" taken in "scenes of misery", for instance, being "antecedent to any reasoning, by an instinct that works us to its own purposes, without our concurrence" (I.XIV, p.75). A significant extended discussion on the relation between theory and experiment ends the First Part. Burke affirms that
It is, I own, not uncommon to be wrong in theory and right in practice; and we are happy that it is so. Men often act right from their feelings, who afterwards reason but ill from them on principle;

(I.XIX, p.90)

This is a happy discovery for Burke, but also he immediately seeks to redress the balance in respect of reason's role. Reason is in fact unavoidable. It influences theory and practice, so it is worth getting it right by providing for it sound empirical considerations.

In the Second Part, Burke would appear to move closer to Romanticism:

But let it be considered that hardly any thing can strike the mind with its greatness, which does not make some sort of approach towards infinity; which nothing can do whilst we are able to perceive its bounds; but to see an object distinctly, and to perceive its bounds, is one and the same thing. A clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea.

(II.IV, pp.107-8)

The motion towards infinity is indicative of a newer aesthetic approach (albeit mapped out using older dialectical method) which uses (passim) analogous contrasts to make its point, darkness over light, clearness over obscurity, pain over pleasure etc. The
The idea of infinity is, in a specific orientation, (refreshingly) fragile ("the artificial infinite") (II.IX, pp.132-3). In II.XI Burke speaks importantly of what might be termed the "infinity of potential" or "infinity of possibility":

> The spring is the pleasantest of the seasons; and the young of most animals, though far from being completely fashioned, afford a more agreeable sensation than the full grown; because the imagination is entertained with the promise of something more, and does not acquiesce in the present object of the sense.

(II.XI, p.138)

Sublimity is likewise enhanced by (the appearance of) infinite number, this perception being subjected to careful dialectic ("for the appearance of care is highly contrary to our ideas of magnificence" - II.XIII, p.140, "a profusion of excellent things is not to be attained" - II.XIII, p.141, etc.).

Beauty, for Burke, does not have anything to do with proportion (III.II, p.164). This is stated quite radically, in keeping with the style throughout. By the time Burke’s thought on beauty has been well developed in this Part, he seems able (III.XV, pp.216-7) to acknowledge the unattainability, in some

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280 It is arguably a very radical statement, given the proliferation of classically-oriented works.
respects at least, of a definition of beauty.\textsuperscript{281} Burke makes the important point that something akin to pain (for example "labour") is necessary in order to sustain the imagination (IV.VI, p.255). This would appear to be one of the measures whereby he makes his system of thought coherent (see I.III). Another noticeable comment in the Fourth Part concerns the mind's attention range, which requires unity "So that every thing great by its quantity must necessarily be, one, simple and entire" (IV.X, p.264).

The foregoing analysis of general points in the main work is offered to show, as a background,\textsuperscript{282} Burke's central aesthetic assumptions. The remainder of the present discussion consists of an analysis of Burke's concept of the pleasure of imitation, and of those passages in the main work which show his recognition of the power of pure sound.

The (mixed) delight felt on viewing "scenes of misery" (I.XIV, p.75) is present also in "imitated distresses", except that to the latter is joined the inevitable perception that it

\textsuperscript{281} In arriving at this, Burke cites some of Hogarth's views.

\textsuperscript{282} And not necessarily as any sort of special synthesis in itself.
is an imitation and thus there is a resultant pleasure (I.XV, p.75). The example contrasting the representation of "the most sublime and affecting tragedy" with the execution of a high-ranking criminal (I.XV, pp.76-7) brings Burke's argument to a deep level: the imitative arts possess an immanent "comparative weakness" (I.XV, p.77), they yield to the sublime. Perhaps Burke here intends only to argue for a partial rejection of imitative doctrine, given that the arts are still seen as imitative. The pleasure of imitation is particularly applicable in the case of art specifically: "No work of art can be great, but as it deceives; to be otherwise is the prerogative of nature only" (II.X, p.137). It is, however, noteworthy that the pleasure of imitation in the case of art is not necessarily in respect of slavish imitation of nature or canonical examples, but merely in respect of the existence of imitation per se.

Finally, Burke's work is notable for its treatment of music in itself, especially the specific mentioning of instrumental music (in a work on general aesthetics).[^283] Music heads the list

[^283]: Burke's treatment of instrumental music is perhaps not yet at the level of a problematic case study, as with some writers who were increasingly to single it out as a problem of description within the conceptual framework of a system of imitative arts.
of examples which succeed in imparting pleasure to the "state of indifference": it does this as a medium in itself (I.II, p.45).

Empiricism is a basis of Burke's deeply felt respect for sound, which respect would appear to arise out of his enmity with what may be regarded as traditional aesthetic comforts:284

the most lively and spirited verbal description I can give, raises a very obscure and imperfect idea of such objects; but then it is in my power to raise a stronger emotion by the description than I would do by the best painting. This experience constantly evinces. The proper manner of conveying the affections of the mind from one to another, is by words; there is a great insufficiency in all other methods of communication; and so far is a clearness of imagery from being absolutely necessary to an influence on the passions, that they may be considerably operated on without presenting any image at all, by certain sounds adapted to that purpose; of which we have a sufficient proof in the acknowledged and powerful effects of instrumental music. In reality a great clearness helps but little towards affecting the passions, as it is in some sort an enemy to all enthusiasms whatsoever.

(II.IV, pp.102-3)

Burke would seem to take an optimistic view of the contemporary aesthetic status of instrumental music ("acknowledged...

284 In this case, clarity. In the contrastive structures which he sets up (pleasure-pain, clarity-obscurity etc.), Burke seems consciously to make the more difficult, less comfortable (and non-traditional) aesthetic choices. This gradually serves to build the aesthetic structure which is sought after.
effects"). This passage goes far in recognising both the nonimitativeness of instrumental music and its aesthetic legitimacy and a value at least equal to other musical and general arts. There may be a certain reserve in that Burke would appear still to see it as necessary that, in respect of the evocation of passions without the imposition of imagery (specification), "certain sounds" be "adapted to that purpose".

The pleasure of deception also operates in the case of the concept of infinity. It is in the course of making this point (II.VIII, p.130) that Burke includes a rich description of sounds, to the extent of onomatopoeia. There is certainly here a deep acknowledgement of the power of sound. Certainly the concomitant visual descriptions ("If you hold up a strait pole...") are permeated by methodical illustration whereas there is far more spontaneity and grandeur surrounding the descriptions of sound. In the case of the madmen, it is noticeably sounds which are said to strike "powerfully on their

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285 And possibly it is even better regarded than the others, particularly since the tone in respect of instrumental music may be thought of as somewhat reverential and anticipating that in the onomatopoeic passage in II.VIII.

286 The whole section (II.VIII) could be said to anticipate Wackenroder's "A Wondrous Oriental Tale of a Naked Saint".

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disordered imagination" (II.VIII, p.131).

Burke does acknowledge the effectiveness of the visual senses, perhaps in the context of a separate aesthetic discussion, but it is continually clear that sound *per se* is very important, or at least of equal stature to the visual sense. The power of sound arises throughout a range of its properties:

Sounds have a great power in these [sublime] as in most other passions. I do not mean words, because words do not affect simply by their sounds, but by means altogether different. Excessive loudness alone is sufficient to overpower the soul, to suspend its action, and to fill it with terror. The noise of vast cataracts, raging storms, thunder, or artillery, awakes a great and aweful sensation in the mind, though we can observe no nicety or artifice in those sorts of music. The shouting of multitudes has a similar effect; and by the sole strength of the sound, so amazes and confounds the imagination, that in this staggering, and the hurry of the mind, the best established tempers can scarcely forbear being born down, and joining in the common cry, and common resolution of the crowd.

(II.XVII, pp.150-1)

Burke does (implicitly) admit that words do affect by their sounds. The "hurry of the mind" is, in correspondence with the hurry of the spirits of the madmen in II.VIII, conceivably "unrestrained by the curb of reason" (II.VIII, p.131). This passage largely relies on the concept of the sublime as being
procured by the difficult side of aesthetic pairs - the obscure, painful, dark, difficult etc. The sublimity of sound arises (in a principal way) because of excess (the manifestation of loudness).

Burke seems intent throughout on making the contrast between sublime and beautiful (logically, from the title). In the discussion of music in III.XXV he states: "My sole design...is, to settle a consistent idea of beauty" (III.XXV, p.235). Burke identifies moderation and constancy\textsuperscript{287} as being productive of musical beauty (III.XXV, p.234). It would really appear that, even in making distinction between the sublime and beautiful in respect of music and sound, there is an underlying unity of aesthetic approach. Burke keeps up his commitment to the difficult side of the aesthetic system, in particular, pain: "The passion excited by beauty is in fact nearer to a species of melancholy, than to jollity and mirth" (III.XXV, p.235).

At later stages in the work, Burke's equal treatment of the sound world as aesthetic paradigm is evident (IV.XI). Sound in

\textsuperscript{287} The complaint against excessive variety smacks of the French side in the (earlier) French-Italian musical controversy.
itself is eminently associable with greatness. Burke's final observations on the question of sound are in connection more with poetry than music. The agenda for poetry is a non-imitative one, judging from the title of V.II, "The common effect of Poetry, not by raising ideas of things", and the explicit title of V.VI, "Poetry not strictly an imitative art". It is in V.II that it is explained by what means words affect: "mere sounds" are not enough (in order to give a considerable meaning to the arrangement of words). The unintelligibility of sound is emphasised: "yet the sound without any annexed notion continues to operate as before" (V.II, p.316).

Burke's influential work is a principal starting point for autonomistic aesthetics which were freer of representational considerations. It cites the case of instrumental music almost in a marvellous way which in some senses promises a new direction for future discussions of instrumental music, in discussions of general and of musical aesthetics.

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Smith, 1777

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288 For discussion of dating see Bryce and Wightman eds., 1980, pp.171-3.
The title of Smith's essay appears to indicate an underlying menace on two counts: (1) precise imitative natures are in question, and (2) Smith does not in general seem to be convinced that the arts unconditionally deserve to be termed "imitative". Smith's work is structured in three Parts, with an Annexe. Part I lays out what Smith sees as acceptable bases for the pleasure of imitation (this perhaps in the more central context of general aesthetic pleasure), especially the important "disparity principle" (I.5 →, pp.178 ff.). Part II deals extensively with musical aesthetics, most significantly with those of instrumental music. Many particular technical and aesthetic issues are analysed very precisely indeed. Part III is a short commentary on the nature of dancing, which bears some relation to the discussion of instrumental music. The Annexe also has some relevance to the discussion of instrumental music.

Part I begins with the consideration that the aesthetics of imitation depend on what is subjected to (exact) imitation (its

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289 Although Smith is keen to arrive at true assumptions concerning the aesthetics of resemblance, this may not necessarily be in order specifically to fit them into a primarily mimetic aesthetic system. The "disparity principle" has something to offer Smith's nonmimetic instrumental music aesthetics (though it can on the face of it be difficult to ascertain exactly how it may contribute).
stature, or standing - for example whether it is a common carpet, or St Peter's in Rome - I.1, p.176). Continuing the discussion, Smith is concerned with the ethics of resemblance, the significance, in various cases, of the exactitude of imitation (for example in respect of correspondences, I.2 →, pp.176 ff.). Smith thus appears to wish to say something important about general aesthetics, precisely arising from his consideration of imitation (in its ethical dimension):^290

But in objects of the same kind, which in other respects are regarded as altogether separate and unconnected, this exact resemblance is seldom considered as a beauty, nor the want of it as a deformity. A man, and in the same manner a horse, is handsome or ugly, each of them, on account of his own intrinsic beauty or deformity, without any regard to their resembling or not resembling, the one, another man, or the other, another horse.

(I.2, p.177)

This usage precisely of the aesthetics of imitation in order to introduce the question of innate (as opposed to reflected) beauty may amount to, if not a wholesale rejection of imitative doctrine, at least a critical scepticism of it. The passage would

^290 “Ethical dimension”: the dimension that imitation is considered by Smith (with whatever degree of objectivity) to be appropriate or inappropriate in particular cases.
seem to aspire to put mimetic aesthetics in proportion with more autonomistic aesthetics. Observations by Smith on the ethics of resemblance may thus (and otherwise) be quite relevant to his concept of instrumental music aesthetics.

Having made some distinctions between nature and art, in respect of resemblance (I.1-4, especially I.4, p.178), Smith now brings out an important corollary:

But though a production of art seldom derives any merit from its resemblance to another object of the same kind, it frequently derives a great deal from its resemblance to an object of a different kind, whether that object be a production of art or of nature.

(I.5, p.178)

This is the "disparity principle", central to Smith's aesthetic theory. Perhaps the first real hint of how this principle may obtain in Smith's instrumental music aesthetics occurs in the next paragraph:

In Painting, a plain surface of one kind is made to resemble, not only a plain surface of another, but all the three dimensions of a solid substance. In Statuary and Sculpture, a solid substance of one kind, is made to resemble a solid substance of another. The disparity between the object imitating, and the object imitated, is much greater in the one art than in the other; and the pleasure arising from the imitation seems to be greater in proportion as this disparity is greater.
The substance of this example rests on traditional criticisms of sculpture (where many things were unacceptable which nevertheless were accepted in painting). The function of disparity is "to render interesting the imitation of an object which is itself not interesting" (I.9, p.180). The intrinsic interest of working materials therefore becomes an issue for Smith, not only of taste, but of the entire artistic process. This is the thrust of I.11, p.182, that flowers and foliage, beautiful though they may be, do not contain enough interest to suffice as independent subjects for sculpture ("which is to please alone"), though they may well serve to ornament what is more important than them.

The criterion of interest, as discussed here, may have implications for Smith's instrumental music aesthetics. Also relevant is the point following (I.12, p.182) that

both the shuttle of the weaver, and the needle of the embroiderer, are instruments of imitation so much inferior to

291 Smith does not, subsequently, seem really to specify exactly why sculpture ought not to represent certain kinds of subject while painting may.

292 In this case, as objects of imitation.

293 Interest is thus arguably an important criterion of immanent beauty.
the pencil of the painter, that we are not surprised to find a proportionable inferiority in their productions.

What must be determined here is whether "inferiority" is in respect of general aesthetic worth, of which imitative accuracy may be considered an element, or just imitative accuracy taken by itself. It would appear from the context that what Smith means, say, by "a good picture" (I.12), is one that is well executed, i.e. has "beauty of imitation" (I.14, p.183) that celebrates the disparity principle. Smith seems to make the aesthetic merit of the productions proportionate to their efficacy as imitators. But Smith does not regard this as conclusive, since, strictly speaking, it must be taken separately from consideration of the disparity principle:

We take into consideration, not only the disparity between the imitating and the imitated object, but the awkwardness of the instruments of imitation; and if it is as well as any thing that can be expected from these, if it is better than the greater part of what actually comes from them, we are often not only contented but highly pleased.

The disparity principle is neatly stated in I.14: "but the disparity between the imitating and the imitated object is the foundation of the beauty of imitation. It is because the one object does not naturally resemble the other, that we are so much pleased with it, when by art it is made to do so" (p.183).

The converse of the disparity principle is "deception" (I.15-6, pp.184-5), which is off the point of the pleasure of the imitative arts. Any pleasure produced by deception is always transitory.
Smith still seems to dwell on the achievement of imitation, but he is also really laying the basis for a more inarticulate mode of production which runs parallel to representational ethos in terms of being an acceptable artistic method or else is disguised using representationalistic language (because Smith can find no independent explanation for it). It is this model which Smith builds on in his discussion of instrumental music in Part II.

Music and dance are the first of man's natural pleasures that are of his own invention (II.1, p.187). Rhythm "is the connecting principle of those two arts" (II.2, p.187). The "system" of music "is called a song or tune" (II.2). The primacy of vocal sound is acknowledged: "The human voice, as it is always the best, so it would naturally be the first and earliest of all musical instruments" (II.3, p.187). Poetry actually originates in music, since sensible words replace in music "unmeaning or musical words" (II.3-4, pp.187-8). One may perhaps regard this as a tribute by Smith to music as predecessor of verbal artistry.

\(^{295}\) This statement of course does not seem to make much logical sense. It is just part of the common currency of attempted justifications of preference of vocal sound.
Music thus acquires its status in Smith's aesthetics.

The intimate connection between words and music and, by default, the basis for Smith's instrumental music aesthetics, is expressed in II.5:

The Verse would naturally express some sense which suited the grave or gay, the joyous or melancholy humour of the tune which it was sung to; being as it were blended and united with that tune, it would seem to give sense and meaning to what otherwise might not appear to have any, or at least any which could be clearly and distinctly understood, without the accompaniment of such an explication.

(p.188)

What is noticeable is the absence of a value judgement - the alternative to "explication" is merely an ordinary alternative, not an unthinkable one.296

Interestingly, Smith sees dance as having significant explicatory potential (II.6, pp.188-9). Dancing can, with music, in certain circumstances represent in a "more natural" manner (II.6, p.189), but words with music can represent some important things which are outside the scope of dancing to represent:

Poetry, however, is capable of expressing many things fully and distinctly, which Dancing either cannot

296 The language here seems merely factual without a specific hint of approval or disapproval: "to what otherwise might not appear to have any".
represent at all, or can represent but obscurely and imperfectly; such as the reasonings and judgments of the understanding; the ideas, fancies, and suspicions of the imagination; the sentiments, emotions and passions of the heart. In the power of expressing a meaning with clearness and distinctness, Dancing is superior to Music, and Poetry to Dancing.

(II.7, p.189)

A central semantic hierarchy is thus established. Smith is now ready cleverly to introduce the place of instrumental music in his aesthetic scheme.

It is through the following assumption that Smith is able to introduce the aesthetic position of instrumental music:

Of those three Sister Arts, which originally, perhaps, went always together, and which at all times go frequently together, there are two which can subsist alone, and separate from their natural companions, and one which cannot.

(II.8, p.189)

Smith makes this distinction on the basis that dancing cannot be independent, since

the rhythmus, the proper proportion, the time and measure of its motions, cannot distinctly be perceived, unless they are marked by the more distinct time and measure of Music.\(^{297}\)

\(^{297}\) Smith's emphasis in II.8 on the superiority of the ear in evaluating the rhythmus of dancing may be taken as an indication of respect for the world of sound as at least co-equal in the range of aesthetic senses.
Reading the next paragraph, it would seem that II.8 could have no sensible function other than to introduce the concept of "independentness" of instrumental music:

It is Instrumental Music which can best subsist apart, and separate from both Poetry and Dancing. Vocal Music, though it may, and frequently does, consist of notes which have no distinct sense or meaning, yet naturally calls for the support of Poetry. But "Music, married to immortal Verse", as Milton says, or even to words of any kind which have a distinct sense or meaning, is necessarily and essentially imitative.

But Smith does not yet elaborate on why instrumental music has its own particular status. Specific discussion of instrumental music is postponed until II.17→, pp.195 ff.

It is essential for Smith first to show the imitative possibilities of (vocal) music. There are three particular modes of imitation:

yet even in such didactic and historical songs there will still be imitation; there will still be a thing of one kind, which by art is made to resemble a thing of a very different kind; there will still be Music imitating discourse; there will still be rhythmus and melody, shaped and fashioned into the form either of a good moral counsel, or of an amusing and interesting story.

In this first species of imitation, which being
essential to, is therefore inseparable from, all such Vocal Music, there may, and there commonly is, added a second. The words may, and commonly do, express the situation of some particular person, and all the sentiments and passions which he feels from that situation. [...] 

To these two different sorts of imitation, - to that general one, by which Music is made to resemble discourse, and to that particular one, by which it is made to express the sentiments and feelings with which a particular situation inspires a particular person, - there is frequently joined a third. The person who sings may join to this double imitation of the singer the additional imitation of the actor; and express, not only by the modulation and cadence of his voice, but by his countenance, by his attitudes, by his gestures, and by his motions, the sentiments and feelings of the person whose situation is painted in the song.

(II.9-10, p.190; II.15, p.194)

Smith's central point is that music pleases immensely because whatever imitation it (poorly) conveys obeys the disparity principle extremely well. It would appear that, for Smith, all music is imitative in this negative sense:

The tone and movements of Music, though naturally very different from those of conversation and passion, may, however, be so managed as to seem to resemble them. On account of the great disparity between the imitating and the imitated object, the mind in this, as in the other cases, cannot only be contented, but delighted, and even charmed and transported, with such an imperfect resemblance as can be had. Such imitative Music, therefore, when sung to words which explain and determine its meaning, may frequently appear to be a very perfect imitation.
The way in which musical utterances may be "managed" is by singing them to words "which explain and determine" their meaning. Perhaps it is still unclear whether Smith considers this (the explicatory requirement) the only acceptable aesthetic base for music, i.e. whether music per se has an acceptability independent of all explication. It may also be remarked that perhaps Smith in discussion conflates music per se and vocal music to the extent that it may be difficult to know to which category of music Smith is assigning a specific nature (or that the natures he wishes to postulate for music per se - i.e., par excellence, instrumental music - and vocal music are in fact very similar, to the point of being almost undistinguishable).

Some of the technique of music's imitation, whether it be seen positively or negatively, is arrived at in discussion in II.12 through an analysis of the genres of recitative and air. Smith starts with a supposition concerning the nature of the feelings of a person who is at the extreme of emotion:

In a person who is either much depressed by grief or enlivened by joy, who is strongly affected either with love or hatred, with gratitude or resentment, with admiration or contempt, there is commonly one thought or
idea which dwells upon his mind, which continually haunts him, which, when he has chaced it away, immediately returns upon him, and which in company makes him absent and inattentive. [...] He takes refuge in solitude [...] where he can repeat to himself, which he does sometimes mentally, and sometimes even aloud, and always in the same words, the particular thought which either delights or distresses him. Neither Prose nor Poetry can venture to imitate those almost endless repetitions of passion. They may describe them as I do now, but they dare not imitate them; they would become most insufferably tiresome if they did. The Music of a passionate air not only may, but frequently does, imitate them; and it never makes its way so directly or so irresistibly to the heart as when it does so.

(II.12, pp.191-2)

It is through considering emotional extremity that Smith arrives at his consideration of music's power. If it is conceivable that whenever Smith speaks of "imitation" in connection with music, it is precisely in order to illustrate the essential power over the person which music has, then, in one interpretation, mimetic principles are transformed using the disparity principle in order to provide an essentially autonomistic aesthetic base for the discussion of music's true nature:

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298 And not really to infer that music in fact has specific representational powers on a one-to-one basis of correspondence.

299 On one level the disparity principle opens up a greater variety of imitation, the kinds of which are generally less precise. But the thrust of Smith's discussion throughout is that the less precise imitation is the more it becomes something else, and on examination this something tends towards an autonomist view.
It is by means of such repetitions only, that Music can exert those peculiar powers of imitation which distinguish it, and in which it excels all the other Imitative Arts. Poetry and Eloquence, it has accordingly been often observed, produce their effect always by a connected variety and succession of different thoughts and ideas: but Music frequently produces its effects by a repetition of the same idea; and the same sense expressed in the same, or nearly the same, combination of sounds, though at first perhaps it may make scarce any impression upon us, yet, by being repeated again and again, it comes at last gradually, and by little and little, to move, to agitate, and to transport us.

(II.12, p.192)

Smith here, at the linguistic level at any rate, acknowledges music's evocative abilities ("to move...to transport").

Before moving to the specific discussion of instrumental music in the second half of Part II, Smith has two further points to make. These points affect what Smith has to say concerning the nature of music.

Firstly, having specified the first and second species of musical imitation (II.9-10, p.190), Smith stipulates the moral content of imitable (metaphysical) objects:

300 At this stage, it may still not be clear that Smith is speaking of anything other than vocal music. The question for the modern reader might be whether all that Smith says of vocal music, or vocal with instrumental music, is to be implied to hold also for solo instrumental music. Interpretations of this difficulty will be suggested in the analysis of the substantial part of what Smith has to say concerning instrumental music in II.17→, pp.195 ff.

301 Described (II.15, p.194) as "the general and particular sorts of imitation".
To these powers of imitating, Music naturally, or rather necessarily, joins the happiest choice in the objects of its imitation. The sentiments and passions which Music can best imitate are those which unite and bind men together in society; the social, the decent, the virtuous, the interesting and affecting, the amiable and agreeable, the awful and respectable, the noble, elevating and commanding passions. [...] it is these and such like passions which Music is fittest for imitating, and which it in fact most frequently imitates. They are, if I may say so, all Musical Passions; their natural tones are all clear, distinct and almost melodious; and they naturally express themselves in a language which is distinguished by pauses at regular, and almost equal, intervals; and which, upon that account, can more easily be adapted to the regular returns of the correspondent periods of a tune.

(II.13, p.192)

Correspondingly, "the unsocial, the indecent, the vicious passions, cannot easily be imitated by Music" (II.13, p.192).

Smith is imprecise about how these views can be sustained, except to cite the regular periodicity of (presumably, current) music as a factor with which to associate supposed emotional characteristics. The relevance of this point to Smith's general aesthetic views on the nature of music possibly lies in the inherent identification he makes of "Musical Passions". The style in which Smith appears to couch the point as a whole would appear to sustain a quasi-Romantic emotionalism rather than classical
representationalism. And mention of the moral values which music might take on in a representationalist aesthetic framework is conspicuously absent.

The second point which Smith makes before the main discussion of instrumental music concerns the aesthetic importance of the technical musical elements themselves, melody and harmony:

To the merit of its imitation and to that of its happy choice in the objects which it imitates, the great merits of Statuary and Painting,\textsuperscript{302} Music joins another peculiar and exquisite merit of its own. Statuary and Painting cannot be said to add any new beauties of their own to the beauties of Nature which they imitate; they may assemble a greater number of those beauties, and group them in a more agreeable manner than they are commonly, or perhaps ever, to be found in Nature. [...] Music, by arranging, and as it were bending to its own time and measure, whatever sentiments and passions it expresses, not only assembles and groups, as well as Statuary and Painting, the different beauties of Nature which it imitates, but it clothes them, besides, with a new and an exquisite beauty of its own; it clothes them with melody and harmony, which, like a transparent mantle, far from concealing any beauty, serve only to give a brighter colour, a more enlivening lustre, and a more engaging grace to every beauty which they infold.

\textsuperscript{302} Seeming either to imply that "the great merits of Statuary and Painting" constitutes precisely this "happy choice", or else simply that Music's merits are somehow of the same order as those of painting and sculpture.
The language of this passage is, as elsewhere in Smith, classical, but it contains autonomist concepts. Some of the thrust of Smith’s arguments seems to be that music exhibits the same aesthetic merits as visual (and perhaps literary) arts, but with an added edge of its own in the form of the musical elements themselves. Again, Smith seems to leave something unexplained or unaddressed. Why precisely does he consider that the musical elements contribute so much to beauty of effect? Smith seems to be working his way towards answering this question, or just restating the mystery, in the section on instrumental music proper. As it is, this passage suggests a proto-Romantic faith in music, articulated by a wonderment at the musical elements and their power.

The difference between vocal music and instrumental music is that vocal music is perceived to have articulation, perhaps definable as that correspondent technical quality which enables it to have semantic content. For this reason, Smith opens his

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303 It is important in the context of the present work and the issues it raises thoroughly to explore passages having a seemingly representationalist viewpoint expressed in classical language (language which appears to take for granted classical concepts) which occur in general and musical aesthetic works.
discussion of instrumental music proper with the observation that
its capacities for imitation are limited:

The imitative powers of Instrumental are much inferior to those of Vocal Music; its melodious but unmeaning and inarticulated sounds cannot, like the articulations of the human voice, relate distinctly the circumstances of any particular story, or describe the different situations which those circumstances produced; or even express clearly, and so as to be understood by every hearer, the various sentiments and passions which the parties concerned felt from these situations: even its imitations of other sounds, the objects which it can certainly best imitate, is commonly so indistinct, that alone, and without any explication, it might not readily suggest to us what was the imitated object.

(II.17, p.195)

Smith has already devoted some space to explaining a theory of vocal articulation (II.3-5, pp.187-8). Instrumental music does not articulate in this way. It cannot produce factual, verbal description, nor even can it specify which emotions are to be inferred (presumably, in cases of "programmes", if any, upon which it may be based), though this would seem to presuppose that, according to Smith, instrumental music does evoke emotions. Smith's conservatism in evaluating instrumental music's ability to imitate other sounds does seem to show a reluctance on his part at all to associate the concept of imitation with
instrumental music. Smith clearly regards Corelli as having been less successful in musical imitation than Händel, since Händel's instrumental music (in *L'Allegro, il Penseroso ed il Moderato*) imitates sounds which are already musical: "these are not only sounds but musical sounds, and may therefore be supposed to be more within the compass of the powers of musical imitation."

(II.17, p.195). But no value judgement is implied between the two composers, even though in the case of Händel's work, Smith notes that with the explanation provided by Milton's text, "indeed, the imitation appears, what it certainly is, a very fine one" (ib.). Smith is able to make value judgements on the quality of imitations without drawing inferences of an evaluative nature from whether or not these imitations are present. The concept of imitation is thus of decidedly lesser importance for Smith in the case of instrumental music.  

Next, Smith sees it as important to deal with the question of instrumental music's ability to imitate other sounds, or to imitate physical parameters:

304 Although, as it becomes apparent in II.19, the deepest impact of music may in fact be similar (or in some way identical) to the effects of the most striking imitation in its ideal aspects.
Instrumental Music is said sometimes to imitate motion; but in reality it only either imitates the particular sounds which accompany certain motions, or it produces sounds of which the time and measure bear some correspondence to the variations, to the pauses and interruptions, to the successive accelerations and retardations of the motion which it means to imitate: it is in this way that it sometimes attempts to express the march and array of an army, the confusion and hurry of a battle, etc. In all these cases, however, its imitation is so very indistinct, that without the accompaniment of some other art, to explain and interpret its meaning, it would be almost always unintelligible; and we could scarce ever know with certainty, either what it meant to imitate, or whether it meant to imitate anything at all.

(II.18, p.196)

Two elements are important in this paragraph. Smith is not satisfied with definition on a metaphysical level ("Instrumental Music is said sometimes to imitate motion"): it must rather be specific. Smith would seem prepared to accept either of the explanations he himself suggests (imitating the sounds which motions produce, or producing imitations of the rhythms which are inherent in the motions - either of these models will do for Smith). Also important is the consequence of the observation that this kind of imitation remains "indistinct": another art must be present in order to sustain the meaning of instrumental music.
Smith has now branched out from considering\textsuperscript{305} just verbal explanations as giving explicatory meaning to instrumental music, to considering other art forms as well for this endeavour.

Smith now attempts to reveal the significance of the value judgement which he has set up regarding imitation \textit{per se}. He would seem to do this by the simple, imprecise asseveration that music's finest effects are of the same order as the effects of a fine imitation, i.e. they have the same emotional impact. Smith does not yet at any rate trouble to state why this should be. The route to this thinking is through a consideration of the level of abstraction of instrumental music:

In the imitative arts, though it is by no means necessary that the imitating should so exactly resemble the imitated object, that the one should sometimes be mistaken for the other, it is, however, necessary that they should resemble at least so far, that the one should always readily suggest the other. It would be a strange picture which required an inscription at the foot to tell us, not only what particular person it meant to represent, but whether it meant to represent a man or a horse, or whether it meant to be a picture at all, and to represent any thing. The imitations of instrumental Music may, in some respects, be said to resemble such pictures. There is, however, this very essential difference between them, that the picture would not be much mended by the inscription; whereas, by what may be considered as very little more

\textsuperscript{305} Or at least from mentioning only verbal explanations.
than such an inscription, instrumental Music, though it cannot always even then, perhaps, be said properly to imitate, may, however, produce all the effects of the finest and most perfect imitation.

(II.19, p.196)

At a very elemental level, Smith's thoughts on instrumental music arise via a caution in respect of the disparity principle. It is because of this caution ("it is, however, necessary...") that there is the (putative) "very essential difference" between instrumental music and abstract visual art (in its total sense of abstraction). Smith would appear to make a value judgement on total abstraction ("whether it meant to be a picture at all").

But Smith does compare the imitations of instrumental music (such as they are, according to his critique) to the completely unmeaning abstraction which to him justifies his speaking of "a strange picture". If the explanation is not provided, then

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306 Taking it that Smith's comparison between the totally abstract painting and instrumental music is about two different media, then, for Smith, total abstraction is outside the realm of artistic media (since the totally abstract painting lacks status as a picture, i.e. as a medium). Total abstraction "fails" because it cannot share in the effectiveness wrought by the finest imitations, which in the case of instrumental music are brought about even in the absence of or in spite of the imperfection of imitations (depending on the point of view). But Smith might not be making a negative value judgement on abstraction qua concept. The use of "strange" may be interpretable as being somewhat reserved instead of downright condemnatory. Certainly, Smith seems at pains to suggest the positivity of abstraction, conceivably in the sense that instrumental music can be abstract and "produce all the effects of the finest and most perfect imitation".
instrumental music's imitations remain unperceived. Another interpretation, which Smith does not seem to suggest as such, is that representations may more easily be read into instrumental music than into some other abstract form (specifically abstract visual art). But the interpretation would not appear to work this way. The imitations are there, actually or potentially. They just are latent and need to be discovered by an attached explanation, or possibly by the mind on its own. Smith does not seem to specify how his concept of "inscription" should function, whether it be at the level of creative intention "imposed" by the composer, or whether the consumer of the work of art (in this case instrumental music) is free to attach his own meaning to what he considers to be represented by the music. Smith makes basic points in II.20 concerning the nature of mental states. Firstly, he postulates a psychophysical model:

That train of thoughts and ideas which is continually passing through the mind does not always move on with the

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307 Perhaps because there was not then yet anything explicitly approximating to a theory of "abstract" art.

308 The foregoing comments make some attempt to postulate issues which are not specifically addressed in Smith,1777 but which might reasonably have been discussed by Smith as a logical consequence of some of his arguments.
same pace, if I may say so, or with the same order and connection.

(II.20, p.196)

The motion of this train of thought is livelier according as one's mood is happier:

in this wanton and playful disposition of mind we hate to dwell long upon the same thought, so we do not much care to pursue resembling thoughts; and the variety of contrast is more agreeable to us than the sameness of resemblance.

(II.20, pp.196-7)

In II.20 Smith is merely setting the scene for an associationism that he seems (desperately, almost) to need in order to give instrumental music status even though it be a nonimitative art.

To be certain, instrumental music can harmonise itself with the prevalent mental state, but, if the mental state is "natural"

(and Smith is quick to emphasise moderation - II.20, p.197), the music can mould the mind into feeling whatever mood is desired:

Acute sounds are naturally gay, sprightly, and enlivening; grave sounds solemn, awful, and melancholy. There seems too to be some natural connection between acuteness in tune and quickness in time or succession, as well as between gravity and slowness: an acute sound seems to fly off more quickly than a grave one: the treble is more cheerful than the bass; its notes likewise succeed one another more rapidly. But instrumental Music, by a proper arrangement, by a quicker or slower succession of acute and grave, of resembling and contrasted sounds, can
not only accommodate itself to the gay, the sedate, or the melancholy mood; but if the mind is so far vacant as not to be disturbed by any disorderly passion, it can, at least for the moment, and to a certain degree, produce every possible modification of each of these moods or dispositions.

(II.21, p.197)

It is the model of the neutral or "natural" state of the mind that allows Smith to categorise instrumental music both as a cause of emotion and as a possible accompaniment to it. Smith restates this in abstract and then in concrete terms:

And we are all sensible that, in the natural and ordinary state of the mind, Music can, by a sort of incantation, sooth and charm us into some degree of that particular mood or disposition which accords with its own character and temper. In a concert of instrumental Music the attention is engaged, with pleasure and delight, to listen to a combination of the most agreeable and melodious sounds, which follow one another, sometimes with a quicker, and sometimes with a slower succession; and in which those that immediately follow one another sometimes exactly or nearly resemble, and sometimes contrast one another in tune, in time, and in order of arrangement. The mind being thus successively occupied by a train of objects, of which the nature, succession, and connection correspond, sometimes to the gay, sometimes to the tranquil, and sometimes to the melancholy mood or disposition, it is itself successively led into each of these moods or dispositions; and is thus brought into a sort of harmony or concord with the Music which so agreeably engages its attention.

(II.21, pp.197-8)

When Smith speaks of the "incantation" of music, he is abstract
in style, and when he discusses what is happening with regard to
the aesthetic experience of a concert, the example is more
crcrete. The point regarding the "sort of incantation" seems to
rest on associationism since the music has itself to be of a
certain disposition (dictated by the associations of the rhythm -
"sprightly" or "solemn" - and register - "acute" or "grave")
before it can move emotionally (and moving emotionally means in
this context bringing the mind to rest on a preconceived
disposition). Smith is, apparently, careful enough to lock his
ideas into a system of aesthetic thought. In respect of the more
concrete example of the concert, it may be important to realise
that Smith places a high aesthetic value ("pleasure and delight")
on the direct, tactile contact with sounds ("to listen to a
combination..."). This point may, for him, hold more interest
than questions of how he is to explain instrumental music's power
and function in terms of imitation or the lack of it. The ebb and
flow of the dispositions which music is said to evoke is
explicable in the context of imitation or nonimitation
("sometimes exactly or nearly resemble, and sometimes contrast
with one another") perhaps simply because for Smith's model no
other working hypothesis is perceived. But it is perhaps
difficult to know where, if anywhere, Smith would like the
emphasis to lie: on the effective power of pure sound, whether
taken in its totality or elementally, or on the fact that
instrumental music's effects can be described in such a way as
to fit a theoretical model that satisfies current aesthetic
thought (especially insofar as this thought recognises more
advanced, nonrepresentationalistic modes)?

However Smith constructs his model of the way instrumental
music works, he remains keen to emphasise that the pleasure it
affords does not occur by means of imitation:

It is not, however, by imitation properly, that
instrumental Music produces this effect: instrumental
Music does not imitate, as vocal Music, as Painting, or
as Dancing would imitate, a gay, a sedate, or a melancholy
person; it does not tell us, as any of these other arts
could tell us, a pleasant, a serious, or a melancholy
story. It is not, as in vocal Music, in Painting, or in

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309 Smith may be using, for example, the concepts of correspondence (associationism) and resemblance and contrast (disparity principle). These are possibly interpretable as having derived from notions of imitation. They may, however, be oriented primarily to the specific (pleasurable) end said to arise from imitation (see, for example, II.19, p.196) but which seems rather compatible with a Romantic type of satisfaction with music.

310 Smith does not here, or at another point in the work, discuss the significance of the composer's intention as to the imitativeness of (purely) instrumental music. The only treatment in this regard would be the mention of the "programmes" of the Corelli and Händel examples (II.17, pp.195-6).
Dancing, by sympathy with the gaiety, the sedateness, or the melancholy and distress of some other person, that instrumental Music soothes us into each of these dispositions: it becomes itself a gay, a sedate, or a melancholy object; and the mind naturally assumes the mood or disposition which at the time corresponds to the object which engages its attention. Whatever we feel from instrumental Music is an original, and not a sympathetic feeling: it is our own gaiety, sedateness or melancholy; not the reflected disposition of another person.

(II.22, p.198)

The implication here would seems to be that instrumental music is superior in attuning itself to the mood of whatever subject matter is involved, whether a story or a person. Instrumental music is able, without any intermediary, to get to the heart of a situation. This would seem to suggest that in Smith's aesthetics there must still be a situation to be represented or suggested, and thus an outlook where representation is still the key seems indicated. But just how near Smith is to suggesting, perhaps with the early Romantics, that the world of instrumental music is essentially subjectless can be seen from his imprecision in designating what it is one feels from listening to instrumental music and from his emphasis on the directness or originality of that feeling, this emphasis giving an idea of the status and originality Smith attaches to the art of instrumental
Instrumental music’s nonimitativeness obeys the disparity principle. Smith uses (II.23, p.198) a garden metaphor to illustrate the nature of instrumental music. The views which one receives upon walking in a garden may have various effects on the mind, which suits itself to the nature alleged to be inherent in a particular view or landscape. But the views themselves cannot imitate any of the mental dispositions to which they give rise. That would not be the working model. Likewise, instrumental music does not, processively, imitate:

Instrumental Music, in the same manner, though it can excite all those different dispositions, cannot imitate any of them. There are no two things in nature more perfectly disparate than sound or sentiment; and it is impossible by any human power to fashion the one into any thing that bears any real resemblance to the other.

(ib.)

311 In this aesthetic experience (viewing a garden), a representationalistic concept, associationism, can be seen to support a theory which professes to have nonrepresentationalistic consequences. The argument does not work the other way about, i.e. it is not possible that, because the mind can imitate the "objects" - the views or landscapes - in an original way, these "objects" are capable of imitating the mind. The impropriety of this reverse argument again does not seem to be precisely substantiated by Smith, but rather taken for granted. This may indicate that Smith continually takes the position that, for aesthetic theory, of instrumental music in particular (which may, for Smith, already stand out as a medium), imitation carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, since it can be used as a concept in aesthetic arguments without necessarily leading to specifically classical constructs.
Smith may thus be self-satisfied at having well integrated the disparity principle in his aesthetic explanation of instrumental music.\footnote{312}

The course of Smith's discussion from here on takes the order of instrumental music in a supportive capacity, followed by solo instrumental music. Smith may not yet be liberated enough from the concept of the predominance of vocal music to feel adequately secure to discuss the aesthetics of instrumental music \textit{per se}, i.e. in its manifestation as solo art form (including concerted instrumental music), without the combination of another art, as a priority in the first instance.

In II.24, Smith quotes from Rousseau,1768.\footnote{313} The substance

\footnote{312} The disparity principle, according to Smith's constant thought, purports to be the model for the highest beauty of imitation, but its nature, resting on the very lack of resemblance and thus of the possibility of imitation, may perhaps actually be deemed antirepresentationalistic. This may be the reason for any satisfaction which Smith may feel at its incorporation into the nonrepresentationalistic explanation of instrumental music aesthetics.

\footnote{313} The article "Imitation", reprinted in a supplement (1777) to the \textit{Encyclopédie}. The basis for the passage is Rousseau,1761, Ch.16. The context in Rousseau,1768, and it is this context which is criticised by Smith, is "dramatic and theatrical music". The context in Rousseau,1761 is rather music \textit{per se}. This of course cannot have been known in time by Smith, since the \textit{Essai sur l'origine des langues} remained unpublished until 1781 (Geneva). Twining,1789 (Dissertation II, note f, pp.55-7) has another criticism to make of the same article. Twining quotes from the second (and last) paragraph of the article: "there is no relation between chords and objects which one would wish to depict, or passions which one would wish to express." ("Imitation", Rousseau,1768; p.251). Also Kames,1762 is quoted: "Harmony, properly so called, though delightful when in perfection, \textit{hath NO RELATION to sentiment.}" In objecting to Rousseau, Twining tries to show an alleged inconsistency within Rousseau's oeuvre (referring to
of the argument of Rousseau which is quoted, is that music can imitate even the objects which are normally considered representable only by the visual arts (in Rousseau's argument, painting), i.e. visual objects. It does this by evoking emotions or mental motions which a person would be supposed actually to feel upon seeing the objects. Smith's counter in respect of this argument is that instrumental music is in fact nonimitative or imperfectly imitative:

Upon this very eloquent description of Mr. Rousseau I must observe, that without the accompaniment of the scenery and action of the opera, without the assistance either of the scene-painter or of the poet, or of both, the

Rousseau,1753) and within Rousseau,1768. Twining's complaint concerns the notion of exclusive supremacy of melody, to the detriment of the expressive properties of harmony. His rejoinder is that, while there is some truth in what Rousseau and Kames suppose concerning harmony, they go rather too far: "Had these writers contented themselves with saying, that harmony has much less relation to sentiment than melody, they would not have gone beyond the truth. And the reason of this difference in the effect of the same intervals, in melody, and in harmony, seems, plainly, this - that in melody, these intervals being formed by successive sounds, have, of course, a much closer, and more obvious relation to the tones and inflexions by which sentiments are expressed in speech, than they can have in harmony, where they are formed by sounds heard together." This is a simple contradiction of Kames, some of whose ideas at least are compatible with Smith's (his seemingly more representationalist ones at any rate, such as the selective notion that music can ally itself only to "agreeable passions" - these not necessarily being disputed by Twining). In Kames,1762 harmony is definitely seen (in Kames' somewhat diffuse argument, pp.452-3) as a weak element, almost in the sense that it has too much to do. But Twining's defence of harmony, such as it is, is only thinly, if at all, to be equated with the slightly later Romantic appraisal of this element as a source of music's immanent power. Kames, Rousseau and Twining are probably in a more or less representationalist debate concerning musical elements. It is Smith's criticism of the passage from Rousseau,1768 that appears to take the issue into the area of the autonomy of instrumental music.
in instrumental Music of the orchestre could produce none of the effects which are here ascribed to it; and we could never know, we could never even guess, which of the gay, melancholy, or tranquil objects above mentioned it meant to represent to us; or whether it meant to represent any of them, and not merely to entertain us with a concert of gay, melancholy, or tranquil Music; [...] With that accompaniment, indeed, though it cannot always even then, perhaps, be said properly to imitate, yet by supporting the imitation of some other art, it may produce all the same effects upon us as if itself had imitated in the finest and most perfect manner. Whatever be the object or situation which the scene-painter represents upon the theatre, the Music of the orchestre, by disposing the mind to the same sort of mood and temper which it would feel from the presence of that object, or from sympathy with the person who was placed in that situation, can greatly enhance the effect of that imitation: it can accommodate itself to every diversity of scene.

(II.25, pp.199-200)

An important difference between Smith's and Rousseau's arguments appears to be that Rousseau expects instrumental music, music *per se*, to undertake an exact reproduction at the physiological level of the mental impressions one receives from a particular scene, whereas Smith's model of evocation is essentially at the general, psychological level. Another significant point is that, regardless of any lack of security shown by Smith in not seeming able first and foremost to discuss the aesthetics of solo instrumental music, the objections made, for example, to
Rousseau, and the resultant theory of the action of instrumental music when combined with other arts, would seem to be eminently compatible with, if not actually in some respects identical to, the theories put forward as to the aesthetics of solo instrumental music (II.29→, pp.203 ff.).

Smith continues with examples from opera. The general point he makes has more to do with recommending discriminating usage of what imitative powers music has (or of the respects in which it can "produce all the effects of the finest and most perfect imitation" - II.19, p.196):

Instrumental Music, however, without violating too much its own melody and harmony, can imitate but imperfectly the sounds of natural objects, of which the greater part have neither melody nor harmony. Great reserve, great discretion, and a very nice discernment are requisite, in order to introduce with propriety such imperfect imitations, either into Poetry or Music; when repeated too

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314 This could mean that, for Smith, the order of discussion (actually combinational music followed by solo instrumental music) is irrelevant or insignificant. But Smith's emphasis (II.3, p.187) on the quality of vocal music must be taken into account as a background factor. It would then seem that there was in fact for Smith a real insecurity associable with the prospect of first discussing solo instrumental music and only then dealing with its role in combination (opera *par excellence*).

315 It might therefore be arguable that, since Smith evidently knew at least French opera well, he felt comfortable first to discuss combinational music, or even that the fact that he was comfortable in discussing operatic repertoire (as well as solo or ensemble instrumental repertoire) made it a matter of indifference to him whether combinational or solo instrumental music was discussed first.
often, when continued too long, they appear to be what they really are, mere tricks, in which a very inferior artist, if he will only give himself the trouble to attend to them, can easily equal the greatest. I have seen a Latin translation of Mr. Pope's Ode on St. Cecilia's Day, which in this respect very much excelled the original. Such imitations are still easier in Music. Both in the one art and in the other, the difficulty is not in making them as well as they are capable of being made, but in knowing when and how far to make them at all: but to be able to accommodate the temper and character of the Music to every peculiarity of the scene and situation with such exact precision, that the one shall produce the very same effect upon the mind as the other, is not one of those tricks in which an inferior artist can easily equal the greatest; it is an art which requires all the judgment, knowledge and invention of the most consummate master. It is upon this art, and not upon its imperfect imitation, either of real or imaginary sounds, that the great effects of instrumental Music depend; such imitations ought perhaps to be admitted only so far as they may sometimes contribute to ascertain the meaning, and thereby to enhance the effects of this art.

(II.25, pp.200-1)

The key to Smith's thought in this passage may perhaps be expressed in the interdiction that he shortly makes in respect of scenery, that imitations ought not to "resemble those of painted Statuary" (II.26, p.201). Smith keeps reiterating his central point that it is noble to seek to achieve the aesthetically pleasurable results of what the best imitations

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316 Whence the usefulness of the discussions in Part I (for example the criticisms of sculpture).
(presumably meaning the visual and literary arts) can offer, but
that this search in the case of instrumental music, whether or
not it supports other arts, does not come to fruition by recourse
to a process analogous to the imitation *qua* concept which is the
cornerstone of visual and literary arts. Instead, the beauties
sought after (whether or not they are to accord with the
disparity principle) are achievable more indirectly:

> It is not by imitation, therefore, that instrumental
Music supports and enforces the imitations of the other
arts; but it is producing upon the mind, in consequence
of other powers, the same sort of effect which the most
exact imitation of nature, which the most perfect
observation of probability, could produce. To produce
this effect is, in such entertainments, the sole end and
purpose of that imitation and observation. If it can be
equally well produced by other means, this end and purpose
may be equally well answered.

(II.28, p.203)

Smith perhaps does not know if instrumental music's function as
specified in this way (i.e. supportive function) could "be
equally well produced by other means". What seems important is
that the function *is* produced somehow. Smith may simply perhaps
wish to allow for more representationalist possibilities, perhaps
that instrumental music is after all based on a primarily
representational ethos. Certainly, Smith's insistence that
essential beauties stem from what appears to be a
representationalistic model involving nature and probability
could make it exceedingly difficult to classify his argument in
Smith, 1777 as a whole as unmistakeably autonomistic. This is part
of the (acceptable)\textsuperscript{317} ambiguity inherent in Smith's text.

Whereas the arguments and objections in II.25-8 deal with
musical and dramatic parameters rather than comment on the
essential nature of music (except perhaps in a functional sense),
II.29 recommences the discussion of music \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{318} Instrumental
music provides aesthetic directionality in respect of vocal
music:

Both in the recitatives and in the airs it accompanies
and directs the voice, and often brings it back to the
proper tone and modulation, when it is upon the point of
wandering away from them; and the correctness of the best
vocal Music is owing in a great measure to the guidance
of instrumental; though in all these cases it supports
the imitation of another art, yet in all of them it may
be said rather to diminish than to increase the resemblance
between the imitating and the imitated object.

\textsuperscript{317} It could perhaps be hypothesised that ambiguity is an acceptable and, for some writers, essential stylistic feature in respect of their treatments of autonomistic musical aesthetics.

\textsuperscript{318} This is a loose categorisation, that the thrust of II.25-8 is procedural and conventional rather than especially concerned with the nature of music.
This may consciously signify a concession for instrumental music in its relationship with vocal music. And Smith is careful to stress the operation of the disparity principle in whatever the combinational art form may be.\(^{319}\)

In II.29 Smith asseverates instrumental music's freedom from imitation as a method:

> But if instrumental Music can seldom be said to be properly imitative, even when it is employed to support the imitation of some other art, it is commonly still less so when it is employed alone. Why should it embarrass its melody and harmony, or constrain its time and measure, by attempting an imitation which, without the accompaniment of some other art to explain and interpret its meaning, nobody is likely to understand? In the most approved instrumental Music, accordingly, in the overtures of Handel and the concertos of Corelli, there is little or no imitation, and where there is any, it is the source of but a very small part of the merit of those compositions. Without any imitation, instrumental Music can produce very considerable effects; though its powers over the heart and affections are, no doubt, much inferior to vocal Music, it has, however, considerable powers:

\(^{319}\) Whether Smith would go so far as to say that the beauties of combinational forms have very much or mostly to do with music seems not to be specifically addressed in Smith, 1777.
"embarrassed"). Musical imitation\textsuperscript{320} in any case accounts for only a small proportion of the value of instrumental music, which logically leaves a great deal of this value to be explained by music's immanent powers. This is a convincing reason for Smith in the remainder of II.29 to go on to analyse (elementally) what it is exactly that constitutes music's "sweetness" and other pleasant factors.\textsuperscript{321} The significant concept which Smith reminds the reader of is the importance of temporal organisation in music. The exact status of this in relation to the sensuousness of music may, however, remain unclear:

Time and measure are to instrumental Music what order and method are to discourse; they break it into proper parts and divisions, by which we are enabled both to remember better what is gone before, and frequently to foresee some of what it is to come after: [...] without this order and method we could remember very little of what had gone before, and we could foresee still less of what was to come after; and the whole enjoyment of Music would be equal to little more than the effect of the particular sounds which rung in our ears at every particular instant.

(II.29, p.204)

\textsuperscript{320} Presumably, when it is effective, in accordance with earlier criticisms in II.25-6.

\textsuperscript{321} This discussion in the remainder of II.29 may embody parametric considerations similar to the approach taken in the case of the mainly operatic examples in II.25-8. Smith does nevertheless have a few new things to say in his argument which make it essential to consider this portion of the text.
While Smith deprecates any exclusive concentration on sheer sensuousness, this may not necessarily mean that he devalues the instantaneous impact of music *per se*. This passage may possibly be interpreted as a restraint (time and measure in their analogical relation to discourse) imposed by Smith on what he recognises implicitly as a (or perhaps the) real aesthetic experience *par excellence* afforded by music.

II.30, pp.204-5 could be termed the centrepiece of Smith's aesthetic discussion. It effectively summarises his "doctrine" of instrumental music and affirms his recognition of its essential interiority:

A well-composed concerto of instrumental Music, by the number and variety of the instruments, by the variety of the parts which are performed by them, and the perfect concord or correspondence of all those different parts; by the exact harmony or coincidence of all the different sounds which are heard at the same time, and by that happy variety of measure which regulates the succession of those which are heard at different times, presents an object so agreeable, so great, so various, and so interesting, that alone, and without suggesting any other object, either by imitation or otherwise, it can occupy, and as it were fill up, completely the whole capacity of the mind, so as to leave

322 Indeed, further remarks (II.30, p.205 - see discussion below) show that Smith does equally value the sensuousness of music.

323 I.e. in terms of pure sound.
no part of its attention vacant for thinking of any thing else. In the contemplation of that immense variety of agreeable and melodious sounds, arranged and digested, both in their coincidence and in their succession, into so complete and regular a system, the mind in reality enjoys not only a very great sensual, but a very high intellectual, pleasure not unlike that which it derives from the contemplation of a great system in any other science. A full concerto of such instrumental Music, not only does not require, but it does not admit of any accompaniment. A song or a dance, by demanding an attention which we have not to spare, would disturb, instead of heightening, the effect of the Music; they may often very properly succeed, but they cannot accompany it.

(II.30, pp.204-5)

Smith first synthesises the elements which make up instrumental music in order to deduce its stature as object ("so agreeable, ...great...various...interesting"). The elements are, basically, variety (of a number of parameters) and sonorous harmony. It would seem roughly that, for Smith, the sensuous pleasure of music derives from its sonorousness, and its intellectual pleasure from its adherence to rhythmic or temporal systematisation.\(^{324}\) Smith seems to require consideration of an ensemble of instruments for his aesthetic criteria here to work.

He appears implicitly to distinguish this consideration from that

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\(^{324}\) The latter point possibly confirmed by the later assertion that "time alone, without tune, will make some sort of Music" (Annexe.4, p.211 - see whole context for details).
of an operatic ensemble ("orchestre"), already discussed in II.25-8. The distinguishing factor would seem to be the (intentional) subjectlessness of concerted instrumental music, discussed in the remainder of II.30. The "story" which instrumental music tells is "that combination of sounds of which itself is composed" (II.30, p.205). Only rarely does instrumental music have a programme or agenda.\textsuperscript{325} If an explicit statement of the autonomous nature of instrumental music is looked for, the following may be seized upon: "Its meaning, therefore, may be said to be complete in itself, and to require no interpreters to explain it" (II.30, p.205). Smith is now able to make this differentiation between instrumental music and other arts: "The subject of a composition of instrumental Music is a part of that composition: the subject of a poem or picture is no part of either" (II.30, p.205). The interiority of instrumental music is thus asserted.

\textsuperscript{325} "That music seldom means to tell any particular story, or to imitate any particular event, or in general to suggest any particular object" (II.30, p.205). Smith may be making a simple statistical observation that most instrumental pieces do not have extramusical agendas attached, or perhaps the remark may run deeper, to the criticism that even in cases where programmes are specified, instrumental music's attempts to surmount its own inarticulacy remain singularly unsuccessful (as in the cases noted of Händel and Corelli, II.17).
The discussion of the expression of instrumental music becomes an ideal way for Smith to affirm its originality of feeling (see II.22, p.198). The discussion of expression makes logical use of the points made immediately previously by Smith concerning the subject of instrumental music. Smith considers instrumental music's expression to have an effect not unlike that of the expression of painting, and he appears to condescend to give instrumental music's expression the same status of interest as painting's. The difference between the two expressions can be made using concepts stated in II.30:

But the effect of the expression of Painting arises always from the thought of something which, though distinctly and clearly suggested by the drawing and colouring of the picture, is altogether different from that drawing and colouring. It arises sometimes from sympathy with, sometimes from antipathy and aversion to, the sentiments, emotions, and passions which the countenance, the action, the air and attitude of the persons represented suggest. The melody and harmony of instrumental Music, on the contrary, do not distinctly and clearly suggest any thing that is different from that melody and harmony. Whatever effect it produces is the immediate effect of that melody and harmony, and not of something else which is signified and suggested by them: they in fact signify and suggest nothing.

(II.31, pp.205-6)

Something this passage has in common with II.22, p.198 is the
level of the originality of the feeling received from
instrumental music's entailing nonrepresentationality: the
presence and effect in instrumental music only of the melody and
harmony (doubtless, Smith means, as governed or regulated by the
temporal organisation) - since there is nothing else, the
attempts at providing a programme being, according to Smith,
exceptional cases - means that there can be no signification, no
clear representation.

The conclusion of Part II is perhaps somewhat general and
unspecific, while a fair summary of the direction of Smith's
arguments:

In Instrumental Music, therefore, though it may, no
doubt, be considered in some respects as an imitative art,
is certainly less so than any other which merits that
appellation; it can imitate but a few objects, and even
these so imperfectly, that without the accompaniment of
some other art, its imitation is scarce ever intelligible:
imitation is by no means essential to it, and the principal
effects which it is capable of producing arises [sic] from
powers altogether different from those of imitation.

(II.32, pp.206-7)

The thrust of this may be that, instrumental music's imitative
powers being negligible, it is nonviable as an imitative art par
e excellence. Smith may simply feel the need for security in
ending his comprehensive discussion of instrumental music in Part II and so chooses to reiterate, for his own benefit and the benefit of the reader, the principles he has discerned.

Bearing in mind the artistic ordering which Smith has established (II.7, p.189) in respect of clear representation, one point in Part III interestingly reinforces the nonimitativeness of instrumental music. Smith's contention (III.7, p.209) is thattexted vocal music (presumably with a coherent text) gives rise to imitative dancing whereas untexted vocal music (which is equivalent to instrumental music) does not. In this case an imitative art form facilitating imitation in another art form where a nonimitative art form cannot facilitate imitation.

Concluding generally, Smith,1777 is an autonomist work not least in respect of the amount of space devoted to the discussion of instrumental music aesthetics. Instrumental music appears to be brought to the fore as a central art form. Smith develops aesthetic precepts from imitation theory, which turns in on itself in order to facilitate a new kind of discussion. The approach embodied in Smith,1777 may perhaps be interpreted as transitional, in the sense of its being a necessary precedent,
in logical terms, for the almost frantic\textsuperscript{326} discussions employed by at least some of the Romantics.

\textit{Blake, 1808}

The depth of Blake's attack on what he deems to be stale principles is made evident from the outset: "This Man was Hired to Depress Art" (title page and preliminary leaves; p.284).\textsuperscript{327} It is evident from Blake, 1808 that his conceptual framework is new and uncompromising. As a Romantic, Blake would appear to have seen it as his mission to refute archaic thinking where others, like Wackenroder, did not include any such refutation or mention of earlier doctrine in their work. Thinking along similar lines, it may be feasible to divide Blake's arguments into those which resemble archaic ones but which actually (and perhaps obligatorily in the context of Blake's thought) take on new meaning in the context of Romanticism, and arguments which are exclusively and truly autonomist ones, serving the Romantic cause vibrantly.

\textsuperscript{326} In terms of enthusiasm for instrumental music.

\textsuperscript{327} References are to the part of Reynolds, 1797 Blake is commenting on, followed by the page number (showing Blake's remark) in Wark ed., 1975.
An appropriate starting point may be Blake's attitude towards genius (compared with Reynolds'). Blake says of one of Reynolds' comments: "All this Concession is to prove that Genius is Acquired, as follows in the Next Page" (title page and preliminary leaves; p.287). Clearly, Blake does not believe that it is, preferring to put his faith in the interior world:

"Knowledge of Ideal Beauty is Not to be Acquired. It is Born with us. Innate Ideas are in Every Man, Born with him; they are truly Himself. The Man who says that we have No Innate Ideas must be a Fool & Knave, Having no Conscience or Innate Science" (Discourse III; p.298). And (possibly by extension) Blake says of form: "All Forms are Perfect in the Poet's Mind, but these are not Abstracted nor Compounded from Nature, but are from Imagination" (Discourse III; p.298). Genius is unerring (Discourse IV; p.304) and unbindable (Discourse VI; p.312). Perhaps most significantly, Blake cites prevalent British aesthetics - Bacon, Newton, Locke, Burke - and holds that

328 Which perhaps for Blake constitutes genius, or a part of it. He notes earlier that "Enthusiastic Admiration is the first Principle of Knowledge & its last" (Discourse III; p.297).

329 As linked to Locke.
"They mock Inspiration & Vision. Inspiration & Vision was then, and now is, & I hope will always Remain, my Element, my Eternal Dwelling place; how can I then hear it Contemned without returning Scorn for Scorn?" (Discourse VIII; p.316).  

Blake subscribes heavily to the notion of unteachability of genius (Discourse VII; p.313) and, similarly, the worth of teaching oneself (Discourse II; p.295). It is perhaps on the basis of this approach to the question of genius that Blake abhors Reynolds' notion of imitating one's best contemporaries (Discourse VI; p.309).

Whatever Blake feels about the imitation (emulation) of contemporaries, accuracy and discrimination in transferring subject matter to the artistic medium is a prerequisite: "To learn the Language of Art, 'Copy for Ever' is My Rule" (title page and preliminary leaves; p.285); "Imitation is Criticism" (Discourse I; p.292). This seems nowhere near to saying that the

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330 Blake may be reacting to Burke when he says: "Obscurity is Neither the Source of the Sublime nor of any Thing Else" (Discourse VII; p.312).

331 Frye, 1967 notes (p.320) that, for Blake, the imaginative person is the norm and that works of art are unitive because imagination is bound up with human essence/existence. Whether Blake really embraced an extreme form of this view perhaps does not affect the direction of his thought as far as it concerns (indirectly) instrumental music aesthetics.
ethos of art ought to be mimetic but rather to advocate a kind of (Romantic) idealism. It is tied in with genius: "Mechanical Excellence is the Only Vehicle of Genius"; "Execution is the Chariot of Genius" (Discourse I; p.292). Imitation is now a vehicle while classically it was a means to a moral or religious purpose. It is specifically related to imagination: "I know that The Man's Execution is as his Conception & No Better" (Discourse IV; p.300). Blake rejects the idea that the mental world of the imagination has equal status with physical reality (Discourse VII; p.315). Antithetical to imagination are "Works of Manual Labour" (Discourse I; p.293) because they are merely products of trickery (associable with the older, classicist views which Reynolds advocates), i.e. pained labour indicates slavishness rather than exercise of imagination.

Blake also makes several disparate observations which may have a common relation to his discussion of genius. Emphasis on individuality may be relevant. Blake shrewdly points out: "Every Class is Individual" (Discourse III; p.298). Perhaps also relevant is the observation that "To please All Is Impossible" (Discourse VIII; p.317), though this context is not one that
directly suggests the question of genius. Genius or greatness probably may be associated with a positive appraisal of novelty (doubtful in traditional aesthetics): "The Great Style is always Novel or New in all its Operations" (Discourse V; p.307).

From this brief analysis and collection of remarks it may be seen to what extent Blake, 1808 constitutes a complete overturning of *status quo* principles. True, some acceptance of classical ideas is entertained, but only in order to allow adaptation and reinterpretation in the area of Romantic antiquarianism. Blake elegantly brings to a peak some ideas which were first convincingly generated by Shaftesbury and were to serve so importantly in the age of Beethoven.
French polemicism

Taken chronologically, the two French works selected here as precursors of fuller, Hoffmannesque autonomistic aesthetics are certainly uneven in this function, but not always to the extent that some commentators have supposed. Lippman ed., 1986 characterises (p. 257) Morellet, 1771 simply as a late defence of music as an imitative art. Maniates, 1969 emphasises Morellet's acknowledgement that musical imitation of environmental nature (as opposed to human nature or "passions") is weak and his assertion that too much (imitative) exactitude is demanded of the arts, and merely accepts (p. 134) that "Morellet's apology represents not only a justification of the capacity of instrumental music to express emotion, but also a defence of the entire imitative doctrine as applied to the arts." Such interpretations view writings which contain arguments refined in such a way as Morellet's as retrenchments of existing artistic doctrine rather than also substantially recognising and evaluating their new elements.

Morellet, 1771
It is preferable to say that Morellet, 1771 arrives at autonomistic aesthetic concepts less directly than, say, Chabanon, 1779. Thus an earlier body of writings, though less explicit in the area of autonomistic aesthetics, may be full of indirect observations on it and not necessarily to be dismissed simply as representationalist. An elucidation of this area in Morellet, 1771 may not therefore, for instance, be entirely overshadowed by a central concept which Morellet asks acceptance of, that "all depiction is an imitation" (p.269). The linguistic arguments underpinning the first "species" of musical imitation/expression/depiction, of the material world/environmental nature, are unsound and give rise to a long list of characterisations (pp.270-4 - see characterisations, pp.271-2), the force of which seems to be to imply a necessity of the imitative explication of the nature of music, and to a statement of intent concerning their significance: "But these analogies can not be contested. The use that is made of them alone proves their reality" (p.272). Such statements would exemplify Maniates' assertion of a function of the eighteenth-century aesthetician, "to elasticise an inflexible system of
thought" (p.133). But this and other parts of Morellet's text
do not merely do that; the very instability of the arguments here
seems also to be a feature of other, contemporary texts which try
to get to grips with autonomistic aesthetics, these being
increasingly without a defence and in some cases even a treatment
of representational doctrines. (The "obscure analogies" which
Morellet expounds occur in other key texts: the "sound and
movement correspondence" (p.273), for example, is also taken up
by Smith, 1777 (II.18; p.196).)

What is highly significant is Morellet's ability to conclude
the first part of the discussion, on the first "species" of
musical imitation, with an effectual formulation of autonomistic
aesthetics. The main part of this formulation reads:

May one not say: precisely because music is, more than
spoken language, a work of art, because it is more a
language of convention, it has had to content itself more
willingly with the slightest resemblances? Weaker than
nature, it has had to seize upon all the supports it
encountered on its path.

(p.273)

Crucial points here concern the insecure concept of "language of
convention" and the weakness of music in comparison to nature.
The tailpiece of the formulation adds a psychological
justification to Morellet's argument:

We must also take into account the facility with which small reasons make a determination when there are no stronger ones.

(ib.)

On the surface this may appear simply to be a defence of representational thinking, but the content is nonetheless ambiguous, being readable both for and counter to the traditional position. The direction of the argument significantly depends, for example, on the positive or negative desirability in context of "facility" and "determination". As already noted in the discussions so far of British and Continental aesthetics, essential ambiguity in some main or supporting assertions in contexts of mainstream aesthetics may, in addition to the positing of insecure arguments and concepts, be considerable as a feature of early texts which inherently contain material for autonomistic aesthetics.

So far, autonomist material has been amply provided in the first part of Morellet's discussion, where it might have been less expected than in the second part, which deals with "the expression of the passions" (p.275). In the latter, having
defined the "natural declamation" (p.275) of the emotions as the basic matter on which the effect of music is founded (insofar as its main purpose has been transferred from merely the imitation of the natural world), Morellet places instrumental music in context in a characteristically, if perhaps unconsciously, double-edged fashion:

Instrumental music entirely alone will be at least a language that is written without vowels, like some oriental languages; and if it accompanies sung words, the vowels are put in.

(p.276)

The assumptions Morellet offers which lead to this view are unsatisfactory in themselves and gloss over relevant corollaries, for instance a central problem of correlation of specific passional "accents" with concerted instrumental sonorities. Suggesting that instrumental music on its own is less of a language than when it is graced by vocal music, action and poetry can be read as being either in or counter to the direction of tradition. Thus the features of essential ambiguity and insecurity of argument are present.

How is this contextual designation of instrumental music
to be viewed when taking account of a potential reception history of autonomistic musical aesthetics? Morellet,1771 addresses contentious issues which are at the heart of the establishment of a base for these aesthetics. That it may be read as doing so, if it does so at all, in a traditional way need not exclude or diminish the importance of the newer argument. Contrary to the research conclusions previously discussed, a strong case for giving precedence or at least significant emphasis to the directions in which texts such as Morellet,1771 beckon ought to be considered. Allowing this interpretation of them while critically evaluating the reinforcements of traditional positions which they also embody would provide a more committed and accurate method of dealing with the double-edged theories which arise, whether or not any contained ambiguities are intentional.

In the final section, Morellet cites a "general objection" (p.279), the response to which he claims will even further reinforce his previous arguments. The listing of reasons why music's imitative powers (concerning both nature and the emotions) are (merely) "very imperfect" (p.279) does not, as in many other contemporary writings, come close to the full depth
of meaning as to why music should ultimately be totally inadequate in this respect. It is the sort of defensive argument in this section which is probably a mainstay of the case for taking a traditional perspective on this and other similar writings, but, defensive as it may be, the complete argument retains its double-edgedness. This is seen in the solution which Morellet propounds to the observation that music's imitation is "very imperfect": "This difficulty is founded merely on a false idea that people form of what imitation in the arts should be: they demand here too much exactitude" (p.279). Even if it is asseverated that Morellet had no intentions in the direction of autonomistic aesthetics, this statement shows him having to point the way for change in aesthetic thinking in order to get his position accepted. Such manoeuvring must, if nothing else be admitted, necessitate close scrutiny of the motivation of this position.

Chabanon, 1779

The energy with which Chabanon rejects the artistic doctrine of imitation is not quite apparent in the opening of Chapter II
of Chabanon, 1779. But this mild opening results in a recommendation to reexamine music on its most radical, elemental level, using the "route of analysis" derived from the studies of metaphysics and chemistry, for instance (though such an analogous application requires careful evaluation). This atomisation results in the acceptance only of melody as the essential musical element. The concentration on melody implies for Chabanon an aesthetic emphasis on critical functional criteria, since, as to music, "to demand of it what it cannot do by singing is to inflict absurd laws upon it, and to subject it to this is to pervert it and denature it" (p.296). Chabanon thus formulates the core negative answer to his expressed question, "should music according to its essence imitate?" (p.296) and subsequently reinforces it with largely well-observed counterexamples to the idea of music's being essentially imitative.

Chabanon is ready to take various aspects of his personal questioning on this issue to their logical extremes. In doing this he often succeeds in ridiculing arguments which are counter to the anti-imitative precepts he seeks to establish but sacrifices accuracy on other points. Coincidentally, arguments
which bring in mention of the animal world (pp.298-9) contain inaccuracies, the first example, citing birdsong, suffering from a too limited technical outlook, though it is ample for making the aesthetic point required, that the alleged imitation involved in birdsong hardly lives up to its task. This supports the perception, more or less obvious, that while Chabanon's arguments may be consistently and enthusiastically well aimed, they are not always of consistent calibre. The philosophy of Morellet's arguments differs in that they are of somewhat more uncertain aim, while being also of uneven calibre.

Chabanon appreciated (p.299) Morellet's arguments but questioned why they should necessitate music's having to be an imitative art. For Chabanon the true explanation is that music is to the auditory senses what beautiful objects are for the visual senses and that this scheme does not involve imitation. Chabanon's anxiety for a critical, methodical support of this position concerning music is evident: "let us accomplish the proof that it pleases independently of all imitation" (p.300).

Perhaps Chabanon's first clearest statement of autonomistic aesthetics in this essay is an abrupt one, containing ideas which
modern philosophical thought would be loath to specify so immediately:

Music therefore acts immediately on our feelings. But the human spirit, that swift, active, curious, and reflective intelligence, enters into the pleasure of the senses. It is not able to be a dormant and indifferent spectator of it. What part can it play in sounds, which having in themselves no determinate signification, never present clear and precise ideas? It searches in them for relationships, analogies with various objects or various effects of nature. What does it achieve?

(pp.300-1)

This central statement is carefully placed in the middle of selective examples which are of varying quality. Chabanon proceeds to attempt to show that music as imitation is a view received under pressure of tradition. A critical aspect of the newer view lies in the "distinction argument", that one should "not apply indistinctly to music everything that may be true of the other arts" (p.302).

Chabanon nonetheless does (at times) accept that music does in fact imitate but the question is, what it is really imitating? When, for instance, the mental intention is to depict in music light and darkness, the actual musical result is the depiction of contrast, and, most importantly, "any contrast whatever"
(p.304). This is one of a number of vital and clever observations which lead Chabanon in all his arguments to concepts of the indefiniteness of music.

**Conclusion and indicators**

It has been important to select two substantial examples of French aesthetics in order to assess their ideas from the standpoint of newer thinking and examine the real extent of contrast between them (Chabanon's work is pinpointed as one of the pioneer attempts at autonomistic aesthetics while Morellet is significantly overlooked). French aesthetics in the latter eighteenth century struggled with a number of issues and the fact that autonomistic aesthetics is recognised as part of that struggle does credit to French openmindedness.

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German Romanticism

Wackenroder, 1797, 1799

- Contextual introduction

Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, together with his friend and literary partner Johann Ludwig Tieck, reacted against the stultifying intellectual atmosphere of his native Berlin. The intense figure of Joseph Berglinger, Wackenroder's powerful literary creation and chosen communicative vehicle for a newer stream of thought on the nature of art, can be directly paralleled with Wackenroder himself in that they share the same conflict between the constricting fear caused by (worldly) paternal domination (perhaps interpretable also as a microcosmic representation of the dominating intellectual atmosphere) and (spiritual) love of art.  

Wackenroder's life was spent in the forced study of law. But his artistic and musical outlook was informed by his private

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333 The particular problems posed in Behler, 1993, pp. 242 ff., regarding the notion of analogy between Berglinger and Wackenroder himself, seem not to be given a precise placing in Behler's discussion. Behler would seem in this context to wish to put forward "the notion that art has a life-endangering character, that a basic antagonism exists between life and art" (p. 242). This is the lesson Behler wishes to be drawn from Berglinger as analogy. But the relationship between life and art admits of more than simply antagonistic considerations.
tutors (during both school and university education) and
academics and theorists, whose lectures on art, music and
philosophy he (optionally) attended, by specific documentary and
literary sources which he read at least partly as a result of
these contacts (and also undoubtedly on his own initiative), and,
not least notably, by journeys made together with Tieck in the
summers of 1793 (to Franconia - south Germany - using Erlangen
as a base) and 1796 (to the art galleries in Dresden). From the
point of view of influence on Wackenroder's writings, the
significant point about these journeys was the strong cultural
as well as environmental contrasts between the austere Protestant
north (of which tradition the two travellers were part) and more
expansive Catholic south Germany. Wackenroder's assimilation of
the artistic treasures, visual and musical, of the south was
important in determining the tone and structural content of his
writings.\textsuperscript{334}

Wackenroder, 1797 was published anonymously in Berlin
(actually printed in late 1796, the date of publication being

\textsuperscript{334} The foregoing remarks are based on the excellent biographical introduction in Gillies ed., 1966, pp.ix-xxx. See also the observations in Schubert tr., 1971, pp.26-7.
postdated 1797). Tieck's collaborative contribution was minimal. Wackenroder possibly influenced Friedrich Schlegel's views on instrumental music. Schlegel's brother August Wilhelm was among those who received Wackenroder's writings well and defended their content. He sent a copy to Goethe, whose initial reaction was stern (essentially distrusting the apparent

335 Schubert tr., 1971, p.10n2.

336 It was more in the case of Wackenroder, 1799, containing Wackenroder's writings posthumously published by Tieck (Hamburg, 1799). See Behler, 1993, p.244. For general assessment of balance of contributions between Wackenroder and Tieck, see Schubert tr., 1971, pp.9-25 (especially pp.9-10 and discussion of research by Richard Alewyn, pp.22-3), pp.199-204.

For the purposes of the present discussion, it is assumed that most of the Confessions (Wackenroder, 1797) and eight specific essays in the Fantasies (Wackenroder, 1799) are by Wackenroder. According to Schubert, the only essay in Wackenroder, 1797 which is certainly by Tieck alone is "Longing for Italy". Of the rest Schubert says that the preface was written jointly, one of the shorter essays on painting is definitely of uncertain authorship, and a significant proportion of the remainder, including substantial essays on medieval and Renaissance artists (using Giorgio Vasari's Lives of the Artists (1550) as source) and the introductory Joseph Berglinger essays, is by Wackenroder. Behler, 1993 appears to think (p.244) that the "Letter of a Young German Painter in Rome to his friend in Nuremberg" (the italicised words were in the original text "spaced out" - see Schubert tr., 1971, pp.73-4) is by Tieck. Regardless of the difference with Behler on the subject of one essay, Schubert's opinions on the authorship of the pieces individually provide a satisfactory working hypothesis, and it is assumed on stylistic grounds, and using Schubert's reasoning in its fullest implications, that most of the pieces which are unattributed by Schubert are the work of Wackenroder.

337 Through their mutual friend Reichardt. Schubert tr., 1971 discusses (p.35) Reichardt's role in the publicisation of Wackenroder's work, and Helm, 1980 notes (p.707) that Friedrich Schlegel coedited a periodical, Deutschland (Berlin, 1796) with Reichardt - of course, Wackenroder knew Schlegel in 1796. For Schlegel's writing on instrumental music in Das Athenäum (1798) see Day and Day and Le Huray, 1981, p.247.
religious excesses of Wackenroder,1797 as well as the aesthetic precepts therein) but may have mellowed in later years. But its general reception was conditioned by the Zeitgeist as exemplified in contemporary Berlin. Becker,1984 observes:

The thoughts developed therein [in Wackenroder,1797] were wilful and novel, the postulates ingenious and radical, too radical to engender sales. With the exception of a small circle of artists and educated, the ineffectiveness of the writings was consequently guaranteed.

(p.72)

Tieck oversaw the immediate posthumous editing and publication of the remainder of Wackenroder's essays in this vein (sometimes with additions of his own) and supervised further various editions of Wackenroder's essays. The immediate result was the publication of eight further essays in a tributary volume, Wackenroder,1799. It is with this and the first volume (1797) that an analysis of Wackenroder as a formulator of autonomistic aesthetic concepts may effectively deal.

Many of the essays in Wackenroder,1797 and two of Wackenroder's essays in Wackenroder,1799 are specifically about

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338 For discussion of A.W.Schlegel's and Goethe's viewpoints see Schubert tr.,1971, pp.11-15.
visual arts and artists, or about "art" in a generalised sense.

In these there occasionally occur musical imagery and passing references to the art of music. Other essays mainly concern music. The "particular fondness" which Wackenroder reportedly

339 The essays in the following list are those which deal substantially or exclusively with music or which contain a significant mention of music:

**Wackenroder,1797**

* "A Few Words concerning Universality, Tolerance and Human Love in Art"

* "Letter of a Young German Painter in Rome to his friend in Nuremberg"

* "The strange musical life of the musical artist Joseph Berglinger. In two parts."

**Wackenroder,1799**

* "Musical Essays By Joseph Berglinger":

  ___ Introductory Remembrance

  ___ "A Wondrous Oriental Tale of a Naked Saint"

  ___ "The Marvels of the Musical Art"

  ___ "Concerning the Various Genres In Every Art and especially concerning Various Types of Church Music"

  ___ "Fragment of a Letter By Joseph Berglinger"

  ___ "The Characteristic Inner Nature Of The Musical Art and the Psychology of Today's Instrumental Music"

  ___ "A Letter by Joseph Berglinger"

This does not necessarily imply that the remaining essays do not ever make significant contributions to musico-aesthetic issues. Any division into "musical" and "nonmusical" essays
had for the musical essays, with a desire to see them in print (p.163), is suggestive of his distinctive special valuation of music among the arts.

In order to illustrate Wackenroder's thought as to autonomistic aesthetics (in music and in general) it is appropriate to concentrate on the musical essays, taking into account how this thought is illuminated by concepts in the other essays. In a passage from the essay on the painter Francesco Francia (Wackenroder, 1797) the point is made that the production of beauty (which is exaltedly expressed in terms of "glory" and "light") is not confined to one individual but rather allowed to many (select) individuals ("For, to be sure, beauty in art...the great artists whom heaven has placed upon earth" - p.88).

Wackenroder's view of the unique sanctity of art and his reverence for (divine) artistic inspiration is generally clear. That he envisaged the possibility of, as it were, an artistic autocracy or oligarchy may remain open to debate (for example risks artificiality, but a working hypothesis perhaps ought to be made available in the context of researching Wackenroder's position on music.)
there is for Wackenroder "the divine Raphael" - p.88). Yet in such a context of approximate equality of responsibility (or of "glory"), within a select group, for the "reflection" of beauty, Wackenroder, while being content to offer a spectrum of named visual artists, actually does not, even in the musical essays, mention a single composer by name. This fact can raise several questions. It would seem to indicate that Wackenroder's objectives in the accounts featuring music (on a concise or extensive level) were somehow different from those concerning particular arts and the general idea of art in the rest of the work. The nature and extent of such differences may have much to do with Wackenroder's special valuation of music. The decontextualising approach, which deals not with individual composers or their works but rather purely with concepts of the nature of music, may in fact be seen as a cause of this special elevated valuation of music; it is, moreover, autonomistic in character: the decontextualisation of the concepts renders them, and, intuitively, the nature of pure music, autonomous.

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340 I.e. real, extant composers and works.
Wackenroder's text is so resplendent with imagery that it is difficult to apprehend his central arguments (such as they are) in their pure form. The reader may in fact be forced to take an "imagistic" view of the text in order to derive complete benefit from and understanding of Wackenroder's insights. This is not, however, to accuse Wackenroder of lack of essential clarity. It is simply that the text embodies and expresses perfervid religious devotion towards works of art and the concept of art. From this consideration particularly a general analysis may be attempted.

Whatever the function of the friar's mask, it would

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341 Given this lack of context, it is useful briefly to emphasise the important elements of Wackenroder's musical education. In addition to his early musical education, Wackenroder was taught (before his university education commenced) by Karl Friedrich Christian Fasch and (after his university education finished and he was forced to practise law) by Karl Friedrich Zelter, Fasch's successor at the Berliner Singakademie There was also his contact with Johann Friedrich Reichardt.

342 Mostly taking the "musical essays" into consideration.

343 The essay "The Characteristic Inner Nature Of The Musical Art and the Psychology of Today's Instrumental Music" becomes the focus of the present discussion, though of course Wackenroder's (musico-)aesthetic thought would appear to admit of a varied number of critical treatments, whether generalised surveys or specific studies of individual portions of his writings. A mixture of both of these broad types of treatment is attempted here.

344 The "authorial voice" assumption is questioned in, for example, Behler,1993, pp.227-8.
certainly be fair to assume that Wackenroder advocates the necessity of (unconditional) love of art (p.81). This is impressively stated thus:

\[ \text{Art is above the human being: we can only admire and esteem the magnificent works of its consecrated ones and open our entire soul before them for the liberating and cleansing of all our emotions.} \]

Doubtless every human being who bears a feeling and loving heart within his breast has some particular favourite object in the realm of art;

(PP.128-9)

This agrees with (and, in a sense, completes) the earlier assertion that "Art is to be called the flower of human emotion" (p.109), which contradicts the demands made on art by classical aesthetics. Art appears now explicitly to be seen as end (or result) rather than means. It is some (far-off) external goal, since the uninitiated "speak about the artist's inspiration as if it were an object that they had before their eyes; they interpret it and tell a great deal about it; and they fittingly ought to blush in uttering the holy word, for they do not know what they are expressing with it" (p.82).

\[ ^{345} \text{The emphasis suggests awe and may serve to indicate that art may in some cases be autonomous in respect of content. This emphasis and other features of the text may be preparation for Wackenroder's assumptions concerning instrumental music (however coherently they are} \]
It is perhaps only by noting these attitudes towards art
that a suitable context for Wackenroder's special elevation of
music among the arts may be identified. One of the essays which
best and most suggestively exhibits this elevation of music is
"The characteristic Inner Nature Of The Musical Art and the
Psychology of Today's Instrumental Music" (Wackenroder, 1799).
This essay is decontextualised, and as esoteric as Wackenroder's
other writings.\textsuperscript{346} It would appear to be a particular compartment
or subsection of Wackenroder's thought (expressed via Joseph
Berglinger) in Wackenroder, 1799, but stands on its own
sufficiently interestingly to require individual analysis that
could effectively summarise Wackenroder's entire position in
regard to instrumental music aesthetics.

The development of pure music parallels the gradual,
centuries-long refinement of the soul. Within the new sound world
there occurs "a sensual copy of and testimony to the beautiful

\textsuperscript{346} Esoteric in the sense that Wackenroder's writings serve a new purpose and so, while perhaps in the main comprehensible, retain their mystique. Since, for Wackenroder, music is (at least) a mysterious art, its aesthetics perhaps must be couched in an appropriate stylistic atmosphere which does not give the uninitiated complete access.
refinement and harmonious perfection of the human mind of today"
(p.188). Following the discovery of natural ("fundamental") laws,
a new source is made possible, "the plentiful fountain-head from
which the masters draw the most varied tonal combinations"
(ib.). The "monochrome beam of sound" (ib.) is almost
profligate in its potential.

Because pure music (instrumental) is special among the arts,
it is also the youngest of them. Music ("the tone") has a
mysterious effect ("dark and indescribable element") which is
unparalleled in any other art since it attains "an inexplicable
sympathy" (ib.) with the heart. Wackenroder sees advantages in
this sympathy, concluding pragmatically that, through it, "the
musical art has become a comprehensive and flexible mechanism for
the portrayal of human emotions" (ib.). The resultant
perfection which this offers enables instrumental music to take
its place as the newest of arts.347

In parabolic fashion Wackenroder criticises (p.189) those
who, for various reasons, fall short in the handling
(appreciation or composition) of music. Whatever the degree of

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347 Perhaps in the sense of the most newly refurbished art.
their shortcomings, they are "sterile" and "not to be mentioned" (p.190). They fail to enter into proper interaction with (autonomous) music, which, like no other art, "has a raw material which is, in and of itself, already impregnated with such divine spirit. Its vibrating material with its ordered wealth of chords comes to meet the creating hands halfway and expresses beautiful emotions, even if we touch it in an elementary, simple way" (p.189). Wackenroder appears here (at least as well as in other contexts) to set the seal on the idea of music's autonomy. He states the, as it were, basic claim of music as a capable force. Music is, mainly due to its inscrutability, uninterrogable (p.190). Rationalistic questioning disturbs ("undermines") art, which is, after all, "in the realm of the spirit" (ib.). Wackenroder refuses to recognise any efficacy of "thoughts about emotion" which the reason may substitute for "emotion itself" (ib.). Biblical language serves Wackenroder well in illustrating what can only be interpretable as his underlying dismay and concern at the prospect of a reasoning approach to music being adopted.348

348 The context here is applicable to music, since it is made the basis of Wackenroder's next
An eternally hostile chasm is entrenched between the feeling heart and the investigations of research, and the former is an independently, tightly sealed, divine entity, which cannot be unlocked and opened up by the reason.

(ib.)

Contrary to reason is intuition which is describable with water imagery ("daring swimmer", "pushes...like interfering waves", "secrets...rush in" - ib.).

Though Wackenroder does not believe in instancing specific composers, he uses the existing variegation of musical repertoire to condemn any requirement of articulacy in respect of music:

Hundreds and hundreds of musical works express gaiety and pleasure, but in each one a different spirit sings and toward each of the melodies different fibres of our hearts respond with trembling. - What do they want, the faint-hearted and doubting reasoners, who require each of the hundreds and hundreds of musical pieces explained in words, and who cannot understand that not every piece has an expressible meaning like a painting?

(p.191)

A certain mildness would seem to occur in the condemnation in unburdening, "And, therefore, I venture to express from the depths of my being the true meaning of the musical art and say..." (p.190).

349 Schubert tr.,1971 notes (p.30) the existence of "water" metaphors in Wackenroder,1797 but does not extend her discussion to their appearance in Wackenroder,1799.
that some music may yet be understood to have an "expressible meaning". But it may be doubted here whether Wackenroder really intends to make any concessions in this direction. Certainly, that he is able to build up quite quickly to the explicit and somewhat extraordinary claim that it is through musical sounds alone that "we learn to feel emotion;" (p.191), is evidence of his uncompromising advocacy of music's governmental rather than merely instrumental aesthetic role.\(^{350}\)

Perhaps curiously, reasoning in some way too is caught up in Wackenroder's account, since even "the dry, scientific system of numbers", equated with "the strange, miraculous incantations of an old, frightful sorcerer", has its part to play. It would appear that the rational part of the mind is also a willing participant in the aesthetic process ("the mind is astounded by its own nature", and "the language of words" is made to serve the ends of the doctrine of feelings - p.191). Thus nothing, even reason, escapes being incorporated in Wackenroder's aesthetic

\(^{350}\) That Wackenroder throughout these writings specifically takes exception only once (to Friedrich von Ramdohr, at the outset of Wackenroder,1797) leads to the conclusion that in getting his message across he chose to be primarily innovative rather than disputatious. Perhaps in somewhat similar fashion to his lack of reference to composers, Wackenroder is at the other end of the scale reluctant to present disputants (probably because he thinks them unworthy of mention -"sterile souls", p.190).
thought.

Wackenroder affects to want to know (pp.191-2) how music can be surpassed in ability to "poetise" the emotions, to rescue them from their state of "wandering around lost in real life" (p.192). The water imagery is again used to support the idea of "sharply defined boundaries" (p.192) as a desirable result of (music's) organisation of the emotions.

Despite art's innocence, it possesses "sensual force" (p.192). This can give rise to multitudinous fantasies, which are (partially) enumerated (pp.192-3). Then, relieving the reader of further imaginative effort, Wackenroder notes, "But who can count and name them all, the ephemeral fantasies which chase the musical strains through our imagination like changing shadows?" (p.193), as if aware that some descriptive limitations could beneficially be applied.

Wackenroder seems thus far to have been discussing inclusively all manifestations of instrumental music, but in fact discussion of its highest reaches has been left until last:

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351 The context - p.192 - would seem to suggest that art's "angelic purity" proceeded from essential formlessness.
And yet, I cannot refrain from extolling, in addition, the latest, highest triumph of musical instruments: I mean those divine, magnificent symphonic pieces (brought forth by inspired spirits), in which not one individual emotion is portrayed, but an entire world, an entire drama of human emotions, is poured forth.

(ib.)

Why Wackenroder appears to regard this discussion as additional to what has previously been said may remain unclear, except that it may be observed that Wackenroder's particular fascination is with the latest instrumental pieces' ability magically to evoke a whole gamut of emotions. Central is the spontaneous effect (or perhaps illusion) which surfaces whatever level of manipulation Wackenroder imagines goes on underneath, inside the process:

Then, as I sit there listening for a long while in more ominous stillness, then it seems to me as if I had experienced a vision of all the manifold human emotions, how they incorporeally celebrate a strange, indeed, an almost mad pantomimic dance together for their own pleasure, how they dance between each other impudently and wantonly, with a frightful spontaneity like the unknown, enigmatical sorcerer-goddesses of Fate.

(ib.)

This spontaneity is what makes opposites attract in the soul (pp.193-4) and the mystery of this attraction is best examined through the medium of music ("what art...dark, secret, gripping
significance?" - p.194). The heart remains a feeling organ, whatever the rational (negative) or instinctual (positive) response of the mind ("Indeed, our hearts fluctuate...one single earthly bliss" - ib.). The ambiguity and mischievous approach generated by spontaneity is responsible for music's status as being "truly a divinity for human hearts" (ib.).

The final act of Wackenroder's discussion appears climactic:

But why do I, foolish one, strive to melt words into tones? It is never as I feel it. Come, Thou musical strains, draw near and rescue me from this painful earthly striving for words, envelop me in Thy shining clouds with Thy thousandfold beams, and raise me up into the old embrace of all-loving heaven.

(ib.)

Wackenroder leaves behind his verbal aspirations and completes the "talkdown", arriving at a state where the reader becomes total listener. Any pseudo-semantic connections of music with language are severed and language's inadequacy is admitted.352

- Conclusion

In Wackenroder, 1797 and Wackenroder, 1799, music, in its pure

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352 Perhaps language is, for Wackenroder, not thereby redundant as well. See, for example, Charlton ed., 1989: music's capacity "to transport to a new world those who know how to submit to it...depends on the rejection of words" (p.13).
(instrumental)\textsuperscript{353} form, is presented as playing an essential part in the effect that art has in relation to the human psyche. In these two rich texts, music is discussed not only in essays bearing music-specific titles but also (and, at times quite substantially) in essays on the visual arts. Music is, for Wackenroder, the pinnacle of the arts. It is therefore important to attempt to establish (1) which aspects of music appealed to Wackenroder, (2) the extent to which music is indispensable in Wackenroder, 1797, 1799, (3) the extent to which sentiments similar to Wackenroder's occurred in the works of his German contemporaries (those who, like Wackenroder, were in the forefront of emergent Romanticism),\textsuperscript{354} specifically considering Wackenroder's influence on the (slightly later) work of E.T.A. Hoffmann.

\textsuperscript{353} Taking it that vocalised music is instrumental.

\textsuperscript{354} A detailed discussion of the early German Romantics' views, whether explicit or more implicit, on instrumental music aesthetics lies outside the scope of the present work. The choice to discuss Wackenroder's work only stems from the conviction that, while he may not be the most representative writer of his period, Wackenroder appears to say much that is essential to the new "doctrine of the soul" which, \textit{inter alia}, rediscovers past piety.
Conclusion

The focus of the works dealt with in the foregoing discussion is principally nonmimetic, or amimetic. Between three major European regions, strategies broadly similar in outline were being proposed in order to encompass instrumental music's aesthetic position, which possibly had never before been systematically addressed. A growing polarity between the aesthetics of these writers and the aesthetics of writers such as have been considered in Ch.2 was being experienced, to the extent that the entire musical world, composers, executants and critics, would be ever more continually invited to make a choice between representationalism and its contraries.
CHAPTER 4 -

RECEPTION: MUSIC AND THE AESTHETIC (2)
Introduction

Ch.2 of the present work, "Context", deals with what could be referred to as the "contextual enemy" of autonomistic aesthetics, representation ("contextual" because it is inborn, ingrafted). Ch.3 assumes the designation "Precedence" for writings which sufficiently anticipate autonomistic aesthetics while lacking the aesthetic climate in which to put such aesthetics to full use, as it were. Many works dealt with individually in Ch.2 and Ch.3 obviously deserve mention in both these Chapters, but the consequent separation of quotation that this would entail has been avoided in the present study. While this is not to deny that there are some essential ambiguities inherent in the works of some authors, detailed analysis of these ambiguities is not important enough for the general picture, which may be illustrated by the case studies of Beethoven and E.T.A. Hoffmann in this final Chapter, of the view of aesthetics which would by 1800-10 seem to have established itself, though it remains crucial that the general picture be in some way built upon such detailed analysis. It is the case studies of Beethoven

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355 Bonds, 1991 appears to expound autonomistic musical aesthetics as a function of rhetoric rather than representation. See especially his Ch.4.
and Hoffmann which, classically, attract the designation "Reception".

It is to be noted that one important possible conclusion arising out of the discussions so far of Chs.2 and 3 is that the 1790s in particular present a period of change in respect of autonomistic aesthetics of instrumental music. By the time of the "arrival" of Beethoven, the importance (to the foremost minds of the time at any rate) of the understanding of these aesthetics had far surpassed that of their (mere) recognition.

In essence, this final chapter presents aspects of events in the target decade, 1800-10, of the present work and suitable preliminary material for it, such as "genius" and other relevant issues in Shaftesbury and Kant particularly. After these historical-intellectual precedents have been outlined comes an examination of the attitudes to autonomistic musical aesthetics of Mozart and Haydn (being great immediate predecessors of Beethoven). Finally, questions concerning Beethoven's music are addressed, with special reference to the work of E.T.A.Hoffmann.

356 Or of the attempt thereat.
In particular, Hoffmann's Beethoven criticism is discussed for what it reveals of autonomistic musical aesthetics.
Reasons why Beethoven has been chosen to be commented upon in detail: genius - some precedents in aesthetic thought: Dryden, Shaftesbury, Kant.

Shaftesbury (1)

Magnani, 1970 fixes Shaftesbury as the precedent for the understanding of Beethoven as a genius, stating that it was he who "helped to introduce" (p.128) the emergent conditions which not only enhanced the technical freedom of the artist but also connected him personally with cosmological issues.\(^{357}\) Noteworthy brief pre-1970 secondary discussions of Shaftesbury's significance for Magnani include Cassirer, 1951 and Hampson, 1968.

Cassirer takes as his argument Shaftesbury's freshly thought-out adaptation from Plato and Plotinus of the concept of "an intuitive understanding". Shaftesbury wished to reverse Plato's condemnation of art to allow for "the process of becoming" in which genius would have a central though uniquely mysterious role (p.317). Shaftesbury made genius philosophically respectable, regardless of some previous writers’ attempts to explore it in intricate ways which were polar opposites to his

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\(^{357}\) I.e. a sense of the universe as being the place of immanent elemental forces which it was the artist’s duty or role to be in touch with and to express.
thought (p.318). Shaftesbury was an original formulator of the most important post-Cartesian ideas about the nature of beauty, representing "a purely dynamic standpoint" in his theories both of art and of nature (pp.321-2). Cassirer is concerned (pp.322-6) to emphasise the delicacy and profundity of Shaftesbury's standpoint in comparison to other writers such as Du Bos, who is in a sense taken to task (p.322) for not being a suitable source as to the purpose of fully discussing aesthetic experience.358 Hampson,1968 uses some of the same imagery.359 Shaftesbury's importance lies in his commitment to move "the centre of aesthetic enquiry from the object to the creative process by which it came into being" (p.203). The route to the aesthetic was by means of morality (pp.99-100).360

358 Cassirer fragments sources, i.e. classifies each one according to the professional category of its author and not according to its own integrity evaluated qualitatively as thought. From that classification he attributes reliability. For example, the writings on musical aesthetics of someone with proven high musical attainment are automatically taken to be more reliable than the pronouncements of a non-musician (or a musician of little talent) whose writings display equal quality.

359 I.e., with the advent of Shaftesbury, "Imitation of nature thus came to be conceived in a dynamic rather than a static sense" (p.203) (emphasis added).

360 This is, properly, a widely held assumption. Though Hampson does not discuss aesthetics at this point, this passage both neatly summarises Shaftesbury's status as a moral aesthetician and prepares for the mention of his aesthetics.
Even more importantly, Shaftesbury's relevance specifically to musical aesthetics has been taken into account. Bent, 1987, having noted that Shaftesbury's thought became fundamental to German eighteenth-century aesthetics,\textsuperscript{361} instances (p.12) his likely influence on Kirnberger. McGeary, 1993 consistently quotes extracts from Shaftesbury's oeuvre which indicate a positive appraisal of autonomistic musical aesthetics but does not draw any firm conclusions to the effect that they may be analysed in this way. McGeary does identify ("Shaftesbury's appeal... republican form of government" - p.533) the importance for historical aesthetics of Shaftesbury's moral-aesthetic link. Of course, McGeary's concern is an inquiry into opera (though he does manage to uncover strands of thought which, if one segregates opera and instrumental music, are applicable to both genres).\textsuperscript{362} A surfeit of "spectacle", i.e. representation or

\textsuperscript{361} For details of German translations see Price,1955,pp.159-60; French translations are usefully mentioned in Caygill,1989, p.45n5. For further detail see, for example, Grean,1967,pp.ix-xii. Also see Atkins,1951, Ch.6, for discussion of later English critics (for example Lowth, Young, Grey and Warton) who may also have been read in Europe. Atkins, in his cautious critique, also notes (pp.324-5) that Shaftesbury regarded "all beauty...as an expression of the divine life of the world, and the animating principle of literature" and in conclusion comments (p.326) that "with a restless and open mind he discusses many of the current theories; and in that sense he may be said to reflect in his own peculiar way many of the critical tendencies of his time."
symbol, onstage "could only indicate a lack of, or lead to loss of, liberty" (p.535). As to general aesthetic debate, McGeary fundamentally concludes only that Shaftesbury strives for "the ideal of the simple" (p.537). Music, then, is just something which might be accommodated to this ideal.

Dryden

One important contemporary of Shaftesbury\textsuperscript{363} was also connected with the increasingly common idea of "autonomisation" of art and its criticism. Winn,1992 emphasises (p.21) Dryden's musicianship and goes much further as well. Dryden's motivation was, textually, to present the greatest challenge possible to the composer.\textsuperscript{364} He accommodated (ib.) the composers while testing

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[362] McGeary states (p.533) that, for Shaftesbury, freedom is indispensable for the development of artistic progress and this in one way serves to sum up twin track elements of his argument (i.e. the applicability to both opera and instrumental music aesthetics of some points). Useful though this is, McGeary unfortunately restricts himself to how the questions of personal and social liberty, which are but part of the picture of freedom \textit{qua} concept, find their place in Shaftesbury's thought. There is also always the possibility of gathering internal evidence (of the Romantic kind). Only by taking into account a widened scope can one appreciate how far ahead of his time Shaftesbury was.
\item[363] The period in question being c.1685-1700 (the latter date the year of Dryden's death).
\item[364] Perhaps with the high purpose that both words and music could each and together benefit, each reach excellencies of art.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
This underlies Winn's claim (p.21) that "Dryden also looked ahead to the revaluing of music in the later eighteenth century."

Zwicker, 1987 addresses head-on the topic of genius as conceived by Dryden. The political role of the poet was diminishing (p.267) and instead "The language of authority, judgement, and artistic power, the insistence on the literary and the aesthetic, is itself a bid by the poet for recognition of his genius very much in our sense of the word", it being further noted (p.268) that "Dryden's self-knowledge as a poet was quite objective by this point in his career." This is Zwicker's commentary on a passage abstracted from the preface to Dryden, 1681. Seventeenth-century writers seemed to understand "wit" to do duty for what from the middle of the eighteenth century

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365 Winn's wide-ranging discussion (pp.126-36) on how Dryden, 1687 and Dryden, 1697 are treated in settings to music is unsuitable for comment here because of its basic eclecticism, eclecticism being sometimes useful as a term in discussion but not in the case of the present work's continuing examination of autonomistic musical aesthetics. Winn concludes with the observation that "Dryden and similar writers were unable to grant that music had a technique as precise and intellectual as their own" (p.136). Were Dryden and the other, unspecified writers to have held such an opinion, it would not have been enough to warrant their being thought of as opponents of any emergent autonomistic aesthetics. Rather were they concerned with perfection in poetry, as they had attained or sought to attain in prose, without detracting from music's "honour", its efficacy, and making no particular value judgement on music's imprecision other than comparing it less favourably with the capacities of verbal arts.
century onwards was termed "genius". But Zwicker is exploring earlier (than the middle of the eighteenth century) contexts of "genius", in Dryden, wishing to link it with "the very topic of cultural authority itself" (p.268). This leads to a powerful argument (pp.269-70, esp. p.269) which dwells on "the authority of genius" (p.269), motivationally contrasted with but also complemented by politics. This argument is given more scope in Zwicker,1993, which discusses (pp.30-2) a passage in the preface to Dryden,1667, though here Zwicker confines the terminology to "wit".

Dryden,1687 and Dryden,1697, the "finest English poems on music" (Winn,1992; p.21), offer, in addition to a demonstration of technical effect and "knowledge of musical lore" (p.21), substantial conviction that music ought to be seen to have its own inherent capacity to generate what might be termed music-induced emotions. Music is capable (1687;II:16,24) of calling up any passion. Verse II puts forward a "worship" (20) of pure sound. Yet in IV the archaic "discovers" (34) denotes that the traditional representationalist agenda of music has not quite been lost sight of. In Dryden,1697 the basic musical imagery is
established in Verse II, the sound of Jupiter being manifest before the sight of him.\textsuperscript{366} This moves the crowd to appreciate (34) the power of pure sound and they and their king to recognise (35-39) Jupiter's approach or dwelling.\textsuperscript{367} Still more intimate is the imagery in V, which conveys a deep and ever mysterious role for sound \textit{per se}: love is "a Kindred-Sound" (95), music being the instrument of its success (108).

According to Beardsley,\textsuperscript{1966}, Dryden's empiricist intuition leads him (p.147) to break with tradition in characterising hitherto classicised rules as tending towards being probabilities rather than absolute certainties. Beardsley, in a mention of the seventeenth-century \textit{Querelle entre des anciens et des modernes}, also radically points out what artistic progressiveness might mean:

the view that the rules do not depend merely on authority (as seemed to have been so often taken for granted in the sixteenth century), but can be rationally justified, when this view combines with the recognition that empirical knowledge will be required for some of the premises of that justification, leads in turn [...] to the conclusion that a kind of progress can occur in the arts, after all, since not all the possibilities of excellence have been explored.

\textsuperscript{366} If that is meant to be the order of events in the poem.

\textsuperscript{367} Not in the sense that Jupiter was, objectively, representationally specified by the music.
The idea of artistic progress therefore challenges classical idealism (which as a concept takes refuge in the putative perfection of models). Dryden can at least partly identify with this challenge, which also is being passed to Shaftesbury.

Shaftesbury (2)

The view of Shaftesbury, typified in Kivy, 1976, as a "transitional figure" (p.18) does justice only to the extensiveness of Shaftesbury's classical erudition. To attempt to relegate Shaftesbury or see past his work to those such as Hutcheson and Hume without properly acknowledging the true debt of British aesthetics to him (not to mention the debt owed to him by Continental thought) is to fail adequately to wrestle with the work of one of the most vital harbingers of Romantic aesthetics. In addition to righting misconstruings of

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368 Grean, 1964 inaccurately attributes (p.xviii) the ability to take either of these views ("a rather conventional neoclassicist" or "a precursor of Romanticism") to "the dialectical character of Shaftesbury's philosophy". This observation rests on the overemphasised assumption that Shaftesbury's work primarily (merely) presents "a broadly humane philosophy".
Shaftesbury's standing, in contemporary aesthetics, such as Kivy's, it also is necessary to rescue details of and generalisations from his thought after the same fashion as Caygill,1989 goes to rescue from less than complete understanding the work of Kant, though this approach (to rescue) does not form a significant part of the main analytical method of the present discussion. Prophetic or influential features of Shaftesbury's thought bear urgently on musical aesthetics in general,\textsuperscript{369} not necessarily just on their then condition.

In the eighteenth century Shaftesbury, 1711 was, with its successive editions, the only widely disseminated work in his oeuvre. One way of reading it would be to begin with its perceived basic premises. An overriding belief presented is that truth is the most powerful thing in the world, since even fiction itself must be governed by it, and can only please by its resemblance. The appearance of reality is necessary to make any passion agreeably represented; and to be able to move others we must first be moved ourselves, or at least seem to be so, upon some probable grounds.\textsuperscript{370}

(I, p.6)

Notice that Shaftesbury says "powerful" and not, say,

\textsuperscript{369} I.e. musical aesthetics as having considerable validity at all times.

\textsuperscript{370} See also II; p.86.
"important", surprisingly perhaps at the beginning of a discourse which treats amply of moral considerations. This usage may in fact hint at an aesthetic agenda to come. It is not long before Shaftesbury embarks on one, containing, as it does, relevance to and dependence on the moral realm.

Shaftesbury's mentions and, objective if they are unintentional, definitions of "genius" in some ways seem to verify many writers' portrayal of his work as transitional.\textsuperscript{371}

However, apart from Shaftesbury's being somewhat apologetic in regard to this term, there are contexts which vindicate, say, Magnani's emphasis. Indeed, the very title of Shaftesbury's chief work could embody some notion of genius, since in each of (at least) two passages (see, for example, I, pp.222 ff.; II, p.169n2) a possible reading is that "character" and "genius" are interchangeable.\textsuperscript{372} In this situation the title embodies (in the

\textsuperscript{371} See, for example, I, p.127, p.136n1 (because of Shaftesbury's use of the plural's taking the essential element of the individual from the concept of genius - one example among many in Shaftesbury,1711), p.205 (here genius is distinguished from talent - "masterly command" - see Wittkower,1973,p.305).

\textsuperscript{372} These are the two passages in Shaftesbury,1711 which can be read most specifically as equating "character" with "genius". But there are others, for example I; pp.127 ff., which suggest that the two words are connected in meaning. The follow-up volume, Shaftesbury,1712 also has the word "character" in one of its titles.

In the context of English writing, for example, the entry "genius" in Coles,1676, which
light of Enlightenment thought) potent ramifications. But (irrespective of the title's significance or lack of it) such ramifications are in any case borne out or at least substantially suggested in the text itself. However, in no small part due to Shaftesbury's rambling style, they are often set in discussions of matters which are or seem of little importance to aesthetics as such. This (as with all texts examined in the present work) calls for an alert approach on the part of the reader.

Shaftesbury, 1711 perhaps consciously avoids discussion or even mention of individual works of art in his relentless quest for the ideal of truth (stated at the outset) and for the aesthetic. One of the most searching passages in the whole work, a particularly noteworthy soliloquy by Theocles (II, pp. 97 ff.), at one point relegates the individual work of art if it Shaftesbury may well have known since it was very popular in his day (see Note), is practically the same as in Bailey, 1751 (a posthumous edition of Bailey's also very popular work published in 1721). But, on the evidence of these two works, "character" seems (in a relatively short time) to have undergone a significant shift of meaning: for Coles it means merely "the print of any thing, or mark in short-hand, or any latter; also as Characterism, a lively description of a person" whereas in Bailey one reads "Description, Title, Quality. Characters, Marks, Signs, or Symbols of Things invented by Artists, and peculiar to several Sciences; as Geometry, Algebra, Printing, &c. Characterism, a Mark, Sign, or Distinction, a Description of a Person by Character" (emphasis added).

373 Cf. Wackenroder's avoidance of mention of specific real composers.
cannot be seen to be or is not intended to be inset into the whole of the general picture, not simply compares nature and art:

"O glorious nature! supremely fair and sovereignly good! all-loving and all-lovely, all-divine! whose looks are so becoming and of such infinite grace; whose study brings such wisdom, and whose contemplation such delight; whose every single work affords an ampler scene, and is a nobler spectacle than all art ever presented."

(II, p.98)

Nature is infinite and "wearie[s] imagination" (ib.). Shaftesbury would here seem to be allowing the exaltation of an individual work of nature while excluding exaltation of an individual work of art. The contemplation of nature saves art from the consequences of art's perceived deficiency in the moral realm.

In the same section Shaftesbury offers an autonomistic description of the intellect, as being

"something which acts upon a body, and has something passive under it and subject to it; that it has not only body or mere matter for its subject, but in some respect even itself too and what proceeds from it; that it superintends and manages its own imaginations, appearances, fancies, correcting, working, and modelling these as it finds good, and adorning and accomplishing the best it can this composite order of body and understanding." Such a mind and governing part I know there is somewhere in the world.

(II, pp.103-4)
The lines immediately following ("We have our several understandings and thoughts...But every one for himself") as it were fuse genius with aesthetics. Their powerful conclusion reads

"Who gives the law? ... Who orders and distributes thus?" Nature, say you. And what is Nature? Is it sense? Is it a person? Has she reason or understanding? No. Who then understands for her, or is interested or concerned in her behalf? No one; not a soul. But every one for himself.374

(II, p.104)

Autonomistic imagery is also very marked in discussion of morality:

this is not, nor ever can be, virtue of any kind, or in any sense, but must remain still horrid depravity, notwithstanding any fashion, law, custom or religion which may be ill and vicious itself, but can never alter the eternal measures and immutable independent nature of worth and virtue.375

(I, p.255)

Since the basic vocabulary used in this passage, here pertaining to morality or religious belief, is also used in settings where, specifically, the philosophy of art is under discussion, autonomomistic aesthetics (bearing in mind that "aesthetics" had

374 Emphasis added.
375 Emphasis added.
as a branch of thought yet to be more formally defined) occurs in Shaftesbury, 1711 as, at the very least, a mode of discussion if not a full-blown commitment to issues which were to preoccupy Romantics and which would preface or presage what Romanticism eventually would do. Certainly, for example, when the modern reader a little later encounters phrases such as "this inward anatomy" (I, p.284), Romantic territory may suggest itself (through the hint at a Romantic concept of immanence).

Ideas other than genius and autonomy (according - for the sake of argument - to a model of Shaftesbury's thought as being easily divisible into presentation of distinct ideas) may (more generally) be revealed through a round-up of celebrated and noteworthy passages (or aphorisms) in Shaftesbury, 1711. Of these, two in particular lay claim to classic status.

The first states that the "most ingenious way of becoming foolish is by a system" (I, p.189). Stolnitz, 1961 sees (p.100) this comment simply as Shaftesbury's "apology" for his own discursive style of writing, yet it also is interpretable as more than that. Again, the modern reader may discern a further layer, possibly consisting of a description of Shaftesbury's aesthetics
which he would approve of, perhaps in fact regard as ideal.

The second passage (or aphorism), "beauty...and good...are still one and the same" (II, p.128), Stolnitz, 1961 takes (pp.100-1) as a statement supportive of classicism in that Shaftesbury is alleged merely to preserve "the famous Platonic triad" (p.101), beauty, proportion and truth. Caygill, 1989 agrees (p.46) with Stolnitz in emphasising Shaftesbury's adherence to such a formulation, i.e. one which contains three elements or terms. Stolnitz, therefore, attempts to explain away Shaftesbury's thought using the phrase "the famous Platonic triad" and Caygill in his explanation refers to "Shaftesbury's triple theme of providence, beautiful order and the sense of order". Clearly, these two formulations are superimposable or, at least, one or two of the terms in each case are interchangeable with or may substitute for the corresponding term or terms in the other formulation or formulations. So, the tripartite model suffices. Caygill, however, citing Stolnitz, 1961, states that

Shaftesbury does not reject formalism for sensibility, but

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376 Stolnitz cites *Philebus*, 64e-65a.
argues that they are compatible. His argument rests on the distinction between the production and the reception of a work of art. The artist produces the work according to strict rules, remaining in full control of the design and ensuring its agreement with nature and propriety.

(p.48)

Nonetheless, the view expressed here, that formalism and sensibility are, in Shaftesbury's thought, compatible, is not consistently borne out in Shaftesbury, 1711. In the same argument, Caygill offers a further quotation from the work (I, p.214) and then concludes:

The rigorous separation of the production of a work according to strict rules from the irrational enjoyment of the same work by the spectator is axiomatic for Shaftesbury's philosophy of art. The same "feeling only by the effect whilst ignorant of the cause" [Shaftesbury, 1711; I, p.214] also founds Shaftesbury's social philosophy. The beautiful order is the rational design of providence which ensures balance and harmony but can only be known through its pleasurable effect of unifying private and public interest.

(p.49)

This overlooks the force of the introductory sentence (not quoted by Caygill) to the paragraph in question: "However difficult or desperate it may appear in any artist to endeavour to bring

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377 Or solution, since Caygill is trying to respond to Stolnitz (and, presumably, others holding the same or similar views).
perfection into his work, if he has not at least the idea of perfection to give him aim he will be found very defective and mean in his performance" (Shaftesbury, 1711; I, p.214). This may appear to be simply an echo of classical idealism but when combined with the remainder of the passage makes a whole which can suggest the idea of the perfection of the work of art in its relation to a forward-looking concept of genius and ultimately to autonomistic aesthetics.\(^\text{378}\)

The second passage (or aphorism), "beauty...and good...are still one and the same" (II, p.128), is set in a particularly compelling section of Shaftesbury, 1711 which can help the reader to see Shaftesbury as a proto-Romantic rather than merely a well-read classicist who, with a few new things to say, helped to usher in the Enlightenment. In the section immediately previous to this (II, pp.95-124), Shaftesbury, through his mouthpiece Theocles, deals with the topic of the sublime. The guiding idea throughout this section is, as in Longinus,

\(^{378}\) Note that Stolnitz, 1961 observes (p.100) "that the chief impulse in the modern period is to establish the autonomy of the aesthetic" before proceeding to restrict Shaftesbury's contribution to this impulse to the subsequent reputation of his work rather than its content.
dimension. This with all its associations serves as a suitable preliminary to what Shaftesbury has to say about art and morality ("beauty...and good"). Having dealt with the sublime, Shaftesbury (continuing with the same dialectical convention) passes to a more homely kind of narrative which, as he progresses further into the argument, indicates that he feels he is on sure ground:

Methinks, said he, Philocles (changing to a familiar voice), we had better leave these unsociable places whither our fancy has transported us, and return to ourselves here again in our more conversable woods and temperate climates. Here no fierce heats nor colds annoy us, no precipices nor cataracts amaze us. Nor need we here be afraid of our own voices whilst we hear the notes of such a cheerful choir, and find the echoes rather agreeable and inviting us to talk.

(II, p.124)

It is, of course, here interesting how, turning to the arts after he has mentioned nature, Shaftesbury selects music to introduce the seminal metaphorical discussion which follows, though, of course, the choice could have been arbitrary. As the discussion begins to progress, Shaftesbury still embraces (II, p.125) representationalistic art theory but in the context of "enthusiasm". In fact, practitioners of any art are positively
encouraged to be ardent, "deep in this romantic way" (II, p.125).

By the time Shaftesbury has stated (p.128) the still simple-
sounding aphorism (or, to go further, truth) on art and morality,
a great deal of the ground of wider and more futuristic
interpretations has been laid in a relatively short space (i.e.
II, pp.124-8). Shaftesbury is by this point, if not already
beforehand, not definable solely as a classicist. Instead, he can
be said to be a modern philosopher "reclaiming imagination as the
divine spark in man" (Kearney, 1988; p.155). Shaftesbury is humble
about this mission but convinced of its importance. With the
assistance of moderation and reasonability and like precepts (for
example test by ridicule), which, in Shaftesbury's hands, at
first may seem more rhetorical in the sense of serving only
classicism, it is possible for a nonclassical content to be
projected.

Imagination and immanence are key elements of the
autonomistic aesthetic outlook. In Shaftesbury, 1711 they are
explained within a classical framework which also assumes a
fairly commonplace definition of the power of instrumental music
("What else is even a tune or symphony, or any excellent piece
of music, than a certain system of proportioned sounds?" - II, p.63). However, Shaftesbury's generous and sometimes almost effusive style ensures the emergence of a text which can be read more searchingly than that. His appeals to classical proportion can seem expressed more with the future in mind than reinforcement of the past, as, for example, in the following passage:

"Now having recognised this uniform consistent fabric, and owned the universal system, we must of consequence acknowledge a universal mind, which no ingenious man can be tempted to disown, except through the imagination of disorder in the universe, its seat. For can it be supposed of any one in the world, that being in some desert far from men, and hearing there a perfect symphony of music, or seeing an exact pile of regular architecture arising gradually from the earth in all its orders and proportions, he should be persuaded that at the bottom there was no design accompanying this, no secret spring of thought, no active mind?"

(II, pp.66-7)

The "disordered imagination" is certainly here opposed to classicism but, that being the case, there was surely no need to broach (or, even, postulate) it if all classical foundations were secure.\footnote{\textsuperscript{379} It must be noted that Shaftesbury's style is often difficult to analyse precisely, being rambling and often equivocal.} Also, music comes first in the order of examples,
which consist of the more abstract arts of music and architecture.

Shaftesbury's aesthetics, taken in themselves without reference to reception history (i.e. others' reactions), have far-reaching implications for instrumental music aesthetics. The advice in Shaftesbury, 1711 to authors can be taken to apply to all creative artists. Shaftesbury places emphasis on the prerequisite, immanent "art of hearing" (I, p.156) which is to precede the construction and contemplation of performance works of art. The "philosopher, critic, or author" (I, p.228) should set afoot the powerfulest faculties of his mind, and assemble the best forces of his wit and judgment, in order to make a formal descent on the territories of the heart; resolving to decline no combat, nor hearken to any terms, till he had pierced into its inmost provinces and reached the seat of empire. No treaties should amuse him; no advantages lead him aside. All other speculations should be suspended, all other mysteries resigned, till this necessary campaign was made and these inward conflicts learnt; by which he would be able to gain at least some tolerable insight into himself and knowledge of his own natural principles.

(I, pp.228-9)

This, with all its quirky expressions, describes Beethoven's attitude a century later. The mature Beethoven would also be
prefigured in the work of Kant.

Kant

"The moral commandment within us and the starred sky above us. Kant!!!" This remark of Beethoven's was recorded in early 1820. An incomplete picture remains of precisely what Beethoven's feelings about religion were, though it can be decided that he had a kind of loose adherence to Christianity.

Tyson,1983 notes (p.143) that the "deity of his faith was a personal God, a universal father to whom he constantly turned for consolation and forgiveness. That much is clear from the many private confessions and prayers scattered throughout his papers."

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380 Scruton,1982 describes (p.72) the "so-called `British moralists'', founded by Shaftesbury, as having had an effect on Kant. Scruton's allegiance is to the classical side of Shaftesbury rather than the prescient side.

Blackburn,1984 notes (p.4) that in Kant "the prime investigation is into the kind of mind the individual has". See his Ch.6 (especially pp.197-200, 210-212, 222) for a critique of Hume's relativism, which (with particular reference to Hume,1741b) can serve as a link between earlier theories and those of Kant. Of particular usefulness in this regard (not just in the case of Hume or Kant) is the thought that emotivism in ethics is superimposable on emotivism in aesthetics.

381 See Köhler,1972, p.235, for German original. It comes from the opening sentence of the concluding part (pp.169-71) of Kant,1788. (This sentence was in fact engraved on Kant's tombstone.) The connection between Kant and Beethoven is, in the light of this, Beethoven's only recorded mention of Kant, discussed in Jacobs,1961.

382 Morality does not presuppose religion but Beethoven had had a Catholic upbringing.
One of Beethoven's 1810 letters, to Therese Malfatti,\textsuperscript{383} is cited (p.144) by Tyson,1983 as being revealing of Beethoven's pursuit of the divine through solitary communion with nature but, even more significantly, it is extremely telling in respect of his relationship to instrumental music. In the present discussion, the question is, could Beethoven, had he had the education to prepare him to read Kant's works (or even the patience to do it), have extracted notions of autonomistic musical aesthetics from them? To discover Kant's own attitude to instrumental music aesthetics, it is necessary to turn to Kant,1790 (which demonstrates more than Kant,1788 his attitude to instrumental music).

Kant was aware of Shaftesbury,1711.\textsuperscript{384} Shaftesbury, despite all his heralding of the Enlightenment and (as already argued) Romanticism, retained the legacy of classical mimesis, though he did not emphasise it unduly. Kant,1790 confidently rejected, maybe even simply ignored the essence of this legacy. This rejection or ignoring informs Kant's engagement with "genius":

\textsuperscript{384} See Caygill,1995, pp.91-2.
Every one is agreed on the point of the complete opposition between genius and the *spirit of imitation*. Now since learning is nothing but imitation, the greatest ability, or aptness as a pupil (capacity), is still, as such, not equivalent to genius. Even though a man weaves his own thoughts or fancies, instead of merely taking in what others have thought, and even though he go so far as to bring fresh gains to art and science, this does not afford a valid reason for calling such a man of *brains*, and often great brains, a *genius*, in contradistinction to one who goes by the name of *shallow-pate*, because he can never do more than merely learn and follow a lead. For what is accomplished in this way is something that *could* have been learned. Hence it all lies in the natural path of investigation and reflection according to rules, and so is not specifically distinguishable from what may be acquired as the result of industry backed up by imitation.

(I, p.169)

Kant had by this stage of his work long since discussed and justified (carefully and to his own satisfaction) the principle of universal assent in aesthetic judgements, hence his confidence in noting that all were agreed. From the above passage the autonomy of genius is made clear. It is to be independent of imitation, both of external reality and of the work of other artists. Kant,1790 devotes five sections (two of them substantial) to "genius".385 Citing the work of Edward Young,

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385 See pp.168-83. Apart from this concerted treatment, Kant makes a few other direct observations on genius which are significant in themselves. Poetry, for Kant the first among the arts, is said (p.191) to be indebted "almost entirely" to genius. Genius is definable (p.212) "as the
Bate, 1989 offers (p.89) an eighteenth-century context for Kant's views on genius: "His [Young's] sharp distinction between organic and mechanic anticipate[d] the principle that shape[d] the aesthetics of Coleridge and Schlegel. Via aestheticians such as J.G.Sulzer, Young's metaphor was absorbed into the German tradition, where organicism was a central concern of Herder, Kant and many others." Caygill, 1995 notes (p.214) that "through Goethe and the early Romantics, Kant's views on genius were extremely influential in the early nineteenth century", though of course the impulses of the early Romantics certainly did not stem principally from Kant's work. To aid Kant's notion of "genius", the precise, nonmimetic application which may be permitted representation is given:

Seeing, then, that the natural endowment of art (as fine art) must furnish the rule, what kind of rule must this be? It cannot be one set down in a formula and serving as a precept - for then the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather must the rule be gathered from the performance, i.e. from the product, which others may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let

faculties of aesthetic ideas". Perhaps Kant's boldest claim (p.226) is that, if genius were suppressed, "the freedom of the imagination in its very conformity to law" would be the next to suffer.

386 See also Abrams, 1953, pp.174, 198-200, 207-8.
it serve as a model, not for imitation but for following.

(I, pp.170-1)

Kant is concerned to transcend the "concepts" of nature and freedom.\(^{387}\) Aesthetic judgements are founded on something else, which at first involves empiricism.\(^{388}\) What is required is innate ability to recognise aesthetic worth and, in a way that is the complete antithesis of slavish imitation, to emulate it. This involves knowing that one is making an aesthetic judgement.

In its tortuous way, Part I of Kant, 1790 offers a precise account of what constitutes an aesthetic judgement and how it does or does not pertain to (i) the beautiful and (ii) the sublime. Crowther, 1996 notes (p.121n5) that the "pure aesthetic judgement encompasses both beauty and sublimity".\(^{389}\) It happens that the bulk of Kant's explicit references to music lie in the section of Part I entitled "Analytic of the Sublime" (I.1.2).

\(^{387}\) For a discussion of the function of concepts in Kant's thought, see Schaper, 1979, pp.8, 9-10, 31. Schaper also briefly illustrates (pp.4, 112) the distinction between freedom and nature.

\(^{388}\) For a discussion of Kant and empirical statements see Strickland, 1981, pp.55-6.

\(^{389}\) Emphasis added. Crowther restricts himself to considering the case of natural beauty, the enjoyment of which he, without any specific reference, terms (p.110) "the pure aesthetic judgement in its most basic form".
They are best viewed against the background of what Kant, 1790
sets out to do, namely mediate between understanding and reason.
It is judgement, referred to (Preface, p.4) as "a middle term",
which effects this. Kant wants to answer the following questions:

Has it [judgement] also got independent a priori principles?
If so, are they constitutive, or are they merely regulative,
thus indicating no special realm? And do they give a rule
a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as the
middle term between the faculties of cognition and desire,
just as understanding prescribes laws a priori for the
former and reason for the latter?

(ib.)

It is by no means requisite that all of these be pursued in order
that the reader should grasp Kant's attitude towards music
(instrumental music in particular). A concentration on the
notion of aesthetic judgement suffices, omitting consideration
of the more general teleological judgement. 390

For Kant, "aesthetic judgement is, therefore, a special
faculty of estimating according to a rule, but not according to
concepts" (Introduction, p.36). Concepts are the province of
understanding (concept of nature) and reason (concept of

390 It is useful to note how Kant adequately summarises (II; pp.22-3) his aims in respect of an
account of teleological judgement. Part II, however, has much less relevance to aesthetics.
freedom). Why should aesthetic judgement as a faculty estimate according to a rule? Kant's answer to this lies (perhaps paradoxically) in the autonomy of its decision:

In a Critique of Judgement the part dealing with aesthetic judgement is essentially relevant, as it alone contains a principle introduced by judgement completely a priori as the basis of its reflection upon nature. This is the principle of nature's formal finality for our cognitive faculties in its particular (empirical) laws - a principle without which understanding could not feel itself at home in nature: whereas no reason is assignable a priori, nor is so much as the possibility of one apparent from the concept of nature as an object of experience, whether in its universal or in its particular aspects, why there should be objective ends of nature, i.e. things only possible as natural ends. But it is only judgement that, without being itself possessed a priori of a principle in that behalf, in actually occurring cases (of certain products) contains the rule for making use of the concept of ends in the interest of reason, after that the above transcendental principle has already prepared understanding to apply to nature the concept of an end (at least in respect of its form).

(Introduction, p.35)

Only judgement "contains the rule" needed to establish further conditions in which reason and understanding co-operate to encompass "finality" (which is bound up with the definition of an "end"). As Caygill,1995 puts it (p.200), "it is necessary to assume some form of finality in order for any judgement to take place; this is because finality describes an attunement between
human judgement and the world, without which the 'understanding could not feel itself at home in nature'." At the practical level Kant does not here specify which "certain products" are meant. He appears to leave this open while later going on (I, pp.183-203) to attempt to classify "the fine arts" (p.184), the "requisites for fine art" being "imagination, understanding, soul, and taste" (p.183).

Aesthetic judgement is personal. Its high value is readily acknowledged by Kant when he notes that it contributes nothing to the cognition of its objects. Hence it must only be allocated to the Critique of the judging Subject and of its faculties of knowledge so far as these are capable of possessing a priori principles, be their use (theoretical or practical) otherwise what it may - a Critique which is the propaedeutic of all philosophy.

(Introduction, p.36)

It is within this boundary that Kant's aesthetic views on and mentions of music need to be considered. Kant, 1790 does properly and in an up-to-date way address issues concerning the nature of music. Music emerges positively from Kant's discussion.  

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391 Kant in a footnote states that taste unites imagination, understanding and soul and notes an observation of Hume's that the English are inferior to the French when it comes to taste.

392 For a witheringly negative view on Kant's attitude to music see Weatherston, 1996.
From the foregoing it is possible to analyse the treatment of aesthetics in Kant,1790 and to realise that Kant's general aesthetics can be deployed in respect of music. This may now be done even from internal evidence alone, although some points benefit from clarification or reiteration in other literature. In this spirit Kant,1790 may be read independently of Kant,1781 and Kant,1788 because, although it has much in common with these slightly earlier works, its arguments do not significantly depend on knowledge of them. Indeed, if Kant,1790 were not to be read with an open mind (whether or not with prior acquaintance with previous Kant works), its innovative arguments would (falsely) seem ever more abstruse. In any case, the Preface (pp.3-7) to Kant,1790 evidently suggests this approach.

As aesthetic judgements are personal, beauty is autonomous, or "disinterested" (I, p.43). This is vital to the presentation of aesthetic issues in Kant,1790. Kant introduces his distinction between interest and disinterest by attempting

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393 A second edition of Kant,1781 appeared in 1787.

394 This term occasions a footnote (pp.43-4) which notes among other things the solitary aspect of the judgement of taste. For a very useful summary of Kant's thinking which is applicable to this footnote, see Strickland,1981, pp.96-7.
to qualify, for his purposes, "delight", the human feeling
which is a response to something which pleases:

The delight which we connect with the representation
of the real existence of an object is called interest. Such
a delight, therefore, always involves a reference to the
faculty of desire, either as its determining ground, or else
as necessarily implicated with its determining ground. Now,
where the question is whether something is beautiful, we do
not want to know, whether we, or any one else, are, or
even could be, concerned in the real existence of the thing,
but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation
(intuition or reflection).

(I, pp.42-3)

This is followed by some general examples directly after which,
at one stroke, Kant's antimimetic attitude is clear: "All one
wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object
is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real
existence of the object of this representation" (I, p.43). This
is the essence of aesthetic disinterestedness. Representation is
employed in the service of aesthetics rather than being the ideal
and ground of art. It has lost (or been relieved of) its
classical function. The conclusions which Kant draws from this
proposition form (by his own admission - p.43) the foundation of
his aesthetic theories. This is because he can now say

(remarkably, at the outset of the work) on what basis an object
may be considered beautiful.

Not until Kant, 1790 is well under way is there provided a classification of beauty:

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty, or beauty which is merely dependent. The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to Objects which come under the concept of a particular end.

(I, p.72)

It is the first kind of beauty to which Kant assigns music:

We may also rank in the same class what in music are called fantasias (without a theme), and, indeed, all music that is not set to words.

(ib.)

Here (the first concrete mention of music in Kant, 1790) Kant appears a little slow to recognise (in the sense of explicitly noticing) the (beautiful) autonomy of instrumental music. Kant next notes importantly (ib.) that "in the estimate of a free beauty (according to mere form) we have the pure judgement of taste." This conclusively establishes music in its pure form in Kant's aesthetic world, though it is not yet apparent whether
he regards instrumental music as manifesting immanent force which constitutes its essence or merely notes its textlessness (this being but one of its attributes).

When it is considered that Kant, 1790 embarks on a general discussion in I.1.1, it should not be surprising that it contains so few substantial thoughts on music. The only other example in I.1.1 occurs in the rich summing up at the end:

Even a bird's song, which we can reduce to no musical rule, seems to have more freedom in it, and thus to be richer for taste, than the human voice singing with all the rules that the art of music prescribes; for we grow tired much sooner of frequent and lengthy repetitions of the latter. Yet here most likely our sympathy with the mirth of a dear little creature is confused with the beauty of its song, for if exactly imitated by man (as has been sometimes done with the notes of the nightingale) it would strike our ear as wholly destitute of taste.

(I, p.89)

Here Kant is concerned to list what he sees as possible pitfalls in the aesthetic judgement of music. Still, his main aim remains the preparation of the reader for the discussion of the sublime.

In I.1.2 Kant codifies what is said in I.1.1 concerning aesthetic judgement. If Kant values instrumental music, it is only when its autonomy is unaffected by other considerations
(such as performance context, other arts etc.). Then it constitutes fine art, "which is intrinsically final, and which, although devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication" (p.166). The crucial distinction is between the reflective judgement (required as the standard of fine art) and organic sensation (which attends "agreeable art") (pp.165-6). Kant later introduces (p.189) music as being "the artificial play of sensations of hearing". Before he repeats what he has said previously (pp.165-6), Kant remarks (p.190) (and this is a further advance in his thinking) that one "may feel compelled to look upon the sensations afforded by both [music and the art of colour], not as mere sense-impressions, but as the effect of an estimate of form in the play of a number of sensations." It is the "estimate of form" that is the eminent characteristic of the judging subject.

In the remainder of the music references in I.1.2 (pp.193-6, 198-9), Kant is engaged in a detailed reading of the consequences of the aesthetic position of music. It would be missing the point merely to comment on music's status among the arts purely in
relation to the function it is perceived to fulfil (keeping in
mind whether other arts perform this or similar functions more
effectively). Its aesthetic status could, thanks to Kant, 1790 and
other works which principally and fundamentally develop the idea
of genius from Shaftesbury to Beethoven's middle period,
immeasurably improve its social standing. It is these works which
make Beethoven's 1820 remark possible.
Attitudes of Haydn and Mozart towards instrumental music aesthetics.

Mozart

Mozart's instrumental music well qualifies him for appraisal as one of those eighteenth-century composers who went beyond convention in instrumental genres. His genius did not, however, ensure a change in his social status. Mozart's professional lifestyle acquiesced to the current norms.\(^{395}\) One could say that his social environment and his genius were not completely matched.\(^{396}\) Sadie,1980 notes (p.724) that at the time of Mozart's death (in 1791) he was in high repute but proceeds first to consider the impact of Mozart's operas rather than his instrumental music. Mozart's concentration in his closing years (from 1788) does seem to have been more on opera and sacred music than instrumental music.\(^{397}\) Regardless of this, Mozart's symphonies, concertos and instrumental music for lesser forces

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\(^{395}\) For details of Mozart's lifestyle, see Sadie,1980, pp.680-716.

\(^{396}\) Note, for example, the begging letters Mozart wrote to Michael Puchberg commencing in 1788. Anderson ed.,1966, pp.914-17, 934-8, 939, 940-1, 948-9, 962.

See Howe,1989, pp.157-9 for an interesting discussion of Mozart's genius. For example, Howe emphasises (p.159) that Mozart's genuine docility towards his father Leopold was in harmony with his genius.

\(^{397}\) See worklist, Sadie,1980,pp.725-52.
have an essential place in his output.

In 1781 Mozart, writing in a letter to his father about a new opera, clearly expressed his position on instrumental (or pure) music:

For just as a man in such a towering rage oversteps all the bounds of order, moderation and propriety and completely forgets himself, so must the music too forget itself. But since passions, whether violent or not, must never be expressed to the point of exciting disgust, and as music, even in the most terrible situations, must never offend the ear, but must please the listener, or in other words must never cease to be music, so I have not chosen a key foreign to F (in which the aria is written) but one related to it – not the nearest, D minor, but the more remote A minor.\(^{398}\)

(Anderson ed., 1966; p.769)

Earlier in the letter Mozart notes (p.769) that he had "in working out the aria...allowed Fischer's beautiful deep notes to glow". Mozart had a care for pure music's equality and not subservience to the dramatic situation. He is not, however, merely putting instrumental music on a par with texted vocal music (with instruments). Even were there not any verbal evidence (of his own testimony) for this, the evidence of

\(^{398}\) The issue of key characteristics (outside the scope of the present discussion) was rife in the eighteenth century and persisted into the nineteenth. See, for example, Jan, 1995, and Schafer, 1975, pp.149-56.
Mozart's instrumental music alone could be explored, though such "internal evidence" must be adduced with both confidence and caution.

In the present work it must suffice to mention just one of Mozart's instrumental works, one which brings out a few interesting points. The Piano Concerto no.20 in D minor (1785) is Mozart's first essay in a minor key in the genre. Whether one freely acknowledges it or not, statements about a musical work's historical position are to an extent based on adduced internal evidence. For example Rosen,1971 notes (p.240) that this Concerto, together with no.21 in C major (1785), represents "a liberation of the genre, a demonstration that the concerto could stand with equal dignity beside any other musical form, capable of expressing the same depth of feeling and of working out the most complex musical idea". It may be mentioned here that Beethoven, of course, did the same for the symphony while continuing to respect the concerto. All of Beethoven's first six symphonies have openings which are more or less oblique harmonically while, for example, his five piano concertos, written in the same period, each have more established strong
tonic emphasis at the outset. Rosen further remarks (p.233) of no.20 that no previous concerto "exploits so well the latent pathetic nature of the form - the contrast and struggle of one individual voice against many". It is the perception of this "struggle" that is one factor which distinguishes Mozart and Beethoven. One can argue that Mozart, with the ease of his inspiration, maintained an equilibrium that transcended genre. Then, comparing Beethoven's concertos and symphonies, it is possible that Beethoven saw less of a challenge (though no difficulty) in the concerto form and more in the symphony, though his piano concertos especially are still peerless examples of their kind and do represent an advance on Mozart's.

Mozart's instrumental music in general bears witness to much new detail which shows respect for the aesthetic singling out of instrumental music which was occurring during his lifetime. This might not have been conscious respect since his published correspondence and other documents do not, for example, pay much attention to intellectual thought examined in the present work. What Mozart did not show in verbal evidence he showed in musical evidence.
Haydn

Haydn's published correspondence,\(^\text{399}\) informative as it is, unfortunately tells little if anything tangible concerning his attitude towards the aesthetic implications of instrumental music. The present section is therefore confined to the selective examination of two works on Haydn which appeared almost immediately following his death. In one way these two biographical pieces seem torn between the expression of burgeoning Romantic ideas and remaining loyal to Haydn's classicistic approach, which permeated his ideas on what art was supposed to do.

Griesinger, 1810 opens with an accolade that is redolent of classicism:

Joseph Haydn has ended his glorious career. By his death Germany again suffers a national loss; for Haydn was founder of an epoch in musical culture, \textit{and the sound of his harmonies, universally understood, did more than all written matter together to promote the honour of German artistic talent in the remotest lands}. [...] Original and abundant ideas, deep feeling, fantasy wisely controlled by penetrating study of the art, skill in the development of

\(^{399}\) Landon ed., 1959.
an idea basically simple, calculation of effect by a clever distribution of light and of shadow, pouring forth of the slyest humour, an easy flow and free movement - these are the qualities that distinguish Haydn's earlier and latest works alike.

The absence of comment on any stylistic progress gives the impression that Haydn's output maintained a uniform rather than an evolving perfection ("that distinguishes Haydn's earlier and latest works alike"). Hence classicism (in journalese) opens Griesinger, 1810. The portion emphasised in the above quotation can be understood in the light of the anecdote reported in Dies, 1810 concerning Haydn's planned visit to London:

They reminded him of his age, of the discomforts of a long journey, and of many other things to shake his resolve. But in vain! Mozart especially took pains to say, "Papa!" as he usually called him, "you have had no great training for the great world, and you speak too few languages."

"Oh!" replied Haydn, "my language is understood all over the world!"

Haydn's readily comprehensible "language" might, however, for him have consisted of two elements rather than one force:

He took exception to the fact that so many musicians now composed who had never learned to sing. "Singing must

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400 Emphasis added.
almost be counted among the lost arts, and instead of song they let instruments predominate." To Italian song Haydn granted precedence, and he counselled beginning artists to study song in Italy, instrumental music in Germany.

(Griesinger, 1810; p.61)

Händel is criticised (ib.) for lack of melodiousness (possibly indicating - if Griesinger is fairly representing Haydn - Haydn's adherence to the eighteenth-century doctrine of supremacy of melody). More damning than others of Haydn's reported observations, though, is the entrenchment evident in the following paragraph:

Haydn sometimes said that instead of the many quartets, sonatas, and symphonies, he should have written more vocal music. Not only might he have become one of the foremost opera composers, but also it is far easier to compose along the lines of a text than without one. He complained, moreover, that our German poets did not write musically enough, for a melody that suits the first stanza will seldom do for the following one. Often the sense fits in one line but not in that which should correspond to it. They are also not careful enough in the choice of vowels. Haydn was only a little acquainted with the poets of the latest period, and he readily confessed that he could no longer find his way in their sequence of ideas and in their expression.

(p.63)

If Haydn really did hold this view then in respect of uncovering details of an autonomistic viewpoint (if it exists for Haydn) one
can only, as in the case of Mozart, rely on internal evidence, though the nature of such reliance will differ in each case, i.e. each of their repertoires must be approached taking into account a host of social and technical factors which are not precisely the same in each case.

Dies is by far the more philosophical of the two "biographers". In a recounting of the legendary story of the performance of Haydn's Symphony no.45 in F sharp minor (1772), he perspicaciously objects (p.102) to ideas in the mainstream current of Romanticism:

The truth of the tales of the ancients concerning the wondrous workings of music upon the emotions has often been doubted, but I do not understand the basis of this doubt. The instrumental music of the ancients always served as accompaniment to singing or to mimic dancing. One would have to cast doubts, as well, therefore, on the powerful workings of song and of dance, and so on, which, after all, experience still bears out every day.

Had Haydn undertaken without singing, without dancing, without acting, solely through the power of melody and harmony to work on the Prince's feelings, to make himself understood, and to accomplish his purpose, it seems to me he would have undertaken an impossibility. Granted that instrumental music stirs the emotions. What language can then boast of having words for those emotions? Music without the addition of words, of dancing, or of acting is a riddle to the intellect, capable of an infinity of meanings.401

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401 Emphasis added.
The shrewd question (underlined) in this passage shows that not everyone was swept away by the rapidly developing explanation of art as being concerned with immanence rather than specific expression. Dies had not lost his critical distance.

Perhaps even more than in the case of Mozart, Haydn's attitude towards instrumental music aesthetics needs to be gleaned by considering the internal evidence of his instrumental music output as well as its sheer quantity. He probably felt his God-given genius should be exercised in terms of devotion to duty, with perfection as a sine qua non. But his musical legacy was destined to be adapted to (the sometimes atheistic)\(^{402}\) Romantic vocabulary as well.

\(^{402}\) For example Charlton ed., 1989 notes (p.32) that "Hoffmann never expresses himself in terms implying religious belief."
Reception aesthetics: early Beethoven reception, and introduction to Hoffmann's views on the music of the Viennese classical trinity.

Contemporary instrumental music criticism: the AMZ

In the *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung* (Leipzig, 1798-1848) early reviews of and reports on Beethoven's instrumental music were carried through with nothing of the same frenetic vocabulary and vigorous visionary qualities that characterised the writings of those at the centre of what was new in aesthetic thought. Even in the journal's ninth year, in 1807, the outlook was still markedly pre-Hoffmann, as it were, in that reviewers still struggled to put together a descriptive vocabulary and conceptual structure to cope with Beethoven's instrumental music but in the end were able only to offer bland, standardised language.\textsuperscript{403} In the same year Beethoven is, with perhaps slightly more ingenuity, referred to as "the musical Jean Paul".\textsuperscript{404} The problem, however, remains: what is the significance of the disparity between the tone of many *AMZ* writers and that of a Hoffmann and what consequences does this have for the conception and survival of

\textsuperscript{403} The struggle is evident, for example, in a report on the Third Symphony ("Eroica"). *AMZ*, IX.400.

\textsuperscript{404} *AMZ*, IX.610.
the autonomy aesthetic as formulated by Wackenroder, Hoffmann etc.?

Wallace, 1986 summarises the situation with reference to what he evidently sees as the complementary aesthetics of absolute and programme music. Firstly, he asserts (p.1) in respect of general critical reception of Beethoven that "these reviews, with the exception of those by Hoffmann, provide no evidence that Beethoven's contemporaries accepted the views of early Romantic philosophers on musical aesthetics." This is possibly true, but even so Wallace does not elaborate on its real significance.

Next, Wallace complains (pp.1-2) about music historians who interpret the period in terms of an instrumental music aesthetic:

Einstein finds that one of the central characteristics of this epoch was its rejection of an earlier preference for vocal and imitative music in favour of the pure instrumental music represented by Beethoven's symphonies. [...] Einstein and Lang both imply that the attitude of early nineteenth-century Germans, at least, toward instrumental music was simple and easy to grasp. This new music was superior to vocal and "representative" music precisely because it was accessible to the inmost depths of the soul, and was hence the most spiritual of all the arts. In this view, music's expressive character could only be vaguely defined, but this was seen as a strength, not a weakness. Such theories, however, are drawn entirely from the writings of philosophers and poets, who, with the exception of Hoffmann, were not practising musicians. [...] Their preference for so-called "absolute" music is highly
attractive because it forms a unified, linear progression away from eighteenth-century Aristotelian theories which traced all art, including music, to the imitation of nature.

Apart from having to consider Wallace's particular presentation of the respective positions of Einstein and Lang, it is far from clear what is the importance of the theories mentioned having been drawn "from...philosophers and poets who...were not practising musicians". But some, like Wackenroder, were in fact musicians. Wallace also ventures that these theories were taken "entirely" from people like Wackenroder, a statement which can be regarded as, at best, an opinion. It is also difficult to see what is meant by the "preference" cited forming "a unified, linear progression" retreating from eighteenth-century doctrine: the new approach might actually not have related to eighteenth-century doctrine in quite this manner at all.

Perhaps most importantly, Wallace's critical approach overrides the voice of the artist himself, this voice possibly being simply consciously in agreement with what the aestheticians say or proposing in an original and free fashion concepts which are consistent with the contemporary aesthetic climate. The following entries by Beethoven in his sketch books, concerning
his Sixth Symphony ("Pastoral"), may, for instance, be considered:

It is left to the listener to discover the situation. *Sinfonia caracteristica* or a reminiscence of country life. Every kind of painting loses by being carried too far in instrumental music. *Sinfonia pastorella*. Anyone who has the faintest idea of country life will not need many descriptive titles to be able to imagine for himself what the author intends. Even without a description one will be able to recognise it all, for it is (a record of) sentiments rather than a painting in sounds.

(1807)

Pastoral Symphony not a painting, but an expression of those sentiments evoked in men by the enjoyment of the country, a work in which some emotions of country life are described.

(1808)

(Hamburger tr. and ed.,1951; p.68)

These entries obviously may be analysed for the appreciation of the autonomy aesthetic which they display. Beethoven here wrestles with aesthetic problems. There is a recognition that instrumental music does not "paint", i.e. that programmes explicitly coming from without, from the world external to the music, are not to be found in the music solely as the result of the composer's intentions. Instead, Beethoven appeals to the listener's imagination. The work itself works in partnership with
the listener's intuition. The programme, though at hand, is (surprisingly) unessential to the apprehension of the work. What is needed, Beethoven seems to say, is common sense. The Sixth Symphony is autonomous music in spite of the programme, not representational music because of it.\textsuperscript{405} From the quoted remarks it appears that such was Beethoven's judgement.

Whether or not they fully address the aesthetic issues involved, these comments of Beethoven's show that he was, for all his admiration and awe of the gigantic proportions of Kant and Goethe, just as intellectually capable, still while primarily working as an artist alone, of appreciating and contributing to the formulation of an emergent line of aesthetic thought. Yet at the end of the pre-Hoffmann decade it is reported that Beethoven's First Symphony remains "indisputably the most agreeable and popular".\textsuperscript{406} The intervening symphonies, which in many cases (and certainly, in the case at least of the Fifth, in Hoffmann's perspective) explore almost a nether world, do not figure. The AMZ critic here does not alert the reader to a

\textsuperscript{405} For a general exploration of the meaning and historical setting of the Sixth Symphony, somewhat useful in the context of the present argument, see Kirby,1970.

\textsuperscript{406} AMZ, XII.757.
dilemma in Beethoven reception, an aesthetic crisis. The problem stated in Wallace, 1986 is produced but an approach to dealing with it is not recommended. One particular way forward, though, must consist in determining whether the alleged rejection of contemporary aesthetics by early writers on Beethoven is real or apparent and whether the autonomy aesthetic had reached even an unconscious level of currency among them as it had, at least, among the "philosophers".  

**Hoffmann on Mozart and Haydn**

In 1804 Hoffmann began to use "Amadeus" instead of "Wilhelm" as the third of his names and by late 1808 had fully adopted it. Complimentary as he was to Mozart, and to Haydn, this was not through having reviewed the instrumental music of either. In order to learn Hoffmann's views on their approach to instrumental music in a sympathetic context, it is necessary to

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407 For a detailed treatment of early Beethoven criticism see, for example, Sipe, 1992.


turn to his Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (1810):

Haydn and Mozart, the creators of modern instrumental music, first showed us the art in its full glory; [...] Haydn's compositions are dominated by a feeling of childlike optimism. His symphonies lead us through endless, green forest-glades, through a motley throng of happy people. Youths and girls sweep past dancing the round; laughing children behind trees, lying in wait behind rosebushes, teasingly throw flowers at each other. A world of love, of bliss, of eternal youth, as though before the Fall; no suffering, no pain; only sweet, melancholy longing for the beloved vision floating far off in the red glow of evening, neither approaching nor receding; and as long as it is there the night will not draw on, for the vision is the evening glow itself illuminating hill and glade.

Mozart leads us deep into the realm of spirits. Dread lies all about us, but withholds its torments and becomes more an intimation of infinity. We hear gentle voices of love and melancholy, the nocturnal spirit-world dissolves into a purple shimmer, and with inexpressible longing we follow the flying figures kindly beckoning to us from the clouds to join their eternal dance of the spheres (as, for example in Mozart's Symphony in E flat major, known as the "Swan Song").


The softer language with which Hoffmann here characterises the music of Mozart and Haydn may stand for the beautiful, as opposed to the sublime (Beethoven), though this is not said. There is a progression from Haydn to Mozart. The "sweet, melancholy longing" of Haydn's music is replaced in Mozart's by "inexpressible yearning". This brings Mozart's music somewhat closer to
Beethoven's in (Romantic) import, even though Hoffmann is at pains to recognise the Viennese classical trinity as a unified progression.\textsuperscript{410} Mozart and Haydn aspire to "romanticism", Haydn less so, being "more congenial to the majority" (p.238). What Mozart and Haydn can impart to Beethoven is their "rational awareness" (pp.238-9). This supplies the essential structural cognition without which Beethoven's musical works would be judged "merely as products of a genius who ignores form and discrimination of thought and surrenders to his creative fervour and the passing dictates of his imagination" (p.238).

Hoffmann on Beethoven: the Review of the Fifth Symphony\textsuperscript{411}

Charlton ed.,1989 notes (p.235) that Hoffmann's Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony "retains a primary place" in his Beethoven criticism.\textsuperscript{412} More than any of his subsequent published

\textsuperscript{410} See especially ib., pp.238-9. See also Hoffmann's mention (p.87) of Mozart and Beethoven piano sonatas as being "music of which no tea-connoisseur or whist-specialist can make head or tail". The exclusion of Haydn's keyboard music was probably deliberate, since Hoffmann was very thorough in whatever he wished to say in his writings.

\textsuperscript{411} For general discussion of contemporary Beethoven reviews which are not by Hoffmann, see Schnaus,1977, pp.14-39; on one notable critic, Kanne, see Ullrich,1974.

\textsuperscript{412} For a highly critical view of the Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, which also discusses the contemporary political environment, see Rumph,1995.
criticism of Beethoven's instrumental music, Hoffmann's account here is no less than passionate. It is, even more crucially, intellectually equal to Beethoven's achievement in a manner that its predecessors were not. Charlton ed., 1989 explains (p.235) that "on close inspection Hoffmann's review betrays more differences than similarities with its predecessors, because its postulates, which infuse every detail of the writing, had not been previously set forth as necessary axioms. These postulates were large: that purely instrumental music possessed a supreme status; that one single piece of new music could bear the weight of the claim that instrumental music might supplant painting, drama, even poetry as the purely Romantic art."

Hoffmann is from the outset of the Review in no doubt as to the importance of his topic. He opens with an intense justification of his critical method and an impassioned defence of the new formulation\footnote{This in the light of the intellectual background offered in the present work.} of the nature of instrumental music:

The reviewer has before him one of the most important works by the master whose pre-eminence as an instrumental composer it is doubtful that anybody would now dispute; he is utterly permeated by the subject of the present review,
and nobody may take it amiss if he exceeds the limit of conventional appraisals and strives to put into words all the profound sensations that this composition has given rise to within him.

When music is spoken of as an independent art the term can properly apply only to instrumental music, which scorns all aid, all admixture of other arts, and gives pure expression to its own peculiar artistic nature. It is the most romantic of all arts - one might almost say the only one that is *purely* romantic. [...] Music reveals to man an unknown realm, a world quite separate from the outer sensual world surrounding him, a world in which he leaves behind all feelings circumscribed by intellect in order to embrace the inexpressible. How dimly was the peculiar nature of music perceived by those instrumental composers who tried to represent such circumscribed sensations or even events, and thus to treat sculpturally the art most utterly opposed to sculpture!

(p.236)

Hoffmann in these words sees himself as effecting a conversion of heart in respect of his times. It is in likewise clear, definite language that he continues the Review. Hoffmann in fact writes seven paragraphs in this vein before mentioning a single note of music. Of special significance are his final words before he embarks on the critical analysis proper of the symphony:

> Beethoven bears the romanticism of music, which he expresses with such originality and authority in his works, in the depths of his spirit. The reviewer has never felt this more acutely than in the present symphony. It unfolds Beethoven's romanticism, rising in a climax right to the end, more than any other of his works, and irresistibly sweeps the listener into the
wonderful spirit-realm of the infinite.

(p.239)

Hoffmann is critical: "never...more acutely...than in the present symphony", "more than any other of his works". Since Hoffmann has stressed (pp.238-9) the importance of "rational awareness", it might not be out of place to suggest that "originality" is equivalent to "genius", and "authority" to "technique". Looking at it in this way, it may be easier to recognise that originality will not do by itself. It needs language to complete it.

Hoffmann subjects the Fifth Symphony to an exhaustive analysis. Not only was he prepared to hail it as (at least) a visionary work but in doing this he committed himself to a full description of what occurs in the music, even at the risk of sounding routine or mundane. Almost immediately Hoffmann identifies (p.239) the perceptual difficulty of the opening of the first movement (Allegro con brio) and, having done so, weighs in with an opinion: "Not even the key is yet certain; the listener assumes E flat major." For Hoffmann, bars 1-21

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414 In the present work, a complete treatment of the Review is not offered. Instead there is a concentration on some details contained in it.
"determine the character of the whole piece", the dominant close "giving the listener presentiments of unknown mysteries" (p.239).

Still in the exposition, Hoffmann is comfortable enough to continue hitting home (p.241) the Romantic agenda, or rather the classical/Romantic opposition: "The first violins now take up a second theme, which is melodious but preserves the mood of anxious, restless yearning expressed by the movement as a whole."

Here, an eighteenth-century preoccupation (melody) is contrasted with a nineteenth-century one (yearning).

The development causes Hoffmann more trouble, from the point of view of interpretative difficulty. He particularly notes (p.242) the strangely spelled wind chord in bar 215. Hoffmann doesn't wrestle unduly with this problem. Neither does he attribute any mystical significance to it. Therefore, the Review, for all its enthusiasm, is still kept along the lines of common sense. Hoffmann is exactingly accurate, though. For example, he says (p.243) that the "full orchestra now bursts out with a theme

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415 It becomes clearer as the Review progresses that Hoffmann understands "the whole piece" to mean not just the first movement. See, for example, p.245: "all these [the chromatic modulations] again express the character of the whole work and make this Andante a part of it."
in G major almost identical to that heard forty-one bars previously”. In this Hoffmann makes the effort to refer the reader to different parts of the score in order to illustrate thematic interconnections. Hoffmann justifies (p.244) this effort in the closing words on the first movement: "the episodes and constant allusions to the main theme demonstrate how the whole movement with all its distinctive features was not merely conceived in the imagination but also clearly thought through.”

It is because he wishes to show the balance between genius and its medium, technique (or language), that Hoffmann goes to some lengths in his analysis and readily retreats when it is a case of something not rationally explicable (as with the continued use of the chord spelling in bar 215).

Hoffmann says less on the second movement (Andante con moto). At the beginning of his remarks, he almost seems to present it (p.244) simply as a consequent of the first movement: "Like the voice of a propitious spirit that fills our breast with comfort and hope, we now hear the lovely (and yet substantial) theme of the Andante." The theme must have an immanent content as well as a (melodically) beautiful form (so that it avoids
superficiality). Hoffmann proceeds to show his erudition, in
noting (p.244) Haydn symphony movements as precedents for what
he sees as what Beethoven is trying to achieve here. Hoffmann is
less enthusiastic about this movement than he is about the first.
Nevertheless he gives it his full attention and clearly regards
it too as definitely above the ordinary.

Hoffmann notes (p.247) in respect of the trio of the third
movement a feature of the scoring (bars 217ff.) "which may strike
many people as amusing, but in the reviewer it produced an uneasy
feeling". Hoffmann seems now to pass judgement on the calibre of
audiences (and even musicians). He also takes delight in
describing (p.247) the suspenseful transition to the tutti which
opens the final movement (Allegro). The start of the description
is in accordance with the aesthetic premises he bases his work
on (or, according to Charlton ed., 1989, p.235, is in the process
of constructing): "The restless yearning inherent in the theme
now reaches a level of unease that so constricts the breast that
only odd fragmented sounds escape it." Also, Hoffmann again, at
the end of the description, finds opportunity to note (p.247)
that the dissonant kettledrum C (bar 324, third movement,
maintained to bar 2 of the final movement) "is explained by the character he was striving to give the whole work".

As ever, Hoffmann offers a graphic account of the final movement and remarks throughout on the interrelatedness of the musical material of much of, if not the entire symphony.\footnote{An analysis of what Hoffmann writes concerning the final movement is not necessary here. The detail is too great. It is sufficient to note the methodical emphasis on thematic interrelatedness as a key to Hoffmann's understanding of Beethoven's work.} The general comments with which Hoffmann concludes (pp.250-1) his Review. Critical to Hoffmann's conclusion is the emphasis on "unity", so omnipresent in the work of Mozart and Haydn (p.250). Beethoven has command of genius and language: "The reviewer believes he can summarise his judgement of this composer's splendid work in a few words, by saying that it is conceived of genius and executed with profound awareness, and that it expresses the romanticism of music to a very high degree" (p.251). Hoffmann does not stop there but adds importantly "only an extremely reliable, well-trained orchestra animated by a single spirit can attempt this symphony; the least lapse in any detail would irredeemably spoil the whole work."
This Review is a plea to musical society and society at large against what Hoffmann noted (pp.80-1) later in 1810 was the case with pure music's contemporary status: "For they have also made provision for this; as well as tea, punch, wine, ices, etc., music is always served up too. This is consumed by refined society with the same relish as the other offerings."
CONCLUSION
The eighteenth century prepares and brings about the Romantic free reception of instrumental music as "sensual force" (Wackenroder, 1799; p. 192). True, previous centuries had made significant contributions to the development of a personal aesthetic of independent instrumental music, but it was principally after the growing emergence of Enlightenment philosophy that strategies for what was a new description of music's nature were "codified" and brought together. Therefore, in order to provide an account of autonomistic musical aesthetics, two tasks are requisite. Firstly, we must establish why the eighteenth century constitutes a critical age of change in the arts, especially with reference to aesthetic thought. Secondly, we must ask of generations prior to the eighteenth century to what extent the autonomy aesthetic was unthinkable for them, in their philosophical and chronological reflections on art.

The present work does not seek to execute these tasks in full. The first of them is (in the musical sphere) well attempted by Hosler, 1981. The second is perhaps partly covered by Neubauer, 1986. What the present work does is to anthologise the
autonomy aesthetic, at the musical (and sometimes the general) level, in the hope of arriving at a state of knowledge from which may be drawn useful generalisations about music's historical and philosophical contexts. The progression is thus (1) detailed consideration of primary sources, (2) historical generalisation, and philosophy, (3) theory and cultural practice. Future research, however, should be alive to this three-tiered approach which should in its most detailed workings explain the aesthetics of combinational as well as instrumental music (for example showing, historically and philosophically, each in terms of the other).

The research undertaken for this study has drawn on literature rather than music itself. We are reminded by Dahlhaus of the centrality to the whole economy of musical (and general) Romanticism of literature about music. Whether or not written by a professional musician or connoisseur, contemporary music criticism contributes, often even mysteriously, much to our

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417 Hosler, 1981 does this too, of course, but her work is more clearly historically framed. Only the first two stages have been used in the present work. The third stage would involve some additional value judgements.

418 See Ch. 1.
understanding of musical aesthetics and of music itself. But in case this was not enough, there is what I have called "internal evidence". This means, in my usage, that the music itself is considered as aesthetic evidence of its own (or contemporaneous music's) aesthetic standing. By cross-comparison just of individual pieces of music we can get an idea of where (within given genres) composers' aesthetic priorities lay. Thus it will be remarked, for example, that Mozart and Haydn were putting special effort and thought into their purely instrumental compositions. This perception becomes a feature of autonomistic musical aesthetics. It must, however, be stressed that research in this area currently subsists mainly at the theoretical level. There should, therefore, be a partnership between musicologists and aestheticians in order to consider afresh the viability of the principle of internal evidence (as suggested in this thesis) and whether more explicit use of it can be made in the study of the history of musical aesthetics.

Finally, let us revisit Wackenroder:

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420 See, for example, Ratner,1980 and Bonds,1991.

421 For a contrary approach see, for example, Leppert and McClary eds.,1987.
Art represents for us the highest human perfection. Nature, to the extent that a mortal eye sees it, resembles fragmentary oracular decrees from the mouth of the deity. However, if it is permissible to speak thusly of such things, then one would perhaps like to say that God may, indeed, look upon all of Nature or the entire world in a manner similar to the manner in which we look upon a work of art.

(Wackenroder, 1797; p.120)

What good does it do, however, when I lie sick in the midst of these dreadful doubts about art and about myself, - and some magnificent music springs up, - ha! then all these thoughts take flight in tumult; then the lustful tugging of desire begins its old game again, then it calls and calls irresistibly back and the entire childish bliss opens up anew before my eyes. I become frightened when I consider to what foolish thoughts the wanton musical strains can catapult me, with their alluring sirens' voices and with their wild roaring and trumpet blaring.

(Wackenroder, 1799; p.196)

These two quotations seem to have a connection. Art is godly, doubts concerning it "dreadful". The ultimate question which anybody reading Wackenroder will imagine is, what has brought literature to this pass? In this case (at least) a significant part of the answer is: music. We see, particularly in the "specialist" essay "The Characteristic Inner Nature Of The Musical Art and the Psychology of Today's Instrumental Music", how respectfully and ardently Wackenroder treats the concept of
In this essay language is (as far as music is concerned) definitively subordinated; Wackenroder's reverential awe of music poses for him the problem or unacceptable paradox of attempting to express in words how wonderful music is. Thoughts (which are bound by language) are applied by man to art. But, for the brave, these thoughts are replaced by secrets which are carried from art to man (Wackenroder, 1799; p.190). And musical sounds fracture verbal language:

Whenever all the inner vibrations of our heartstrings - the trembling ones of joy, the tempestuous ones of delight, the rapidly beating pulse of all-consuming adoration, - when all these burst apart with one outcry the language of words, as the grave of the inner frenzy of heart: - then they go forth under a strange sky, amidst the vibrations of blessed harpstrings, in transfigured beauty as if in another life beyond this one, and celebrate as angelic figures their resurrection. -

(pp.190-1)

This is the theme of cosmic vision, picked up in German Romanticism from Hoffmann to Schumann. Wackenroder goes on, in powerful fashion, to portray language as the enemy of what we might term "musical feeling". The essay (too rich for a detailed

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exploration here beyond what has been said in Ch.3) concludes by associating the verbal with merely earthly happiness, the non-verbal with "all-loving heaven" (p.194). Although Wackenroder earlier does praise and acknowledge the necessity of the faculty of language, he does so qualifiedly: "Only the invisible force which hovers over us is not drawn down into our hearts by words" (Wackenroder, 1797; p.118).

It is in literature as well as music that we must look for the waxing and waning of musical aesthetics. As already noted, it is bringing the two closer that is difficult. There is a sense in which we must both widen and better integrate the sources we consider ourselves to depend on when we investigate the autonomy aesthetic as applied to music. It has been clearly demonstrated in the present work how the researches of art theorists, philosophers, literary critics, and other groups we might care to mention, has had some effect on or implications for musical aesthetics. Join with this the work of music analysts, historians of music analysis, and hosts of other music specialisms, and there can be an ever more fruitful ground of enquiry as to the capabilities of the musical art. Autonomistic musical aesthetics
will then be better situated historically. This is needed for reflection of any kind on the nature of music.
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